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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
It is uncontested that forests are imperative for environmental conservation and economic 
development. Benefits from forests are immense and multidimensional: Forests can 
support local livelihoods, assist poverty alleviation, and provide environmental services for 
local communities and greater society. Over the past 50 years, about half of the world's 
original forest cover has been lost. Vietnam is among the countries where forest 
degradation is a serious issue. Several measures have been implemented to alleviate forest 
degradation, including forest land allocation and forest plantation programs. The current 
and growing international interest of civil society and governments in the 
acknowledgement of forest environmental services has become mainstream: Vietnam is 
among several countries who appreciate the need for payment or compensation to local 
communities for forest values through the payment for environmental services (PES) 
mechanism. Since 2010, Vietnam has officially introduced a payments for forest 
environmental services (PFES) scheme to pursue conservation and development goals. 
However, there is still a lack of knowledge for farmers' preferences for policy design and 
implementation. In spite of a number of studies examining the impacts of forest policies in 
northern Vietnam, there is limited research on incentive and forest management at the 
household level. Such an analysis would provide insightful information and entail 
implications for PES policy, especially in terms of effective participation and cost 
efficiency. This dissertation attempts to fill this research gap by examining farmers' 
behavior on forest management and their experiences with forest policies that are necessary 
for determining effective incentives that can bring about changes in behavior related to 
forest conservation practice in a mountainous area. The research is based on two survey 
rounds of 300 representative households in Da Bac district, located in the upstream area of 
the Hoa Binh reservoir in the northwestern region of Vietnam.  
The dissertation is composed of three main parts. The first part examines why farmers 
have adopted forest plantation and how they have managed their forests under the current 
incentive scheme taking several aspects of forest plantation into account. Gross margin 
analysis indicates that growing trees is not profitable and is unable to compete with 
growing cash crops. Government policies, namely, forest land allocation and forest 
plantation programs, are the main reasons why the majority of households still plant forest,
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even though it is less profitable. From a benefit viewpoint, planting forest is another way to 
generate income whereby farmers can reap benefits regularly from non-timber forest 
products. Heckman sample selection estimation examines both determinants of the 
decision to plant forests and the intensity of planting forests. Seedling support positively 
determines the intensity of planting forest, whereas cash support does not. However, the 
magnitude of the impact from seedling support is relatively low and does not appear to 
stimulate farmers to plant more trees. Therefore, there is limited evidence of impacts of 
government support on the sustainability of forest plantation. The findings also highlight 
another issue of forest plantation programs: Despite the fact that some transaction costs of 
participation are fixed, given that the benefit is paid on an area basis only, wealthier 
households receive more support because they own more land. This underlines the strong 
linkage between land allocation and forest conservation policies, especially in mountainous 
areas which suffer from land scarcity. Lack of formal land security is not found to hinder 
investments in forests, which contradicts expectations and the literature. However, this 
unexpected finding may be explained by the behavior of households who do not hold 
formal land security. Such households may expect that their participation will later 
facilitate the recognition of plot ownership by the local government. Due to the conditions 
in mountainous areas where forest plots are located outside of the village, the results 
indicate that the degree of trust among villagers that the planted forests are secured is an 
important factor promoting forest plantation. 
The second part then explores whether new incentives could encourage farmers to 
participate in a stricter forest conservation program. It sheds light on the cost efficiency 
and preferences of local farmers on forest conservation programs. The hypothetical 
baseline assumes that every household is allocated a plot of land of the same size and 
conditions. This assumption is made to avoid bias from land holding inequality and to 
explore the potential demand of forest conservation. The use of the stated preference 
method allows the examination of farmers’ preferences beyond their current practice. A 
choice experiment estimates the willingness to accept (WTA) planting and conserving 
forest and investigate different attributes of forest plantation contracts. Results show that 
pecuniary aspects of forests are the most important factors of the contract, but that farmers 
also consider other aspects when deciding to participate in a program. Results from the 
WTA estimation show that on average, farmers are willing to pay to participate in a 
contract in which they can exploit half of the timber with minimum care and weak 
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regulations. On the other hand, stricter forest conservation contracts demand a subsidy that 
is greater than that offered in previous afforestation programs and in the pilot PFES policy. 
However, the result from the comparative analysis reveals that the WTA is far lower than 
forgone income from cash crops cultivation. This indicates that encouraging farmers to 
plant and conserve forest is not as costly as the opportunity cost of land. Even though local 
farmers tend to associate forests with monetary benefits, the results indicate that given the 
well-functioning land allocation policy, there is room for stricter forest conservation 
programs as long as farmers are adequately compensated. 
The final part of the dissertation focuses on transaction costs (TCs) incurred by 
households who participated in previous forest plantation programs. Measuring actual TCs 
is necessary to examine whether TCs could be a constraint to participation in programs. 
Results indicate that TCs incurred by households are not likely to be a constraint for 
participating in future PES programs if farmer involvement and monitoring mechanisms 
remain the same. Despite the low absolute level of TCs, they are equivalent to more than 
one-third of program benefits, which is quite high compared to other agricultural or 
conservation programs in developed countries where the nature of the programs are more 
complex. Policy design that increases the benefit to balance TCs will improve efficiency. 
The regression analysis on determinants of TCs reveals that the household head's 
education, gender, and perception towards afforestation programs have large and 
significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. Social capital is insignificant for explaining 
participation in the afforestation programs which were implemented in a top-down fashion 
with little community involvement. Therefore, strengthening social capital may not be 
effective in influencing the level of TCs if the program is based on a top-down approach 
which involves less collaboration from participants regarding program implementation and 
no significant conflict among participants and authorities. 
As previous afforestation programs are based on a top-down approach, this 
dissertation contributes to the limited research on the potential demand for and farmers' 
preferences in forest management. The analysis provides policy implications for a PES 
scheme where voluntary participation and cost efficiency are crucial for its success. This 
dissertation also contributes to a small but growing body of literature on choice experiment 
application to the field of forest conservation schemes in developing countries. In addition, 
the analysis of TCs borne by households under the forest management scheme can 
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contribute to the limited number of studies that have empirically analyzed private TCs, 
particularly in developing countries. 
The results of our research underline the inadequacy of previous forest plantation 
support and recommend that when land is limited, higher financial incentives are needed to 
make forest conservation attractive in a PES scheme. Depending on the contract, there 
exists a potential demand for forest conservation with a small subsidy or even without a 
subsidy if extra land is allocated. This suggests that policymakers should integrate land 
allocation into PES policies to obtain better cost efficiency. As the results indicate that 
households have different degrees of willingness to participate in forest conservation 
programs, we recommend that policies target PES campaigns to households who have less 
interest in forest conservation, such as households with livelihoods that depend mainly on 
agricultural production, who have not previously joined the forest programs either due to 
their ineligibility or distrust in local government authorities, and who have limited market 
access due to poor road conditions. In addition, given that the security of forests influences 
the decision to plant forest, strengthening monitoring mechanism or introducing insurance 
to reduce the risk of plantation failure is recommended as another option to promote 
participation.  
This dissertation reveals that the amount of incentives that farmers are willing to 
accept to plant and conserve forest instead of engaging in farming activities is higher than 
previous subsidies. In mountainous areas where ethnic minorities still live in poverty, a 
higher subsidy is expected to achieve both environmental conservation and poverty 
alleviation outcomes. Nevertheless, a critical question arises as to whether a higher subsidy 
can lead to sustainable household forest management. This question should be addressed 
by future research by examining longitudinal data on household livelihood and forest 
management under a PES scheme. It has not been possible to empirically measure TCs of 
farmers engaged in community-based forest management where such information would 
provide interesting results on this matter. The implications on this study could be 
developed further by expanding the survey and gathering data from participants of 
community-based forest management. Further research on the comparison of TCs 
associated with community and individual management is recommended to provide 
information to policymakers and researchers.  
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ZUSSAMENFASSUNG 
 
Es ist unbestritten, dass Wald unverzichtbar sowohl für den Umweltschutz als auch für die 
wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ist. Der Nutzen von Wald ist enorm: Wälder sind 
Lebensgrundlage für die lokale Bevölkerung, unterstützen Armutsminderung und bieten 
Umweltdienstleistungen für Gemeinden vor Ort und die weitere Gesellschaft. In den 
letzten 50 Jahren hat sich die Waldfläche global um ungefähr die Hälfte verringert. 
Vietnam gehört zu den Ländern, in denen Entwaldung ein schwerwiegendes Problem 
darstellt. Eine Reihe von Maßnahmen wurde eingeführt um Entwaldung abzumildern, 
darunter die Zuteilung von Waldflächen sowie Aufforstungsprogramme. Das gegenwärtige 
und wachsende internationale Interesse von Zivilgesellschaft und Regierung an der 
Würdigung von Waldumweltdienstleistungen ist zum Mainstream geworden: Vietnam ist 
ein Land unter vielen, das die Notwendigkeit einer Bezahlung oder Entschädigung für 
Wälder im Rahmen des PES-Mechanismus (Bezahlung für Umweltdienstleistungen) für 
Gemeinden anerkennt. 2010 hat Vietnam offiziell ein PFES-Programm (Bezahlung für 
Waldumweltdienstleistungen) eingeführt, um Walderhaltungs- und Entwicklungsziele zu 
verfolgen. Die Präferenzen von Landwirten für Politikgestaltung und 
Programmimplementierung sind jedoch noch nicht bekannt. Trotz mehrerer Studien, die 
die Auswirkungen von Waldprogrammen im Norden Vietnams untersuchen, gibt es nur 
wenig Forschung zu Anreizen und Waldbewirtschaftung auf Haushaltsebene. Eine solche 
Analyse würde aufschlussreiche Informationen und Schlussfolgerungen für das PES-
Programm liefern, insbesondere hinsichtlich wirksamer Beteiligung und Kosteneffizienz. 
Die vorliegende Dissertation versucht diese Forschungslücke zu schließen, indem sie das 
Verhalten der Landwirte bei der Waldbewirtschaftung und ihre Erfahrungen mit 
Forstprogrammen untersucht. Das ist notwendig um wirksame Anreize festzulegen, die 
Verhaltensänderungen hinsichtlich Walderhaltungspraktiken in Bergregionen herbeiführen 
können. Basis dieser Studie sind zwei Haushaltsumfragen mit 300 repräsentativen 
Haushalten im Da Bac-Bezirk, oberhalb des Hoa Binh-Stausees im Nordwesten Vietnams. 
Die Dissertation besteht aus drei Teilen. Der erste Teil untersucht, warum Landwirte 
aufforsten und wie sie ihre Wälder im Rahmen des gegenwärtigen Anreizschemas 
bewirtschaften, hierbei werden mehrere Aspekte der Aufforstung berücksichtigt. Die 
Bruttogewinnmarge sagt aus, dass Aufforstung nicht profitabel ist, und es ist nicht möglich 
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mit dem Anbau von Marktfrüchten zu konkurrieren. Regierungsprogramme, und zwar die 
Zuteilung von Waldfläche und Aufforstungsprogramme sind die Hauptgründe, warum die 
Mehrheit der Haushalte immer noch aufforstet, obwohl es weniger rentabel ist. Betrachtet 
man den finanziellen Nutzen, ist das Aufforsten eine alternative Einkommensquelle, 
Landwirte ziehen einen regelmäßigen Nutzen aus Nichtholzprodukten. Die 
Stichprobenauswahlanalyse nach Heckmann untersucht sowohl die Determinanten für die 
Entscheidung zur Aufforstung als auch zur Intensität der Aufforstung. 
Saatgutunterstützung beeinflusst die Intensität der Aufforstung positiv, wohingegen reine 
finanzielle Unterstützung keinen Einfluss hat. Das Ausmaß der Auswirkung der 
Saatgutunterstützung ist relativ niedrig und scheint die Landwirte nicht dazu zu bringen, 
mehr Bäume zu pflanzen. Deswegen gibt es nur wenig Anhaltspunkte zu den 
Auswirkungen von Regierungsprogrammen auf die Nachhaltigkeit der Aufforstung. Die 
Ergebnisse verdeutlichen auch einen weiteren Aspekt der Aufforstungsprogramme: 
Ungeachtet der Tatsache, dass Transaktionskosten fest sind, werden die Gelder auf Basis 
der Fläche ausgezahlt; somit erhalten reichere Haushalte, die mehr Land besitzen, mehr 
Geld. Das unterstreicht den starken Zusammenhang zwischen Zuteilung von Landfläche 
und Walderhaltungspolitik; insbesondere in Bergregionen, die unter Landknappheit leiden. 
Mangelnde Landrechte halten die Landwirte nicht davon ab in Wälder zu investieren, dies 
widerspricht Erwartungen und Literatur. Dieses unerwartete Ergebnis kann jedoch mit dem 
Verhalten der Haushalte, die keine offiziellen Landrechte haben, erklärt werden. Diese 
Haushalte können erwarten, dass ihre Beteiligung an der Aufforstung später die 
Übertragung eines Grundstücks durch die Kommunalverwaltung erleichtert. Aufgrund der 
Bedingungen in Bergregionen wo sich Waldflächen außerhalb der Dörfer befinden, lassen 
die Ergebnisse erkennen, dass das Vertrauen unter Dorfbewohnern, dass die bepflanzten 
Flächen geschützt sind, ein wichtiger Faktor für die Aufforstungsförderung ist.  
Der zweite Teil der Dissertation untersucht, ob neue Anreize die Landwirte ermutigen 
können, an einem strikteren Walderhaltungsprogramm teilzunehmen. Er gibt Aufschluss 
über Kosteneffizienz und Präferenzen der ansässigen Landwirte für 
Walderhaltungsprogramme. Das hypothetische Referenzszenario nimmt an, dass jedem 
Haushalt eine Fläche mit derselben Größe und den denselben Bedingungen zugeteilt wird. 
Diese Annahme wurde gemacht, um eine Verzerrung hinsichtlich Ungleichheit beim Besitz 
von Landfläche zu vermeiden und um die potenzielle Nachfrage nach Walderhaltung zu 
untersuchen. Die Methode „Stated Preferences” erlaubt die Untersuchung der Präferenzen 
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der Landwirte über ihre gegenwärtige Praktiken hinaus. Ein Choice-Experiment schätzt die 
Bereitschaft der Landwirte, Wald aufzuforsten und zu erhalten (Willingness to accept: 
WTA) und überprüft verschiedene Eigenschaften von Aufforstungsverträgen. Ergebnisse 
zeigen, dass finanzielle Aspekte die wichtigsten Faktoren des Vertrages sind, dass 
Landwirte aber auch andere Aspekte berücksichtigen, wenn sie sich dafür entscheiden an 
einem Programm teilzunehmen. WTA-Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Landwirte durchschnittlich 
bereit sind, einen Vertrag zu akzeptieren, in dem sie die Hälfte des Holzes abbauen 
können, bei minimaler Pflege und schwacher Regulierung. Andererseits verlangen striktere 
Walderhaltungsverträge eine Subvention, die höher ist als in bisherigen 
Aufforstungsprogrammen und im PFES-Pilotprogramm. Wie die Ergebnisse der 
komparativen Analyse jedoch zeigen, ist die geforderte Subvention deutlich niedriger als 
der Einkommensausfall aus dem Marktfrüchteanbau. Das zeigt, dass die Unterstützung von 
Landwirten bei der Bepflanzung und Erhaltung des Waldes nicht so teuer wie die 
Opportunitätskosten sein muss. Obwohl die ansässigen Landwirte Wald eher mit 
monetärem Nutzen in Verbindung bringen, zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass aufgrund der gut 
funktionieren Landzuteilungspolitik und solange Landwirte angemessen entschädigt 
werden, striktere Walderhaltungsprogramme möglich sind. 
Der letzte Teil der Dissertation fokussiert Transaktionskosten (TK) von Haushalten, 
die bei früheren Aufforstungsprogrammen teilnahmen. Um zu untersuchen, ob TK eine 
Einschränkung für die Teilnahme in Programmen sein können, ist es notwendig 
Transaktionskosten zu bestimmen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Transaktionskosten, die in 
Haushalten anfallen, keine Einschränkung für die Teilnahme an zukünftigen PES-
Programmen darstellen dürften, falls die Einbeziehung der Landwirte und 
Überwachungsmechanismen dieselben bleiben. Trotz der absolut niedrigen TK stellen sie 
mehr als ein Drittel der gesamten Programmunterstützung dar, was im Vergleich zu 
anderen komplexen Landwirtschafts- oder Erhaltungsprogrammen in Entwicklungsländern 
relativ hoch ist. Die Konzeptionierung von Maßnahmen, die die Subvention erhöht und den 
Anteil der TK reduziert, wird die Effizienz des Programms verbessern. Die 
Regressionsanalyse zu Determinanten der TK ergab, dass Bildungsstand und Geschlecht 
des Haushaltsvorstandes und die Wahrnehmung von Aufforstungsprogrammen eine große 
und signifikante Wirkung auf die Höhe der TK haben. Sozialkapital kann die Beteiligung 
an Aufforstungsprogrammen, die nach dem Top-down-Prinzip mit wenig Mitwirkung der 
Gemeinden eingeführt wurden, nicht beeinflussen. Deshalb dürfte, wenn das Programm auf 
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einem Top-down-Ansatz beruht, der wenig Mitarbeit von Teilnehmern hinsichtlich 
Programmimplementierung und keinen bedeutenden Konflikt zwischen Teilnehmern und 
Verantwortlichen umfasst, eine Stärkung des Sozialkapitals die Höhe der TK nicht effektiv 
beeinflussen. 
Da frühere Aufforstungsprogramme auf einem Top-down-Ansatz basieren, leistet 
diese Dissertation einen Beitrag zur begrenzten Forschung zu potenzieller Nachfrage nach 
Waldbewirtschaftung und Präferenzen der Landwirte bei. Die Analyse liefert politische 
Implikationen für PES-Vorhaben, in denen Freiwilligkeit und Kosteneffizienz 
entscheidend für deren Erfolg sind. Diese Dissertation trägt ebenfalls zur kleinen aber 
wachsenden Literatur über die Anwendung von Choice-Experimenten im Rahmen von 
Walderhaltungsprogrammen in Entwicklungsländern bei. Darüber hinaus kann die Analyse 
der TK, die bei Haushalten im Rahmen von Waldbewirtschaftungsprogrammen besonders 
in Entwicklungsländern anfallen, zur begrenzten Anzahl an Studien, die private TK 
empirisch analysiert haben, beitragen. 
Die Ergebnisse der vorliegenden Forschung betonen die Unzulänglichkeiten früherer 
Aufforstungsprogramme und empfehlen im Falle von begrenzter Fläche höhere finanzielle 
Anreize, um Walderhaltung in einem PES-Programm attraktiv zu machen. Abhängig vom 
Vertrag gibt es eine potenzielle Nachfrage nach Walderhaltung mit einer niedrigen 
Förderung oder sogar ohne Zuschuss wenn zusätzliches Land zugeteilt wird. Dies deutet 
darauf hin, dass politische Entscheidungsträger Landzuteilung in PES-Programme 
integrieren sollten, um eine höhere Kosteneffizienz zu erreichen. Da die Ergebnisse 
aussagen, dass Haushalte ein unterschiedliches Ausmaß an Bereitschaft zur Teilnahme in 
Walderhaltungsprogrammen haben, wird empfohlen, dass PES-Kampagnen sich auf 
Haushalte mit weniger Interesse an Walderhaltung richten, wie Haushalte, deren 
Lebensgrundlage hauptsächlich auf landwirtschaftlicher Produktion beruht, Haushalte, die 
bisher nicht für die Teilnahme Waldprogrammen berechtigt waren oder aufgrund von 
Misstrauen gegenüber den örtlichen Behörden nicht teilgenommen haben und Haushalte, 
die begrenzten Marktzugang aufgrund mangelhaften Straßen haben. Da der Schutz des 
Waldes die Entscheidung zur Aufforstung beeinflusst, wird als eine zusätzliche 
Möglichkeit zur Förderung der Teilnahme empfohlen, Überwachungsmechanismen zu 
stärken oder Versicherungen zur Reduzierung von Aufforstungsrisiken einzuführen.  
Diese Dissertation zeigt auf, dass die Höhe der Anreize, bei der Landwirte bereit sind, 
aufzuforsten und den Wald zu erhalten, anstatt andere landwirtschaftliche Aktivitäten 
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auszuüben, höher sind als frühere Subventionen. In Bergregionen, wo ethnische 
Minderheiten noch in Armut leben, wird eine höhere Förderung erwartet, um sowohl 
Umweltschutz als auch Armutsminderung zu erreichen. Nichtsdestotrotz stellt sich die 
Frage, ob eine höhere Förderung zu einer nachhaltigen Waldbewirtschaftung auf 
Haushaltsebene führt. Diese Frage sollte im Rahmen zukünftiger Forschung geklärt 
werden, mithilfe der Untersuchung von Längsschnittdaten auf die Lebensgrundlage und die 
Waldbewirtschaftung im Rahmen eines PES-Programms. Es war nicht möglich, TK von 
Landwirten, die in ihrer Gemeinde an einer gemeinsamen Waldbewirtschaftung beteiligt 
sind, wo solche Informationen interessante Ergebnisse liefern würden, empirisch zu 
messen. Die Implikationen dieser Studie könnten weiter entwickelt werden, wenn Umfrage 
und Datenerhebung von Teilnehmern der von lokalen Gemeinschaften getragenen 
Waldbewirtschaftung ausgeweitet werden. Weitere Forschung zum Vergleich von TK, wie 
sie bei Gemeinde- und individueller Bewirtschaftung anfallen, wird empfohlen, um 
politischen Entscheidungsträgern und Forschern Informationen zur Verfügung zu stellen.  
 
Translated by Christine Bosch 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is uncontested that forests are imperative for environmental conservation and economic 
development. Benefits from forests are immense and multidimensional: Forests can 
support local livelihoods, assist poverty alleviation, and provide environmental services for 
local communities and greater society. However, over the past 50 years, about half the 
world's original forest cover has been lost at a rate of about 12-15 million hectares annually 
(WWF, 2014). The best method of managing forest resources to achieve development and 
environmental goals is a very important issue for policymakers, especially in developing 
countries with constrained resources. Historically, the public sector has dominated forest 
management in most countries in Asia, but over the past two decades this pattern has 
changed towards the greater involvement of local communities (Enters and Durst, 2004). 
Vietnam is not an exception. The management of the forestry sector in Vietnam has been 
decentralized since Doi Moi (renovation) policies in 1988. Through these polices, Vietnam 
has achieved dramatic poverty alleviation and economic development through the 
conversion of a centrally planned economy to a market based economy.  
Challenges remain for reducing poverty in the upland areas where poverty alleviation 
and forest management cannot be treated as separate issues since a high incidence of 
poverty overlaps with the remaining natural forest cover. In Vietnam, mountainous areas 
cover more than two-thirds of the country. As of 2012, the population of the Northern 
Uplands is 11.4 million people, representing about 13% of the country's inhabitants 
(General Statistics Office of Vietnam, 2014a). The population has been increasing mildly 
at a rate of about 0.12% per year from 2000 to 2012. In the mountainous area, ethnic 
minorities, who are the poorest and most marginalized members of Vietnamese society 
(World Bank, 2009), live in unfavorable conditions. The Northern Uplands are one of these 
areas, where poverty rates are far above the national average (ADB et al., 2003). 
Mountains were extensively covered by forests until the mid-twentieth century when forest 
cover declined rapidly due to intensified logging to supply timber, generate money to fund 
the war, and accommodate lowland settlers (Poffenberger and Nguyen, 1998).
Many poor farmers in this mountainous area have long depended on forest resources 
and will continue to do so in the future. Forest resources prevent people from slipping into 
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poverty or from becoming poorer by serving as a safety net through its source of cash 
income. Forest resources can also help lift households out of poverty by functioning as a 
source of savings, investment, asset growth, and livelihood diversification, which can lead 
to permanent increases in welfare (Sunderlin and Ba, 2005). Increases in income can 
accrue through the sale of timber and non-timber forest products, conversion of forests to 
agriculture, employment, and indirect benefits such as income from eco-tourism (Sunderlin 
et al., 2003). Environmental services provided by forests are also as important, if not more, 
for the livelihood benefits of forests. Forests provide various direct environmental services 
to people living in the vicinity of forests, such as improved soil fertility, the protection of 
water quantity and quality, pollination, weed control, and the maintenance of biodiversity 
(Jamieson et al., 1998). For example, loss of forests in the uplands causes siltation of 
downstream irrigation systems and increased severity of floods and droughts (ADB, 2000). 
 
1.1 Forest management in Vietnam 
Deforestation has been a serious issue in Vietnam for decades. The main causes of 
deforestation have been population-driven demand for forest products and agricultural land 
(Poffenberger and Nguyen, 1998; De Koninck, 1999) and wood exploitation for local and 
urban needs (McElwee, 2004), especially from intensive logging by State Forest 
Enterprises (SFEs) (ADB, 2000). However, since the mid-1990s, the trend has been largely 
reversed and forest cover has increased through natural regeneration, extension of tree 
plantations, dramatic changes in agricultural and forestry policies, and economic and 
political responses to forest and land scarcity (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2008). The main 
policy response to forest scarcity was the allocation of forest land to households, which 
restricted slash-and-burn cultivation on hillsides and provided incentives for the sound 
management of allocated land (Meyfroidt and Lambin, 2008). Under the Land Law in 
1993, households were given long term rights to use, transfer, exchange, inherit, rent, and 
mortgage land. Several factors are considered to be the driving force of decentralization of 
forest land: (1) deforestation rates were high; (2) productivity of SFEs were declining and 
many were financially insolvent; (3) exports of timber were insufficient for national growth 
targets; and (4) large areas of the uplands lacked any forest cover and were susceptible to 
soil erosion (Sikor, 1995 cited in McElwee, 2012). Along with the devolution of forest 
management, forest plantation campaigns began in the beginning of the 1990s. The 
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government launched two major nationwide initiatives: the Greening of Barren Hills 
Program (or Program 327) and its successor, the Five-Million-Hectare Reforestation 
Program (5MHRP or Program 661). In the Northern Uplands, there are also other programs 
that provide support for household forest plantation, such as a resettlement program for 
households affected by the construction of Hoa Binh dam and a program to help alleviate 
poverty among ethnic minorities, even though the main goal of these programs differ.  
 
1.2 Incentives and household forest plantation 
It is clear that Vietnam is a remarkable case representing a trend of the transition from state 
forestry to household forestry with the goals of achieving both livelihood development and 
environmental improvement. According to Sunderlin and Ba (2005), whether forest 
resources help alleviate poverty depends on the transition from a natural forest economy to 
a plantation economy. From 2005 to 2010, there is an increasing nationwide trend of 
planted forest area by an average of 7.6% (General Statistics Office, 2014b). In the 
Northern Uplands, this rate has been much higher (16.5%), although it has declined slightly 
since 2011 (General Statistics Office, 2014b).  
Farm households and their interactions with policies are considered to be critical for 
achieving successful forest plantation development. One study finds that compared to areas 
where forest was managed by state entities, areas where the devolution of lands to 
individual households took place were more effective in increasing forest cover and raising 
incomes (Sandewall et al., 2010 cited in McElwee, 2012). However, there is evidence 
questioning the effectiveness of government forest plantation campaigns. Several studies in 
the Northern Uplands have observed that an increase in afforestation was not farmers' 
direct response to the set of incentives provided by government programs and devolution 
of land management. Instead, it resulted from other factors, such as agricultural 
intensification and disruption of customary institutions regulating upland management that 
transformed farmers to a more sedentary livelihood system (Castella et al., 2006; Clement 
and Amezaga, 2009; Sikor, 2001). According to Clement et al. (2009), an expansion of 
planted forest was largely driven by state organizations on protected state-owned land. 
Clement and Amezaga (2009) reveals that 5MHRP has not successfully involved 
households in the forestry sector and has not contributed to poverty reduction or to 
INTRODUCTION 
4 
economic development, citing a problem of inadequate incentives to effectively involve 
households.  
Vietnam is the first country in the region to introduce the concept of a market-based 
forest conservation policy in the form of payment for forest environmental services (PFES) 
to pursue conservation and development goals. In 2008, the government launched a pilot 
policy of PFES in two provinces for a period of two years. Since 2010, the expansion of 
PFES projects nationwide has been allowed under the new national Biodiversity Law 
(McElwee, 2012). In the setting of forest conservation where upland farmers provide 
significant environmental services that benefit downstream communities, the use of a PFES 
scheme to internalize positive externalities is more likely to yield satisfactory outcomes 
(Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Rankine, 2008). However, the implementation of a piloted PFES 
scheme was not without flaws. Even though government officials have strongly praised the 
PES approach, presenting it as a clear win–win for Vietnam, it is argued that PES is not 
likely to tackle the issues of land tenure inequality and the lack of participation of local 
communities in conservation, which are considered key underlying causes of forest 
degradation (McElwee, 2012). The incentive used in the piloted PFES scheme is based on 
the so-called K-factor framework, in which the payment to forest owners is determined by 
forest status, type, and origin, as well as the degree of difficulty of forest management 
(Dam et al., 2014) without taking into account farmers' opportunity costs or preferences. 
The importance of the involvement of local stakeholders in the design of the scheme is 
crucial for achieving cost efficiency and effective participation, as well as to realize the 
pro-poor element of the scheme in the case of PFES policy in Vietnam (Dam et al., 2014).  
Providing incentives to households to achieve successful forest conservation, whether 
in PES scheme or not, generates transaction costs (TCs). Recent research has observed that 
high TCs are involved in the implementation of PES schemes and in farmers' participation 
(e.g., Dunn, 2011; FAO, 2007; To et al., 2012). Some studies find that higher TCs are 
likely to be greater obstacles to the participation of poor households in PES than 
households’ own capacity and resources (Behera and Engel, 2004; Engel et al., 2008; 
Locatelli et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). Studies on agri-environmental schemes which 
emphasize voluntary participation state that TCs incurred by farmers can form a significant 
constraint to participation (Falconer, 2000; OECD, 2005). Research on nature conservation 
also address the issue of potentially high TCs for participating stakeholders and emphasize 
the need for the quantification of TCs (Mburu et al., 2003). Besides the issue of barriers to 
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participation, TCs involved in a PES scheme can reduce the cost-effectiveness and hence 
undermine its sustainability. Few studies have empirically estimated individual farmers' 
TCs involved in agricultural and conservation programs and most have been conducted in 
developed countries (OECD, 2005; Falconer, 2000; Mburu et al., 2003; Falconer and 
Saunders, 2002; Vatn et al., 2002, Rørstad et al., 2007; Mettepenningen et al., 2009). 
Understanding and measuring TCs incurred by households provide insight and policy 
implications for forest conservation under a PES framework. 
 
1.3 Conceptual framework and outline of the dissertation 
This dissertation analyzes farmers' behavior on forest management at the micro level and 
examines interactions between farmers and forest policies that are necessary for 
determining effective incentives that can bring about changes in behavior related to forest 
conservation. This empirical analysis of farmers who supply forest environmental services 
in a mountainous area can provide insight and policy implications to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of PES or other benefit-sharing initiatives among upstream 
and downstream communities. Under the current setting of forest management in Vietnam, 
only production forest1
The dissertation has the following main objectives and research questions: 
 provides the individual with ownership conditions. Since we are 
more interested in understanding individual decisions under which PES can operate, the 
scope of the dissertation is limited to production forest management. 
Objective 1: To analyze the adoption of household forest plantation.  
• Question 1.1: What is the profitability of forest production compared to cash 
crop cultivation? 
• Question 1.2: What is the distribution of government support for forest 
plantation among different groups of households? 
• Question 1.3: What are the factors determining the decision and intensity of 
forest plantation? 
                                                            
1 According to the Law on Forest protection and development issued in 2004, forests in Vietnam 
are classified into three kinds based on their major use purposes: production, protection and special 
use. Production forests are used mainly for production and trading of timber and non-timber forest 
products in combination with protection, which contributes to environmental protection (FAOLEX, 
2014). Production forest does not have restrictions on the volume of timber harvest whereas the 
other two types, protection forest and special use forest, have certain level of restrictions on timber 
harvest. 
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Objective 2: To estimate the willingness to accept (WTA) forest plantation and to 
analyze farmers' preferences for forest conservation contracts. 
• Question 2.1: How much is the WTA of farmers to plant and conserve 
forest? 
• Question 2.2: What are the attributes of forest plantation schemes that 
encourage farmers to participate? 
Objective 3: To analyze transaction costs (TCs) incurred by farm households who 
participated in forest plantation programs. 
• Question 3.1: What are the process and transactions related to the past forest 
plantation programs? 
• Question 3.2: How much are the TCs incurred by households who 
participated in forest plantation programs? 
• Question 3.3: What factors determine the value of household TCs of 
participation in forest plantation programs?  
• Question 3.4: Can community-based forest management reduce TCs below 
those incurred from individual forest management? 
 
First, it is necessary to understand why farmers adopted forest plantation and how they 
managed forests under the current incentive scheme. Several studies have examined the 
impacts of forest policy in the Northern Uplands by using imagery data and qualitative 
analysis (e.g., Castella et al., 2006; Sikor, 2001), emphasizing relevant institutions 
(Clement and Amezaga, 2009) or conducting quantitative analyses at the commune level 
(Clement et al., 2009) or at the household level but focus only on forest land allocation 
(Dinh, 2005). The first objective of this study fills this research gap by examining factors 
influencing forest plantation at the household level, taking into account local conditions 
that impact government support. As Clement et al. (2009) suggest, the effect of state 
policies on forest cover change depends on local social and biophysical conditions. For a 
PES scheme to function effectively, it is important that it results in the provision of 
additional environmental services. This means that the incentive payment should cause 
forest environmental benefits to occur where it would not have occurred otherwise. Thus, 
only investigating farmers' practice on production forest is insufficient to provide useful 
policy implications for PES schemes. There is also a concern that opportunity costs for 
protecting forests rather than planting crops may be too high for PES schemes to mitigate 
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(McElwee, 2012). In addition, in developing countries like Vietnam, the cost efficiency 
aspect of a conservation scheme is crucial as governments strive to minimize incentive 
payments while maximizing conservation outcomes. Therefore, the focus of this study’s 
second objective is to explore the possibility of new incentives that can encourage farmers 
to participate in stricter forest conservation practice. Finally, since reducing TCs can 
contribute to the improvement of a program's efficiency and help alleviate potential 
constraints on the participation of smallholder farmers, TCs incurred by households that 
participated in past forest plantation programs are analyzed in the third objective.  
Figure 1.1 illustrates the concept of PES2
                                                            
2 We consider PES schemes in a broad sense, which includes: 1) payments from the government to 
households; 2) formal markets with open trading between buyers and sellers under either a 
regulatory or voluntary framework (e.g., the international carbon market); and 3) private PES in 
which there are no formal regulatory markets and no or little government involvement (Forest 
Trends et al., 2008). 
 between upstream and downstream 
stakeholders in which the three studies in this dissertation provide a comprehensive 
analysis of households in a mountainous area as suppliers of forest environmental services. 
According to the figure, when households in the upstream area plant forests, apart from 
income and environmental services they obtain from forests, they also generate 
environmental services that benefit stakeholders for downstream areas or wider society. A 
principle of a PES scheme is that downstream stakeholders are buyers of forest 
environmental services that upstream households provide through planting forests. 
Payments for environmental services from buyers can be used as financial incentives for 
households to conserve more forest. The first objective of the dissertation captures the 
current practice of household forest plantation by examining costs (e.g., seedlings, 
fertilizer, herbicide, etc.), benefits obtained from forests, forgone income from not using 
the land for other activities, and other factors influencing forest plantation. Although 
environmental services that households obtain from the forest are important and can be 
substantial, the valuation of such services is beyond the scope of this study. The second 
objective of the dissertation examines households' WTA and preferences for stricter forest 
conservation that could yield additional forests upstream. The third objective of the 
dissertation examines TCs incurred by households participating in forest plantation 
programs. 
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Figure 1.1  Conceptual framework of the dissertation 
 
This dissertation is based on data collected from household survey in Da Bac district, 
Hoa Binh province in northwestern Vietnam. Da Bac district is a mountainous area located 
in the upstream of Hoa Binh reservoir (shown in Figure 1.2). Two survey rounds were 
conducted: one from November to December 2011 and another from September to October 
2012 using structured interviews with 300 representative households. Besides household 
survey data, data was gathered from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, 
and reviews of secondary data and literature. 
 
Figure 1.2 Location of the study area 
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The dissertation is composed of three main chapters addressing the main objectives, 
which are followed by a conclusion. Chapter 2 first analyzes current practices of household 
forest management by comparing the profitability of forest plantation to cash crop 
cultivation as well as by examining farmers' dependency on forest products. Then, the 
distribution of households participating in PES-like programs, such as Program 327 or 
Program 661, is examined. The main focus of Chapter 2 is to identify factors determining 
the decision to plant forest and its intensity using a Heckman sample selection model. The 
regression analysis tests different variables that are hypothesized to affect forest plantation 
behavior, including household demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as 
social capital indicators, plot characteristics, and participation in forest plantation support 
programs. Chapter 3 presents a non-market valuation to explore farmers' preferences for 
conservation oriented forest management versus the current production oriented 
management. Choice experiment estimates the WTA planting and conserving forest under 
a hypothetical baseline scenario. Apart from the amount of subsidy, preferences on other 
attributes of forest management are investigated. The use of a random parameter logit 
(RPL) model reveals the trade-off between subsidy and other program attributes, as well as 
identifies whether there exists heterogeneity in farmers' preferences. Chapter 4 explores 
data on transactional burdens experienced by farmers when participating in forest 
plantation support programs. The main focus is on measuring private TCs; however, 
determinants of TCs are also investigated to test the hypothesis of whether TCs vary 
according to household and program characteristics. The end of Chapter 4 reviews related 
literature and provides a discussion on the issue of TCs in individual and community forest 
management. Finally, Chapter 5 provides conclusions, policy implications, and suggestions 
for further research. 
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Abstract 
Forestry is an important sector in the mountainous area of northern Vietnam, providing 
significant economic benefits to sustain households' livelihoods and generating ecological 
benefits to downstream areas. The Vietnamese government has allocated forest land to 
individual households and has provided support for household forest plantation with the 
objectives of economic development and forest cover expansion. This study aims to find 
out the extent to which forests play a role in farmers’ livelihoods and to examine the 
underlying factors determining the decision to plant forests and intensity of planting 
forests. The results can provide useful information for designing more effective incentives 
under the payment for environmental services scheme between upstream and downstream 
stakeholders. Data of 300 households in the upstream area of the Hoa Binh reservoir are 
analyzed. Heckman sample selection estimation examines the determinants of the decision 
to plant forests and the intensity of planting forests. The results showed that growing trees 
is not profitable and is unable to compete with growing cash crops. Therefore, a sufficient 
amount of subsidy is needed to promote more households to plant and conserve forests. 
Seedling support positively determines the intensity of forest planting, but the magnitude 
of the impact is relatively low and cannot encourage farmers to plant more trees. Cash 
support does not achieve positive impact on intensity of forest planting. The results shed 
light on the importance of monitoring and the optimum incentive needed to achieve the 
sustainability of the forest plantation scheme. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Forestry is an important sector in the mountainous area of northern Vietnam, providing 
significant economic benefits to sustain households' livelihoods as well as generating 
ecological benefits such as reducing soil degradation and improving water flow to 
downstream areas. In the 1960s, forest management in Vietnam was under centralized state 
control, yet since the beginning of the 1990s it has moved towards the empowerment of 
local bodies, especially households (Sunderlin and Ba, 2005). Since 1994, the Vietnamese 
government has allocated forest land to individual households under the 1993 Land Law. 
In addition, the government has provided financial and technical support for household 
forest plantation through several programs that pursue multiple objectives, namely poverty 
alleviation, economic development, and forest cover expansion. Poor countries like 
Vietnam are unlikely to reach the desired planting capacity by relying only on government 
resources through structured government projects. To overcome this resource constraint, 
forest plantation has been proposed as part of the payment for environmental services 
(PES) scheme between upstream farmers and downstream beneficiaries or even beyond the 
local context, such as the formal market under greenhouse gas emission initiatives. From 
the perspective of the government or ecosystem service buyers, it is crucial to understand 
the current context and differences in patterns of farmers’ behavior to encourage individual 
households to participate in forest conservation (FAO, 1986).  
Several studies have examined the impacts of forest policy in the Northern Uplands by 
using imagery data and qualitative analysis (e.g., Castella et al., 2006; Sikor, 2001), 
emphasizing relevant institutions (Clement and Amezaga, 2009), or conducting 
quantitative analyses at the commune level (Clement et al., 2009) and at the household 
level but focusing only on forest land allocation (Dinh, 2005). This study fills the research 
gap by examining forest management at the household level in the northern mountainous 
area of Vietnam. In particular, we aim to find out the extent to which forests play a role in 
farmers’ livelihoods and to examine the underlying factors determining the decision to 
plant forest and intensity of planting forests. Special attention is given to the impact of 
government support on forest plantation. The scope of the study is limited to the decision 
of farmers to plant trees with a production purpose where individual ownership of land and 
trees is given to households. The study does not consider forest protection activities 
because there is a large variation in the management of forest protection activity among 
local government units. For example, in some villages every household participates in a 
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forest protection group, whereas in other villages households manage individual protection 
activities. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 describes the 
study area and provides a brief summary of forest plantation support programs in the study 
site; the methodology, including data collection, economic model, and econometric 
estimation procedure, is presented in Section 2.3; Section 2.4 reports and discusses the 
results; and Section 2.5 provides conclusions. 
 
2.2 Study Area 
The study area is the mountainous district of Da Bac, the largest district of Hoa Binh 
province located in the northwestern region of Vietnam. Da Bac district is the largest 
district in the province and is located at the highest altitude above sea level (560 meters). In 
addition, it has the lowest population density in the province (66 persons per square km) 
(Hoa Binh Statistical office, 2011). The majority of the population is comprised of ethnic 
groups, which are the Tay, the Muong, and the Dao. The study area in Da Bac district has 
diversified economic activities due to its proximity to Ha Noi, which is about 100 km 
away, as well as its varied geography which includes the Hoa Binh reservoir in the south 
and a steep mountainous area in the north. Over two-thirds of the area is covered by natural 
forests (39%) and production forests (28%). Because the government had previously 
provided bamboo and acacia seedlings to farmers, these are the main trees planted in 
production forest areas. Other tree species, such as Eucalyptus, Chinaberry (Melia 
azedarach), Bodhi tree (Ficus religiosa) and Manglietia conifera are also planted in 
production forest areas. Agricultural areas, including paddy fields, are merely 7% of the 
total land area of the district. Nearly one-fifth of the district is identified as unused land. 
Rice is grown as a subsistence crop in irrigated paddy fields of the lowlands, whereas main 
crops, namely maize, cassava, and arrow root, are cultivated in the uplands. In general, 
households also manage to have small-scale livestock farming for home consumption and 
income generation. Fishery and aquaculture are practiced in the communes located near the 
reservoir.  
In Da Bac district, forest land has been allocated to individual households since 1994 
under the 1993 Land Law. Households received a Land Use Certificate (also known as a 
'Redbook') as proof that its holder has the legal rights to exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, 
and mortgage the land use right for the purpose of forestry for 50 years. Land that is 
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classified as 'forest land' is usually located on steep slopes where agriculture is forbidden. 
The process of land allocation in the study area was from 1994 to 1995, which may differ 
across communes. 
Past and current forest plantation support programs 
There is a series of government programs that provides supports for forest plantation with 
varying time spans and subsidy amounts. These are summarized in Table 2.1. The most 
well-known and participated-in program is the resettlement program, also known as 
Program 747, for households who relocated from the Hoa Binh dam construction site and 
its reservoir area. The goal of this program is to promote economic growth and alleviate 
poverty for the majority of population there, ethnic minorities who are on average 
extremely poor. In particular, the investment on short-term growing trees, such as bamboo, 
is supported by provision of seedlings and cash which is used to compensate labor costs for 
a period of three years, as well as training on techniques of tree plantation and 
maintenance.  
The Five-Million-Hectare-Reforestation Program, or Program 661, is another 
government initiative which has the main goal of supporting forest plantation at the 
national level. The program initially offered loans to companies for reforestation for the 
purpose of forest protection and began in 1998 after Program 747. The program has 
evolved to include the provision of direct support to plantations established by households 
since 2006 (Sikor, 2011). The government only provides a broad framework and indicates 
a set of policies, whereby local authorities are given a degree of freedom to design 
activities (MARD, 2000). There are two types of support to individual households 
according to the purpose of plantation, which is either forest protection or production. 
Support differs in terms of the amount and period of benefits, as well as the policy of 
harvesting timber products. Program 661 provides tree seedlings, mainly acacia and other 
slow growing tree species, and cash as labor compensation. The program has a maximum 
total value of support of 2-3 million VND (approximately USD 95-144)3
                                                            
3 The average exchange rate in 2012: USD 1=20,899 VND (Vietcom Bank) 
 per hectare, 
depending on the cost of tree seedlings. The payment for labor compensation is not fixed, 
but is contingent on the quality and survival rate of the trees. As a worst case scenario, 
farmers will not receive any compensation for labor if the percentage of tree cover is less 
than 50% of the pre-determined number of trees per hectare. If, on the other hand, the tree 
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cover is maintained at more than 85%, farmers would receive the full amount of labor 
compensation one year after the beginning of the contract. 
Table 2.1 Summary of major forest support programs in Da Bac district 
Program 747 661 327 135 
Implementing 
period 
1983 - 2008 1999-2010 1992-1998 1998 - present 
Tree species Bamboo Acacia and 
slow growing 
trees 
Bamboo Acacia, 
eucalyptus, etc. 
Type of support 
Tree seedlings 
and cash 
Tree seedlings 
and cash 
Tree seedlings 
and cash 
Tree seedlings 
and cash 
Amount of 
subsidy 
(in thousand 
VND) 
1st year: 
1,000-1,300 
2nd year: 
400-500 
3rd year: 
300-400 
1st year: 
840-1,665 
 
1st year: 250 
1st year: 2,500 
2nd year: 1,200 
3rd year: 800 
4th to 8th year: 
600 and 
decreasing by 
200 every year 
Note: Data on subsidies are from interviews with officers and focus group discussions with 
farmers. The amount of subsidy for each program is not the same for all communes due to 
varying situations at the commune level. 
 
In addition to these two main programs, there is another program for the 
“strengthening of reforestation, re-greening of open land and bare hills as a way to reduce 
harvesting in natural forests” (MARD, 2000, p.1), which is widely known as Program 327. 
Program 661 can be considered as the continuation of Program 327, which began in 1992 
(Nguyen and Baulch, 2007). Lastly, the program for socio-economic development of the 
communes in ethnic, mountainous, boundary, and remote areas (known as Program 135) 
has been nationally implemented since 1998. The major support of the program is for 
infrastructure development, however, there are some components of the program that 
provide seedlings and cash support for afforestation purposes as well. 
 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Sampling and data collection 
A household survey was conducted from November-December of 2011 in Da Bac district. 
A two-stage cluster sampling procedure was employed where a village-level sampling 
frame was constructed based on the number of households per village. At the first stage, 20 
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villages were randomly selected using the Probability Proportionate to Size method 
(Carletto, 1999), resulting in larger villages having a higher probability to be selected. 
Then, 15 households were randomly selected in each of the selected villages using village 
level household lists. For the two villages that did not have a household list, the random 
walk method was used to select the sampled households. In total, the dataset consists of 
300 households which are representative at the district and village levels. The survey 
covered a wide range of topics ranging from demographic, socio-economic data, food 
security, social capital, land use, land tenure, agricultural production, and forest protection 
and production activities. In addition, focus group discussions using the participatory rural 
appraisal (PRA) technique in five villages from different communes were conducted to 
collect detailed information on: community history; government programs for the forestry 
sector implemented in the community and their evaluations; institutional settings for land 
allocation in the community; and information on how households want to improve their 
practices in forest production and forest protection. Four interviews with key informants at 
the district office and state forest enterprise were conducted to obtain insightful 
information on forest plantation support programs. 
2.3.2 Economic model 
This study follows previous research on tree plantation and adoption of conservation 
practices (e.g., Gebreegziabher et al., 2010; Godoy, 1992; Saint-Macary, 2010). In 
principle, factors affecting the decision to plant forest and the intensity of forest plantation 
depend strongly on how the decision to plant trees is conceptualized. An analytical model 
is developed by assuming that the decision by individual households to plant forest is based 
on utility maximization. In other words, a household decides to plant forest if the utility 
from planting forest is larger than the utility from not planting. The utility of adopting 
forest plantation is a function of vector X as 𝑈𝑝𝑖 = 𝑉�𝑋𝑝𝑖� + 𝑢𝑝𝑖, where p = 1 for decision 
to plant forest and p = 0 for the decision to not plant forest. The utilities U are random and 
the ith household chooses to plant forest if it generates more utility than it would by 
choosing to not plant forest, i.e., U1i > U0i. However, since the marginal benefit of planting 
forest compared to not planting forest is not observable, we model the differences between 
utilities as an unobservable variable y*, such that: 
𝑦1𝑖
∗ = 𝑈1𝑖 − 𝑈0𝑖 = 𝑋1𝑖, 𝛽1 + 𝑢1𝑖 where y1i = 1 if y1i* > 0; y1i = 0 if y1i* ≤ 0  (1) 
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where X1i is a vector of explanatory variables affecting the decision to plant forest and u1i 
is an error term. We do not observe the net utility. Instead, we observe whether the 
household decides to plant forest (y1i). To analyze the intensity of forest plantation, we 
examine the number of trees farmers planted (y2i), which is denoted as:      𝑦2𝑖∗ = 𝑋2𝑖′ 𝛽2 + 𝑢2𝑖 where  𝑦2𝑖 = 𝑦2𝑖∗  𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑖∗ > 0; 𝑦2𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑦1𝑖∗ ≤ 0.  (2) 
The variables y1* and y2*are unobserved, whereas y1 and y2 are observed. The error terms 
u1 and u2 are expected to be positively correlated. For example, farmers who are only able 
to achieve a low profit from growing forest given the low availability of their own land will 
decide not to plant forest. It is assumed that u1 and u2 have a bivariate normal distribution.  
2.3.3 Econometric estimation procedure 
In our case, forest planting is only observed for a subset of the sample population and it is 
likely that households who planted forest are not a random subsample of the population. 
Self-selection bias could arise if unobservable factors affect the decision of farmers to plant 
trees or if farmers selected themselves into the forest planting group. In such a case, 
regressing the number of trees on exogenous factors will result in biased parameters. In 
theory, for the case of truncated data where only households with a positive number of 
trees are observed, the Tobit model is a potential option as employed by a previous study 
on innovation adoption (Adesina and Zinnah, 1993). However, since we assume that 
factors affecting the decision to plant forest would be different from factors determining 
how many trees are planted, the Heckman sample selection model is considered to be more 
appropriate than the Tobit model as the latter assumes that the factors for the two stages of 
the decision are the same (Kennedy, 2008). Following the Heckman (1979) approach of 
two-step estimation, the conditional expectation of y2* is given by: 
𝐸(𝑦2𝑖∗ |𝑥2𝑖 ,𝑦1𝑖∗ > 0) =  𝑥2𝑖′ 𝛽2 + 𝐸(𝑢2𝑖|𝑢1𝑖 > −𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1) = 𝑥2𝑖′ 𝛽2 + 𝜎12𝜎1 𝜙�−�𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1 𝜎1� ��1−Φ�−�𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1 𝜎1⁄ �� (3) 
where 𝜙(. ) and Φ(. ) denote the density and cumulative density functions of the standard 
normal distribution, respectively. The aim is to estimate the inverse Mills ratio: 
                                            𝜆(𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1 𝜎1⁄ ) = 𝜙�−�𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1 𝜎1� ��1−Φ�−�𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1 𝜎1⁄ ��                      (4) 
by employing a Probit model as the first step. In the second step, we estimate 
                               𝑦2𝑖 = 𝑥2𝑖′ 𝛽2 + 𝜎12𝜎1 𝜆(𝑥1𝑖′ 𝛽1 𝜎1⁄ ) + 𝜀2.             (5) 
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First, the selection equation (1) with a decision to either plant forest or not as the dependent 
variable is estimated to obtain the inverse Mills ratio. Then, the outcome equation (5), 
which has the number of trees planted as the dependent variable, and the inverse Mills ratio 
and other relevant explanatory variables are estimated.4
 Considering the scarcity of land due to the geographical condition of the study area 
and the state control of land use purposes, we hypothesize that land constraint is a crucial 
factor in determining whether a household decides to plant forest. A previous study in 
Vietnam claimed that lack of land is the main reason for not planting forest (Dinh, 2005). 
Thus, for the selection equation, we examine variables that could affect the land acquisition 
process of households. According to Sowerwine (2004), the implementation of forest land 
allocation has often been captured by the local elite due to the discretionary power of local 
authorities. Hence, factors indicating the connection to local authorities are chosen. 
HIGHESTAGE denotes the highest age of a household member. It is hypothesized that 
households with older members are more likely to be allocated with forest land and will 
therefore have a higher probability of planting forest. Another variable that may affect 
access to forest land is MEMORG: Households with more memberships in local 
organizations may have a stronger social network and are therefore expected to have a 
higher possibility of receiving land compared to households who are not as actively 
involved in the community. Nonetheless, access to forest land does not always result in 
deciding to plant forest. Due to the weak monitoring system, farmers may not feel obliged 
to plant trees in the forest land. Instead, they may try to maximize benefits they obtain from 
all of their land. AREAPC measures the land area per capita (excluding residential land). It 
is hypothesized that households with more land availability per capita are more likely to 
use extra land to plant forest (Gebreegziabher et al., 2010; Schwarz, 2012). 
 Since the sample selection model 
is considered to be more vulnerable to collinearity problems (Puhani, 2000), we impose the 
exclusion restriction to the model, which requires that the selection equation have at least 
one exogenous variable that is excluded from the outcome equation (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2009). The explanatory variables are selected not only based on the literature, but also 
based on the local context. Table 2.2 presents the explanatory variables for both equations, 
their descriptive statistics, and expected signs.  
  
                                                            
4 This approach of estimating the likelihood by way of a two-step method is called the limited 
information maximum likelihood (LIML) method (Puhani, 2000). 
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Table 2.2 Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description Mean s.d. Expected sign 
Outcome equation: Dependent variable 
TREE Number of trees the household planted 
since the inception of household until 
2012  
     1,247.0 1,616.1 N/A 
Explanatory variables 
AGE Age of household head (in years) 44.4 10.9 +/- 
EDUC 1 if the household head has a high 
school certificate, 0 otherwise 
0.5 0.5 + 
ACTIVES Number of non-disabled adults in the 
household aged 18-60 
3.0 1.2 + 
FORESTAREA Share of forest area in the total area 
excluding residential area (%) 
60.0 40.0 + 
DISTANT Walking time from the house to the 
forest plot (in minutes) 
36.7 36.5 - 
REDBOOK 1 if the household has a Redbook for 
forest land at the first time of plantation, 
0 otherwise  
0.6 0.5 + 
TRUST 1 if the household trusts other 
households in the village, in general, 0 
otherwise  
0.4 0.5 + 
INCOMEPC Annual household income per capita 
excluding income from forest  
(in thousand VND) 
6,247.2 6,774.2 + 
SEEDSUP Amount of tree seedlings the household 
received from government programs 
757 1,255 + 
CASHSUP Amount of cash support for forest 
plantation that the household received 
from government programs  
(in thousand VND) 
1,056.9 3,609.2 + 
Selection equation: Dependent variable 
PLANTFOR 1 if the household decided to plant 
forest, 0 otherwise  
0.9 0.3 N/A 
Explanatory variables 
HIGHESTAGE The highest age of a household member 
(in years) 
50.2 15.0 + 
EDUC 1 if the household head has a high 
school certificate, 0 otherwise 
0.5 0.5 + 
ACTIVES Number of non-disabled adults in the 
household aged 18-60 
3.0 1.2 + 
TRUST 1 if the household trusts other 
households in the village, in general, 0 
otherwise 
0.4 0.5 + 
INCOMEPC Annual household income per capita 
excluding income from forest  
(in thousand VND) 
6,247.2 6,774.2 + 
AREAPC Total area per capita (in square meters) 4,655.9 5,077.2 + 
MEMORG Total number of memberships in local 
organizations of all household members 
2.2 1.5 + 
VILLAGE Village where household is located - - +/- 
Note: s.d. = standard deviation, N/A = not applicable 
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EDUC indicates whether the household head has a high school certificate. Formal 
education is supposed to enhance farmer’s ability to acquire and process information on 
land access. This variable is also included in the outcome equation as more education is 
expected to raise awareness on the environmental benefits of planting forest, which might 
determine the number of trees planted (Nepal et al., 2007; Gebreegziabher et al., 2010). 
The availability of household labor is measured by the variable ACTIVES, which 
represents the number of non-disabled adults living in the household aged 18 to 60 years. It 
is hypothesized that a greater availability of labor will positively affect both the decision to 
plant forest and the number of tree planted since most farmers use their own household 
labor (only 6% of households hire labor outside of the household). INCOMEPC denotes 
annual household income per capita during the previous 12 months, excluding income 
from forest. This proxies the wealth status of the household at the time of planting forest 
due to the difficulty of recalling income information since forest trees were first planted, 
which could be longer than 10 years in some cases. Endogeneity is not a concern since 
profit from forest is not a major contributor to household income. Wealthy farmers are 
more willing to forgo current consumption for future benefit and are more likely to assign 
lower risk premiums on future outcomes. Therefore, it is expected that there will be an 
observed positive relationship between tree-growing activity and household income (Patel 
et al., 1995; Dinh, 2005) and hence the income variable is an explanatory variable in both 
equations. TRUST measures the level of trust among farmers and is expected to positively 
affect both the decision to plant forest and the intensity of forest plantation (Nepal et al., 
2007) since the forest land in the study area is normally located far away from the house 
and farmers are concerned about timber stealing and damage to forest caused by grazing 
cattle. VILLAGE denotes the village where households are located to capture the variation 
of forest land availability across villages. 
In addition to the variables in the selection equation, there are more variables 
considered in the outcome equation. AGE denotes the age of the household head and 
represents the experience of the farm household. The influence of age is unclear. On the 
one hand, an older farmer is often considered to be more risk averse and thus less likely to 
invest in economic activities, such as planting forest which yields benefits in the longer 
period (D’Souza et al., 1993; Schwarz, 2012). On the other hand, if forest plantation is 
perceived as a way to earn additional income and thus reduce the scale of the farm 
operation, it may represent an attractive option for older farmers (Gebreegziabher et al., 
DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD FOREST PLANTATION  
24 
2010). FORESTAREA represents the share of forest land in the total land area allocated to 
the household. Despite the fact that households are supposed to plant trees on land that is 
classified as 'forest land', there are a number of households who use the land for food 
production (Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005). Therefore, it is of interest to test the hypothesis of 
whether a higher proportion of forestland has a positive relationship with the number of 
trees farmers want to plant. DISTANT represents the logistic aspect of forest establishment 
by measuring the time needed for walking from the household to the forest plot.5
 
 It is 
hypothesized that greater distances will result in fewer trees planted since the initial 
plantation cost is higher. Land tenure security is considered a key factor for the decision to 
implement long term land use. Studies suggest that smallholders must enjoy security over 
land or trees before they cultivate and care for trees (Godoy, 1992; Dinh, 2005; 
Gebreegziabher et al., 2010; Saint-Macary et al., 2010; Schwarz, 2012). REDBOOK 
represents the possession of the official certificate of the land use right for forest land 
which provides the security of land use for a period of 50 years from the issuance date. 
Farmers who have a land use certificate are expected to plant more trees than those who do 
not have legal security over the land. Another determining factor is the extent of 
government support which has been justified on several grounds, such as the reduction of 
farmers’ financial problems and helping farmers overcome the initial reluctance to invest in 
tree planting (Godoy, 1992; Saint-Macary et al., 2010; Schwarz, 2012). Two variables, 
SEEDSUP and CASHSUP, measure the impact of government support in terms of the 
amount of seedlings and cash that farmers received from the government for the purpose of 
forest plantation. Since farmers received cash at different time periods, the value of cash 
support from each observation is adjusted to the same base year (2000) using Vietnamese 
inflation rates. 
2.4 Results and discussion 
2.4.1 Household characteristics 
The sampled households are comprised of four ethnic groups, i.e., Muong, Tay, Dao, and 
Kinh, where the Muong ethnic group is the majority (43.7%) and the Kinh (ethnic 
Vietnamese) is the smallest group (6.7%). Almost all household heads can read and write 
                                                            
5 Even though some households own more than one forest plots, they are located in the same 
proximity therefore the distance is the same. 
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(92%), yet about half have attained a secondary or higher education degree. The average 
household size is 4.4 persons of which on average of 3 are in the active labor force. The 
average annual income per capita is approximately 5,719,806 VND6 (USD 274.6) and 69% 
of households fall below the rural poverty line of 520,000 VND per month (World Bank, 
2012). 7
2.4.2 Profitability of forest plantation 
 The largest share of household income is from farm activities (76%). The share of 
income from forest, including commercial timber and own consumption of non-timber 
products, is relatively small (9%). About two-thirds of households claim to have 
experienced a food shortage in the previous 12 months.  
Profit from forest plantation is a critical factor influencing the decision to plant forest. The 
net present values (NPVs) of the costs and benefits of two main species of trees, acacia and 
bamboo, are compared with two main cash crops, maize and cassava (see Appendix C for 
details). NPVs are calculated using a seven-year cycle of growth of acacia8 which has the 
longest harvest cycle compared to other plants, an equivalent period for bamboo, two 
seasons per year of maize cultivation, and one season per year of cassava. These 
calculations are based on common practices and average data related to inputs, outputs, and 
management characteristics obtained from the study site. Regarding the NPV of maize 
cultivation, it is assumed that there are negative effects of maize monoculture, i.e., the 
reduction in the top soil and the accumulation of pests and diseases over time. 
Consequently, with time more fertilizer or pesticides will be required to replace the 
nutrients and to maintain the same yield, respectively. Therefore, we assume that the cost 
of fertilizer input for maize is increasing every year by 5% or 10%. The market wage rate 
of 100,000 VND per labor-day is used as the value of the household labor cost and 
discount rates of 5%, 10%, and 15%9
 
 are used for sensitivity analysis. The actual amount 
of forest plantation support (both seedlings and cash) from the government is also 
incorporated in the analysis. 
 
                                                            
6 This is adjusted for inflation and shown in the 2012 equivalent.  
7 Equivalent to USD 1.83 per day 2005 PPP. 
8 Seven years of harvest cycle is chosen as it is the shortest period that farmers can harvest 
commercial timber. 
9 To establish the mid-point of the discount rate, we use Vietnamese average inflation rate from 
1999-2012 which is approximately 7% (World Bank, 2012) plus opportunity cost of capital at 3%. 
Then we plus and minus 5% from the mid-point to set the range of discount rates. 
DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD FOREST PLANTATION  
26 
Table 2.3 Net present values of cash crop cultivation and forest plantation 
Discount 
rate (%) 
Cassava Maize Bamboo Acacia 
5% 
increased 
cost 
10% 
increased 
cost 
no 
support 
with 
support 
no 
support 
with 
support 
5 65,663 119,126 111,658 66,968 73,669 60,482 61,923 
10 55,246 100,592 94,765 44,974 51,371 41,818 43,193 
15 47,212 86,254 81,636 29,882 36,001 28,892 30,208 
Note: The unit is thousand VND per hectare 
 
Table 2.3 shows that, on average, maize cultivation can generate nearly twice as much 
income compared to growing acacia or bamboo, assuming that farmers reap benefits from 
harvesting timber and non-timber forest products. Discount rates capture time preferences 
of households and show that for households with a discount rate of 15%, maize  can 
generate almost three times more profit than planting bamboo or acacia (under the 
assumption of a 5% increment in fertilizer cost). However, a limitation of this analysis is 
that in practice, most farmers also plant short-term crops in forest plots and the profit from 
these crops is not accounted for here. Another shortcoming is that the prices of cash crops 
and timber products are assumed to be constant over time. Thus, the above calculations can 
be considered as lower bounds on the profitability of forest plantation. Our finding is 
comparable with a study in Hoa Binh province (Clement et al., 2007) which found that tree 
planting is not an economically feasible option, except for the richest farmers. From a 
benefit viewpoint, planting forest can be seen as an alternative or secondary livelihood 
where farmers can reap benefits regularly from non-timber products. The results also 
indicate that the monetary support from the government does not contribute much to the 
overall profit, but could help relax capital constraints on the establishment cost of forest 
plantation.  
2.4.3 Dependency of forest products 
It is useful to understand how forest contributes to the livelihood of households by 
examining the extent of dependency on forest products. Dependency was measured by the 
share of income from cash sales and subsistence consumption of timber and non-timber 
products in total household income. We also divided households into three groups by a 
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relative poverty index based on several indicators, following Henry et al. (2003).10
2.4.4 Household forest plantation and participation in forest support programs 
 Annual 
income from forest product is approximately USD 117 per household, accounting for 10% 
of total income. This indicates a low dependency on forest for farmers in the study area. 
We did not find significant differences in either absolute forest income or the share of 
forest income among poverty groups. This is consistent with findings from McElwee 
(2008) and contradicts the general perception that poverty and forests are always linked. 
The linkage between poverty and investment in forest was also examined by analyzing the 
share of households who planted forest in each poverty tercile. Figure 2.1 shows that 
approximately 90% of households within each group has planted forest and that there is no 
significant difference in the forest plantation rate among the poverty groups (the ANOVA 
test result is omitted). Most households could provide information on the program, such as 
the type and amount of benefits they received, yet they were less certain about the name of 
the programs. This could be explained by the fact that there are overlaps of the programs in 
terms of time periods and the type of benefits. More than half of households (56%) 
participated in Program 747, which has the purpose of supporting resettled households. The 
amount of cash compensation and type of tree seedlings provided by the program varied 
across communes. Only 15% of households participated in Program 661. According to the 
PRA, lack of land was the major obstacle for households to participate in Program 661, 
especially for households who had participated in Program 747 and did not want to cut 
down their existing bamboo. There are only a few households who participated in other 
forest support programs (Programs 135 and 327). The distribution of household 
participation in these programs by poverty groups is shown in Figure 2.1. As shown, the 
share of households who received support is significantly different across the poverty 
groups. Among the high-income level households, a higher proportion received support 
than in the case of low- and intermediate-income level households. This can be partially 
explained by the condition of Program 661 which provides support to individual farmers 
with extra land to plant forest. This resulted in greater participation of better-off farmers 
since poorer households own less land. Another explanation would be that richer 
                                                            
10 The indicators that are used for the poverty index are the number of adults who attained at least a 
high school degree, number of children, child dependency ratio, experience of food shortages, 
having a balanced meal (whether household can afford the main meals that consists of rice, 
vegetables and animal protein), toilet availability, quality of the house’s floor, quality of the 
house’s roof, total land (excluding residential area), and value of assets per capita. 
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households are better connected to the authorities and village head and are therefore more 
able to receive support once they plant trees.  
 
 
Figure 2.1 Share of households who planted forest and households who received 
support 
 
2.4.5 Determinants of household forest plantation 
Analysis of profitability in forestry cannot capture differences across households in terms 
of factors and resources which are likely to create variation in the relative benefits of forest 
plantation. There are also other factors affecting the decision to plant forest and the amount 
planted. Estimation results from a Heckman two-step estimation are shown in Table 2.4. 
Since sample selection model is considered to be more vulnerable to collinearity (Puhani, 
2000), we first try to detect potential collinearity between explanatory variables in the 
outcome equation and inverse Mills’ ratio. The Variance Inflation Factor is equal to 1.1, 
which is lower than the threshold of 10, indicating that multicollinearity does not pose a 
problem (Myers, 1990). Another test of collinearity is conducted to test the robustness of 
the model by calculating the condition number.11
                                                            
11 Condition number is defined as the square root of the ratio of the largest to the smallest 
eigenvalue of the moment matrix of regressors. 
 The result shows that the condition 
number is 18.37, which is lower than the threshold of 20 suggested by Leung and Yu 
(1996), indicating that the sample selection model is more robust than its alternative (i.e., a 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
Lowest Middle Highest 
% HH planted forest % HH received support 
DETERMINANTS OF HOUSEHOLD FOREST PLANTATION  
29 
subsample OLS or two-part model). The inverse Mills’ ratio (MILLS) is statistically 
significant at 5% of error probability, providing evidence of sample selection.  
 
Table 2.4 Estimated coefficients from the Heckman sample selection model 
Variable Coefficient estimate 
Coefficient Z-statistic 
Outcome equation: Number of trees planted 
AGE -6.467 -0.82 
EDUC 27.156 0.16 
ACTIVES 68.114 0.97 
FORESTAREA 771.948*** 3.41 
DISTANT -0.464 -0.2 
REDBOOK 202.381 1.22 
TRUST 88.149 0.52 
INCOMEPC 0.004 0.32 
SEEDSUP 0.623*** 9.47 
CASHSUP 0.023 1.02 
Constant 323.826 0.69 
Selection equation: Decision to plant forest or not 
HIGHESTAGE 0.042*** 2.85 
EDUC -0.672* -1.85 
ACTIVES 0.137 0.81 
TRUST 0.822** 2.15 
INCOMEPC -0.00003* -1.72 
AREAPC 0.0008*** 4.62 
MEMORG 0.328** 2.27 
VILLAGE 0.067** 2.08 
CONSTANT -3.443*** -3.66 
MILLS -880.619** -2.14 
Observations 291 
Censored 25 
Wald chi2 (10) 123.06*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% of error probability, 
respectively. 
 
The results from the selection equation show that the highest age of a household 
member and membership in organizations are positive and statistically significant. This 
supports the hypotheses that an older household and a household with more ties to local 
organizations tend to have more access to land and hence a higher probability to invest in 
forest. The area per capita is positive and statistically significant, indicating that 
households with more land tend to invest more on other alternative activities, like forest, 
and do not concentrate only on cash crops. Education and income per capita are negative 
and weakly significant, suggesting that households with higher education and higher 
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income are less likely to plant forest. These results are contrary to the vast literature on 
conservation agriculture (e.g. D'Souza et al., 1993; Anley et al., 2006; Saint-Macary et al., 
2010) and adoption studies of trees plantation (Nepal et al., 2007; Gebreegziabher et al., 
2010;) that claim that education and income have positive impacts on the probability of 
adopting conservation practices. Our results can be explained by the view among farmers 
that forest plantation is purely an income generating activity with relatively little profit and 
is therefore not as attractive compared to other income-generating activities. The labor 
constraint is not significant, implying that labor force is not a critical factor determining the 
decision to plant forest. This result could also stem from the practice of borrowing labor 
from neighbors in the village. Therefore, household labor is not a binding constraint for 
farmers since they can still utilize labor from outside the household without incurring a 
significant cost. This demonstrates that forest plantation does not require much labor force 
beyond household capacity. The level of trust is positively significant, indicating that 
farmers are concerned about the security of their forest products since forest plots can be 
far away from their homes and the monitoring mechanism is not sufficient. Finally, the 
village variable is significant, suggesting that location determines the availability of forest 
land in the study area. In addition, it could be due to the different governance structures of 
forest management across villages. 
Regarding the determinant of plantation intensity, households’ socioeconomic 
indicators (age, education, income, and labor) are found to be statistically insignificant. 
The share of forest land is positive and significant, indicating that farmers with more forest 
land tend to grow more trees even though they have the option to grow cash crops in forest 
land as well. The amount of seedlings received from the government is positive and 
significant: The marginal effect12
                                                            
12 The marginal effect is equal to the estimated coefficient in the case of the OLS estimation of the 
outcome equation. 
 of seedling support is 0.623, implying that farmers are 
not encouraged to grow additional trees from the amount they receive. On the other hand, 
the extent of cash support is not significant, implying that cash support does not function as 
an incentive for farmers to grow more trees. Farmers may view the cash payment as merely 
their labor cost and not an incentive to invest more in forest. The result regarding the 
impact of government support is consistent with other studies on the poor capacity of 
Program 661, which provided inadequate incentives to make forestry an attractive option 
(Clement and Amezaga, 2008; Dinh Duc Thuan, 2005; Ohlsson et al., 2005). The distant 
from the plot to the house is not a significant factor determining the number of trees 
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farmers want to plant. Having a Redbook is also not significant, providing evidence that 
land security does not affect the intensity of the forest. In fact, a number of farmers planted 
forest before they received the Redbook for their forest land. This can be explained by the 
fact that villagers have never experienced reallocation in the district, which contrasts with 
other areas in Vietnam where reallocation has occurred and where land tenure insecurity is 
an issue for farmers (Saint-Macary, 2010).  
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This study has examined socioeconomic aspects of individual forest plantation in the 
northern uplands of Vietnam, providing useful information for the design of more effective 
incentive mechanisms for households to plant forests in the future. Data from 300 
households in Da Bac district were comprehensively analyzed using descriptive statistics, 
gross margin calculations, and econometric estimation. Our results show that a large share 
of households has engaged in forestry, mainly for commercial purposes. The dependency 
on forestry for household income is low. Indeed, it is clear from the gross margin analysis 
that growing trees is less profitable and is unable to compete with growing cash crops. 
Therefore, a sufficient subsidy from the government or other sources is needed to promote 
more farm households to plant and conserve forest. It is also interesting to observe that 
some poor households plant forests occasionally without external support. One explanation 
is the lack of market access for alternative products in some areas, making forest products 
more attractive due to the low maintenance cost of forests. This indicates that profitability 
is not the only factor explaining why farmers engage in forest plantation. Interviews with 
farmers revealed that they are aware of the environmental benefits of planting forest, but 
that it is not the determining factor in the decision of whether to plant forest.  
A Heckman sample selection model investigated the determinants of the intensity of 
household forest plantation. Availability of land is a necessary condition for the decision to 
invest in forest, whereas labor availability is not found to influence the decision to plant 
forest. The level of trust among villagers can be a barrier that keeps farmers from investing 
in forest. Therefore, an effective monitoring mechanism could help lessen this barrier, 
particularly in areas with timber stealing or illegal logging. Education and wealth are found 
to have a negative relationship with the decision to invest in forest, which contradicts 
results in adoption studies on forest plantation and conservation practices. Farmers may 
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only view forest as an income generating business without other non-monetary benefits. 
Therefore, wealthier households prefer to use the resource for more attractive investments, 
such as maize cultivation. Even though the lack of landholding security is always the key 
factor inhibiting farmers to invest in activities that accrue profit in the long-run, such as 
planting forest or conducting conservation practices, there is no evidence in our study that 
farmers’ land tenure security affects the intensity of forest plantation. The lack of previous 
land reallocation experience by farmers in the study area could influence this finding. 
Furthermore, support provided by the government may act as a de facto guarantee of land 
use rights for farmers to plant trees on land where the land use certificate has not yet been 
issued. Our finding also reveals the importance of institutional and governance factor of 
forest support programs at the local government units where they have certain degrees of 
freedom to implement forest policy. This has implications on the mechanism to check the 
transparency and accountability of local authorities in implementing forest policies to 
achieve the desirable policy outcomes.   
Our regression analysis indicates that seedling support positively determines the 
intensity of forest planting, whereas cash support does not achieve similar impact. 
However, the magnitude of the impact from seedling support is relatively low and does not 
appear to stimulate farmers to plant more trees than what they receive. This situation 
underscores the importance of the impact of government support on the sustainability of 
forest plantation, which is recommended for future research especially on the design of 
PES policy. From our current data, we find that households have not replanted trees, but 
have instead grown food crops or left the land fallow after the trees died from unexpected 
problems, such as extreme weather. This phenomenon may nullify the statement by Godoy 
(1992) that outside support or assistance could act as bait that induces farmers to cultivate 
forest on their own. It also sheds light on the importance of monitoring and the incentive 
needed to achieve the sustainability of the scheme.  
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Abstract 
Forests play an important role in the mountainous area of northern Vietnam, they are 
providing not only complementary source of income for poor households but also 
ecological benefits to the downstream area. Government has been active in supporting 
household forest plantation and conservation through the conventional programs providing 
tree seedlings and cash compensation as well as through the introduction of Payment for 
Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES). However, the pilot PFES scheme has not taken account 
of farmers’ opportunity cost of alternative land use or preferences. Our article sheds light 
on the cost efficiency and reasons behind participation of local farmers, which are very 
fundamental for the success of the policy given the limited resources and voluntarism 
nature of the scheme. Choice experiment is used to estimate the willingness to accept to  
plant and conserve forest and to investigate different attributes of forest plantation contract 
that encourage farmers to participate in the program. The results revealed that farmers are 
not only concerned about the amount of subsidy but also pay attention to limitation of 
timber harvest, forest maintenance frequency and the level of punishment in case of 
contract violation. The willingness to accept to plant forest is higher than the previous 
government subsidy but is still far lower than the forgone income of cash crops cultivation. 
This finding underscores the fact that encouraging farmers to plant forest is not as costly as 
the opportunity cost of the land. Even though the local farmers tend to associate forestry 
more with monetary benefits, our findings have confirmed that there is room for a more 
stringent forest conservation program as long as the farmers are adequately compensated.
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3.1 Introduction 
Forests play an important role as a complementary source of income for poor households in 
the mountainous area of northern Vietnam. The government has supported household 
forest plantation for economic development (poverty alleviation) and environmental 
conservation for decades. In 2008 Vietnam implemented a pilot project on payments for 
forest environmental services (PFES) in Lam Dong and Son La provinces where the 
payment streams from ecosystem services beneficiaries, i.e. commercial hydropower, 
water production and tourism businesses, were transferred to the service providers 
including local farming households and communities as a reward for their forest protection 
(Winrock International, 2011). The payment was based on forest quality and threat level of 
the forest, not the opportunity cost of alternative land use accrued to farmers. At the same 
time, the policy tended to overlook other aspects of the program that targeted the interests 
of local farmers and induced more participation.  
Our article sheds light on the cost efficiency and reasons behind participation of local 
farmers in the forest plantation programs, which are very fundamental for the success of 
the PES policy given the limited resources and voluntarism nature of the scheme. Forgone 
income from agriculture is not always a reliable factor in predicting farmers’ participation 
in forest conservation for several reasons. First, there is uncertainty about the costs, yields 
and prices relating to tree plantation (Shaikh et al., 2007; Stavin, 1999). This uncertainty is 
especially important for planting forests, as the benefits accrue in the very distant future or 
several decades after the investment. Second, there may be non pecuniary benefits or other 
private benefits and costs related to forest plantation that farmers may take into account for 
reaching a decision. Our study aims to elicit the willingness to accept (WTA) of farmers to 
plant and conserve forest in their private area as well as to investigate the different 
attributes of forest plantation scheme that encourage farmers to participate in the program. 
It examines whether the farmers in developing countries are concerned only with money 
when it comes to forest conservation program and whether there is heterogeneity in 
contract preferences among farmers. Our findings provide insightful information on 
farmers’ behavior and preferences which could contribute to the PFES related policy 
improvement in Vietnam in the future.  
The analysis is based on choice experiment (CE), a stated preference method that is 
able to incorporate nonmarket values, risk attitude as well as unobservable benefits or costs 
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incurred for substituting agricultural activities with forest plantation. Several studies on 
agri-environmental scheme underscore the importance of looking at social acceptability 
(Espinosa-Goded, 2010; Grosjean and Kontoleon, 2009; Horne, 2006; Ruto and Garrod, 
2009) and heterogeneity of farmer's preferences (Broch and Vedel, 2012; Hudson and 
Lusk, 2004) when determining the factors affecting farmers' participation. Most of these 
choice experiment studies are conducted in developed countries, except for the study on the 
sustainability of sloping land conversion program in China (Grosjean and Kontoleon, 
2009). Therefore, our study also contributes to the very limited research in developing 
countries on the trade-off between environmental conservation and economic development. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows; Section 3.2 describes the study area; 
The conceptual framework, design of the choice experiment, econometric model and data 
collection are presented in Section 3.3; Section 3.4 reports and discusses the results; and 
Section 3.5 provides conclusions. 
 
3.2 Study area 
The study area is the mountainous district of Da Bac, the largest district of Hoa Binh 
province located in the northwestern region of Vietnam. Da Bac district is the largest 
district in the province and is located at the highest altitude above sea level (560 meters). In 
addition, it has the lowest population density in the province (66 persons per square km) 
(Hoa Binh Statistical office, 2011). The majority of the population is comprised of ethnic 
groups, which are the Tay, the Muong, and the Dao. The study area in Da Bac district has 
diversified economic activities due to its proximity to Ha Noi, which is about 100 km 
away, as well as its varied geography which includes the Hoa Binh reservoir in the south 
and a steep mountainous area in the north. Over two-thirds of the area is covered by natural 
forests (39%) and production forests (28%). Agricultural area, including paddy field, is 
merely 7% of the total area and nearly one-fifth of the area is identified as unused land. 
Rice is grown as a subsistence crop in irrigated paddy fields of the lowlands while the main 
crops cultivated in the uplands are maize, cassava, and arrow root. In general, households 
also have small scale livestock farming for home consumption and income generation. 
Fishery and aquaculture are practiced in the communes located near the reservoir. In Da 
Bac district, forest land has been allocated to individual households since 1994 (Tran et al., 
2013) under the 1993 Land Law. Households received a Land Use Certificate (also known 
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as a 'Redbook') as proof that its holder has the legal rights to exchange, transfer, lease, 
inherit, and mortgage the land use right for the purpose of forestry for 50 years.  
  
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Conceptual framework 
This study applies the concept of agri-environmental scheme which gives farmers 
incentives to carry out environmentally beneficial activities on their land. We ask farmers 
to consider whether they want to participate in the voluntary forest plantation program and 
receive compensation (subsidy) from government in return. Choice experiment (CE) is 
employed to collect preference data from respondents in a hypothetical situation. The aim 
of CE is to place the decision maker in a certain frame of mind to compare a number of 
alternatives, each described in terms of some number of attributes (Adamowicz et al., 
1998). In our case, the hypothetical baseline and contract attributes are stimuli and the 
individual’s choice is the elicited response. According to Bennett and Birol (2010), the 
advantage of using CE rather than other stated preference technique is that it can examine 
the trade-off between different contract attributes, both quantitative and qualitative. 
Theoretically, the CE approach is based on consumer theory (Lancaster, 1966) which states 
that consumption decisions are determined by utility derived from the separable attributes 
of a good rather than the good per se. 
3.3.2 Hypothetical baseline 
Our study employs a hypothetical baseline to examine what households would do if 
circumstances changed and farmers were confronted with a new program (Whittington and 
Adamowicz, 2011). The respondents are informed that they would be allocated one hectare 
of land per household in the steep slope area, located about one km away from the 
respondent’s house. We pose this baseline due to the fact that there is an inequality among 
farmers in terms of land holdings. This baseline is plausible from farmers' perspective 
since it is in line with the past forest land allocation in the study area. The size and location 
of the land are given to respondents to minimize the bias that may occur from the 
discrepancy of judgment towards the land and hence the value that respondents place on 
program participation. To underline the importance of the voluntary aspect of the program 
and to ensure that the farmers understand the questions and consider them seriously, we 
begin by asking the respondents about what they would do with this plot of land and its 
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reason. We then provide them with basic information about the new forest plantation 
program that the government would like to propose. This information is important as it 
minimizes the extent of farmers’ own interpretation on information that is not explicitly 
mentioned, and it contains three main components. First, the government will provide all 
the establishment costs of forest plantation including seedlings, fertilizer and labor 
compensation to participants. This aspect is critical since these initial costs of forest 
plantation are found to be different among farmers and would confound the valuation of 
WTA, as farmers with a higher initial cost may give a higher WTA and vice versa. Second, 
the program will have the duration of ten years, and the third aspect is that the choice of 
tree will suit the local condition. This is quite important because some farmers were not 
satisfied with past government programs that offered the tree species that were not suitable 
to the local conditions and consequently a substantial number of trees have died. To 
capture the preference on tree species, the respondents are asked about the choice of trees 
they prefer to grow before starting with the choice tasks. 
3.3.3 Attributes and attribute levels 
After defining the setting of the proposed forest plantation program, the next important 
stage is to select the attributes and their levels. These are initially identified from the 
literature and prior experience of forest plantation support programs in the study area. We 
then further examine the relevance of these attributes through focus group discussions to 
ensure that the chosen attributes accommodate farmers’ preferences and the levels do not 
seem unrealistic from their perspective. At the same time, we also take into consideration 
policy concerns and potential improvement in the future when choosing the attributes. The 
list of attributes and their levels are shown in Table 3.1. Due to the concern on cognitive 
complexity of the questions, we assign only two different levels to each attribute except for 
the subsidy level which has three different levels.  
There are two sources of monetary benefits from participating in the program. The 
first is through the sale of planted trees, and this attribute comprises two levels. One of 
them is a conservation oriented policy where the participant is not allowed to harvest any 
timber products except for use in house construction and with a maximum allocation of ten 
cubic meters for the whole period. Another level is a production or commercial oriented 
policy where the participant is allowed to harvest up to 50% of matured timber products. 
However, the participant is free to harvest any non-timber forest products under both 
levels. This policy is included to examine farmers’ preference beyond the current practice 
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where farmers are free to harvest timber. The second source of pecuniary benefit is the 
subsidy per hectare per year which has three levels ranging from 500,000 VND (USD 25) 
to 1,500,000 VND (USD 75). Establishing the appropriate level of subsidy is a crucial and 
challenging task which requires careful considerations. On the one hand, setting the 
subsidy too high would result in all respondents wanting to participate in the program and 
hence overestimating the WTA. In addition, a proposed subsidy that is far higher than the 
past government offers would lead to unrealistic policy implications. On the other hand, if 
the subsidy is too low, there will be no one participating in the program which would result 
in bias in estimation. To identify an appropriate range of subsidy, we set the figure with 
previous programs as a reference point and then use the survey pretests with local people to 
find the minimum amount that is acceptable among a diverse group of respondents.  
Table 3.1 Attributes examined in the choice experiment 
Attribute Description Levels 
Harvesting policy 
All participants can harvest 
non-timber forest products. The 
difference between the two 
levels is the extent to which 
participant can harvest timber 
products. 
1. Participant cannot harvest 
timber except for the volume used 
for house construction  
(up to 10 m3) 
2. Participant can harvest 50% of 
timber  
Frequency of 
forest 
maintenance 
How often is participant obliged 
to maintain the forest per year 
throughout the contract period. 
1. Once a month 
2. Once every three months 
Punishment  
The severity of punishment in 
case of contract violation. 
1. Contract would be terminated  
and participant has to return all the 
payment received 
2. Pay a fine of 100,000 VND per 
time of violation 
Subsidy  The amount of cash participant 
receives per ha per year 
1. 500,000 VND (USD 25) 
2. 1,000,000 VND (USD 50) 
3. 1,500,000 VND (USD 75) 
Frequency of 
subsidy payment 
The frequency of subsidy 
payment to participant per 
contract year. In case of two 
times per year, half of the 
amount will be provided on 
mid-year and another half at the 
end of the year. 
1. One time per year 
2. Two times per year 
 
The next attribute is the obligation to maintain forest which includes two options of 
once a month or once every three months. The next attribute lists the punishment when the 
contract is violated. There is one level with a relatively strong punishment where the 
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contract would be terminated and the participant is obliged to return all the payment they 
have received, including the initial cost of forest establishment. Another level of 
punishment is weaker, as participant only needs to pay a fine of 100,000 VND 
(approximately USD 5) per time of violation. The final attribute reflects how frequent the 
subsidy will be delivered to the participant. This aspect of the contract is included to check 
whether the farmers prefer the more frequent cash flow to the conventional once a year 
payment.  
3.3.4 Experimental design 
In our case, the use of a generic title for alternatives, or unlabeled experiment (Hensher et 
al., 2005), is considered to be more suitable since the specific title of the contract is not 
meaningful for our research goal. After identifying the attributes and associated levels, we 
generate different combinations of these levels called treatment combinations or choice 
profiles. We employ the full factorial design in which all possible treatment combinations 
are included. There are four attributes with two levels, and one attribute with three levels, 
making it a total of 48 profiles (2x2x2x2x3). Following the recommendation of Street et al. 
(2005) for an efficient design, we construct 24 pairs from 48 combinations, and there are at 
least three attributes that differ in each pair. Then, 24 pairs of alternatives are randomly 
formed into three groups in which eight different choice sets will be shown, one by one, to 
each respondent. According to Hess et al. (2012), there is no evidence of respondent 
fatigue for answering up to 16 choice sets, and our design falls within this limit. 
Nonetheless, we also checked for respondents’ fatigue and their comprehension of the 
questions during pretest and found that respondents had no difficulties in answering the 
choice scenarios. Three different groups (blocks) of choice sets are randomly distributed in 
each village to ensure that there is no bias in responses of choice sets by location. 
3.3.5 Questionnaire development 
There are eight different choice cards in one group with each card representing a choice set 
as shown in Figure 3.1. The respondents are asked to choose one option, either contract A 
or B, or they can choose not to participate in the program at all. This opt-out option is 
included to reflect the real situation of demand for goods and services. The actual choice 
cards contain simplified local language (Vietnamese) combined with pictures and are 
shown to the respondent while the enumerator is providing the explanation. The follow-up 
question of why the respondent chooses a particular choice is asked for each choice set to 
ensure that the respondent understands the task correctly. Prior to the choice questions, we 
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ask the respondents to rank the attributes in the order of importance towards a successful 
forest plantation program. This ranking aims to make the respondents start thinking about 
the forest plantation program. The response can also be used to check the consistency of 
the choice answers later on. After finishing all the eight choice tasks, the respondent are 
asked to rate the feasibility of the hypothetical scenario and the choice questions. The 
reason for choosing not to participate in the program is investigated as well.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Example of a choice set 
 
3.3.6 Econometric framework 
The specification of choice model is based on the random utility theory (McFadden, 1974) 
where the utility, U, of a household i on a good j can be written in the form of a 
deterministic component (V) and a stochastic term (ε): 
𝑈𝑖𝑗 =  𝑉𝑖𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑗 ≡  𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
where V depends on the observable variables xij that include attributes of alternatives, 
household socio-economic characteristics as well as factors related to the decision context, 
βi is a vector of coefficients of these variables for household i representing the household’s 
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preferences, and εij is a random term that is i.i.d. extreme value type 1. According to the 
theory, a household will choose an alternative k from a set of competing alternatives C 
when the indirect utility of k is greater than the indirect utility of any alternative, j. The 
probability of choosing k can be expressed as Pr(𝑘|𝐶) = 𝑃𝑟�(𝑉𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘) > �𝑉𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗�� =  𝑃𝑟�(𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘) > �𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗��,∀𝑗 ≠ 𝑘; 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝐶 
Our objective is to identify and estimate the β vector associated with the explanatory 
variables for the choice made. To estimate the preference parameter vector β, we use 
random parameter logit (RPL) model, also known as mixed logit model. Conditional on 
parameter βi, the probability that household i chooses a specific alternative k in a choice 
task n (which has the sequence n=1, ..., N) from the three alternatives (contract A, contract 
B or no participation) is 
𝑃𝑟(𝑖𝑘|𝛽𝑖) =  exp(𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖𝑘)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑗�
𝐽
𝑗
 
However, the researcher does not know βi and therefore cannot condition on β. Following 
Train (2009), the unconditional choice probability is the integral of Pr (ik) over all possible 
βi . Then the probability of choosing alternative k under RPL model becomes 
Pr(𝑖𝑘) = ���� 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽𝑖′𝑥𝑖𝑘)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝�𝛽𝑖
′𝑥𝑖𝑗�
𝐽
𝑗
�
𝑁
𝑛=1
�𝑓(𝛽)𝑑𝛽 
where f(β) is identified as a normal distribution function for β with mean b and covariance 
matrix W. The model is not subject to the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
condition. It utilizes the repeated observations taken from each respondent, by making 
preference parameters constant over choice task within individual household but not 
among different households. This type of specification is more likely to enhance the 
explanatory power of the model (Broch and Vedel, 2012) than using conditional logit that 
requires IIA property and assumes homogenous preference across respondents. The choice 
probability does not have a closed form solution, thus it will be approximated through 
simulation. The parameters are estimated by maximizing the simulated likelihood function 
across sampled households. 
3.3.7 Estimation procedure 
The model contains variables related to five contract attributes (HARVEST, MAINTAIN, 
PUNISH, FREQUENCY, SUBSIDY) which are assumed to be random parameters and 
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have normal distribution except for the subsidy attribute that is assigned to be a fixed 
parameter.13
The RPL model allows us to identify the determinants of participating in the program 
as a function of contract attributes and household socio-economic factors. We can also 
estimate the marginal willingness to accept (or implicit price) associated with changes in 
contract attributes. Suppose the estimated subsidy parameter is βsubsidy and the parameter of 
an attribute has mean βatt and standard deviation σatt. Then the implicit price of the attribute 
would have the mean of βatt/ βsubsidy and the standard deviation of σatt/ βsubsidy (Hensher et 
 The model also includes an alternative specific constant (ASC) which takes 
the value of one when the household chooses either contract A or B or zero otherwise. The 
function of ASC is to capture all other attributes that are unobservable or omitted from the 
model. In addition, we include in the model household specific characteristics which are 
shown in the literature to be the determinants of farmer participation in agri-environmental 
programs (Espinosa-Goded, 2010; Grosjean and Kontoleon, 2009; Ruto and Garrod, 2009; 
Zbinden and Lee, 2005). These variables include socioeconomic indicators of households 
such as: (1) age of household head (AGE = 1 if household head's age is equal to or less 
than 55 years old), (2) education attainment of household head (EDUC = 1 if household 
head has high school certificate or higher level of education), (3) annual household income 
per capita in VND (INCOME), and (4) number of household members aged 18-60 years 
old who are able to work (ACTIVES). In addition to the profile of household, access to the 
main road (ROAD = 1) is also considered important for the decision to participate in the 
program. The previous participation in the government forest plantation program 
(PASTSUPPORT = 1) is included as this factor can influence the perception of farmers on 
joining another government program. The type of trees that farmers wish to plant is 
hypothesized to influence the participation since some farmers do not want to participate if 
the seedlings provided are not suitable for the climatic or soil conditions. Two main types 
of trees (ACACIA and BAMBOO) are included in the model. These household specific 
variables are entered into the choice model by interacting with ASC to generate variation 
within the choice set. The estimation of such interaction terms examines which household 
characteristics affect the likelihood of participating in the proposed program. The RPL 
model is estimated using 500 Halton draws in order to obtain consistent estimates.  
                                                            
13 The variable is treated as random parameter means that the coefficient is assumed to vary across 
individuals. On the contrary, fixed parameter means that the coefficient is assumed to be the same 
for every observation (Hensher et al., 2005).  
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al., 2005). More importantly, the minimum willingness to accept (total consumer surplus) 
for farmers to participate in the program can be estimated by 
𝑊𝑇𝐴 =  −(𝑉0 − 𝑉1)/𝛽𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦 
where V0 is the indirect utility associated with the status quo of no program and V1 is the 
indirect utility obtained from participating in the program.  
3.3.8 Sampling and data collection 
Two rounds of household survey were conducted from November to December 2011 and 
from August to September 2012 in Da Bac district, Hoa Binh province. A two-stage cluster 
sampling procedure was employed where a village-level sampling frame was constructed 
based on the number of households per village. At the first stage, 20 villages were 
randomly selected using the Probability Proportionate to Size method (Carletto, 1999), 
resulting in larger villages having a higher probability to be selected. Then, 15 households 
were randomly selected in each of the selected villages using village level household lists. 
For the two villages that did not have a household list, the random walk method (Henry et 
al., 2003) was used to select the sampled households. In total, the dataset consists of 300 
households which are representative at the district and village levels. For the second round 
survey, nine households were missing due to unavoidable reasons such as sickness, death 
and relocation. Apart from the choice questions, the questionnaire covered a wide range of 
topics ranging from demographic, socio-economic data, food security, social capital, land 
use, land tenure, agricultural production, forest protection and production activities, and 
benefits from previous government programs.  
 
3.4 Results and discussion 
3.4.1 Household characteristics 
Table 3.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all households as well as the subsamples of 
households who chose to participate in at least one choice occasion and those who 
provided negative answers to all of the choice occasions. The analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) test is conducted to determine whether the means between the two groups are 
statistically different or not. Average age of household heads is about 44 years old and 
there is no significant difference between the groups. Almost all the household heads 
(92%) are men and the percentage of male household heads in the participating group is 
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significantly higher than in the non-participation group. Nearly four-fifth (79%) of all 
household heads has secondary education or higher and there is no significant difference 
between subsamples. Average household size is the same between groups, so is the case 
with land area where the two groups have an average area of 0.47 ha per capita. About 
80% of all households experienced food shortage in the past 12 months with no difference 
in food security status between subgroups. Average per capita income of all the households 
is about 5.8 million VND (USD 275)14
                                                            
14 2012 average exchange rate: USD 1= VND 20,899 (Vietcom Bank) 
 per year and there is no significant difference 
between groups. However, the share of non-farm and forest income is significantly higher 
for participating group (43.8%) than non-participating group (32.8%). The proportion is 
also higher in the participating group even if we consider only the income from forest 
(10.9% compared to 6.5%). This implies that households who have enjoyed greater 
earnings from alternative sources are more willing to participate in the forest plantation 
scheme than those who have earned less from non-farm activities. The road access data 
reveal that households in participating group have poorer access (32.8%) than households 
who do not want to participate in the program (43.8%), which may indicate that households 
with poor access to market need more assistance from the government. It is also possible 
that having limited market access leads to lower opportunity costs of labor and hence they 
are more likely to join the forest program. The current involvement in forestry also varies 
with a greater proportion of household (94.0%) in participating group being currently 
active in forest plantation than the non-participating group (81.0%). Along the same line, 
households who have received the support for forest plantation in the past are more willing 
to participate in the program. 
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Table 3.2 Household characteristics by decision to participate in the program 
Characteristics Participating (n=229) 
Non-
participating 
(n=62) 
All  
(n=291) 
Age of household head 44.3 45.5 44.5 
Gender of household head: 
 % Male 
94.0%* 87.0%* 92.0% 
Education: secondary school or 
higher 79.0% 82.3% 79.7% 
Household size 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Land area per capita (hectare) 0.47 0.47 0.47 
Food security status: % households 
experienced food shortage 81.0% 74.0% 80.0% 
Income per year per capita  
(in thousand VND) 
5,808 5,528 5,748 
Share of non-farm and forest income 43.8%** 32.8%** 41.5% 
Share of forest income 10.9%* 6.5%* 10.0% 
Access to road 34%** 48%** 37% 
Planting forest currently 94.0%*** 81.0%*** 91.0% 
Received support in the past 83.0%*** 65.0%*** 79.0% 
Note: ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of error probability from one-way 
ANOVA; n= number of observation 
 
On the reasons why farmers do not want to participate in any of the contracts, low 
subsidy amount is the most cited response at 33.9%. Lack of labor and household head 
being too old are the second most likely reason (24.2%) for not participating. Low level of 
trust in government is interestingly the third most given response (17.7%). This was due to 
some problems in the previous programs such as uncertainty in subsidy payment and 
seedlings that were not suitable for local conditions. Other economic-related reasons 
include the low income from forestry (12.9%) and the high risk involved (4.8%) due to the 
extreme weather in the mountainous area and benefits from forestry are accrued in the long 
term.  
3.4.2 Ranking of attributes  
Results of attribute ranking are reported in Table 3.3. The desire to earn more income from 
forest products is the most important facet of the program according to the participating 
households. However, the amount of subsidy is considered the most important factor for 
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non-participating group (35.5%). This is consistent with the finding that inadequate 
subsidy is the most common response for not choosing any contracts. Maintenance of 
forest is ranked as the second and third most important attribute for participating and non-
participating groups respectively. Frequency of subsidy payment and punishment in case of 
contract violation are relatively less important for both groups. 
Table 3.3 Attributes that promote the success of a forest plantation program 
Attribute 
Attribute is chosen as the first rank (%) 
All  
(n=290) 
Participating 
(n=228) 
Non-
participating 
(n=62) 
Opportunity to use or sell products for 
income 45.5 50.4 27.4 
Amount of subsidy from the 
government 26.6 24.1 35.5 
Forest must be regularly maintained 
by farmers 25.2 37.1 21.9 
Frequency of subsidy payment 7.2 5.3 14.5 
Punishment in case of contract 
violation 3.1 2.2 6.5 
Note: n= number of observation 
 
3.4.3 Choice of land use 
Farmers have been asked hypothetically what they would do with the land if they were 
allocated one. The answers from participating and non-participating households are shown 
in Table 3.4. Result from Pearson’s Chi-square test is statistically significant (p-value = 
0.00) which reveals that the choice of land use and intention to participate in the program 
are dependent on one another. Overall, most households want to plant forest (67.4%) if 
they were allocated an extra piece of land, suggesting that local farmers are inclined to 
plant forest even without any assistance offered. As expected, the proportion of households 
who want to plant forest is higher for the participating group (71.2%) than the non-
participating group (53.2%). The rest of the households who do not want to participate in 
the program prefer to use the land for cultivating food crops or other income generating 
activities such as raising livestock or leasing the land for a fee.  
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Table 3.4 Choices of land use by intention to participate in the program 
Activity 
Choices of land use (%) 
All 
(n=291) 
Participating 
(n=229) 
Non-
participating 
(n=62) 
Forest plantation 67.4 71.2 53.2 
Food crop cultivation 23.4 21.0 32.3 
Decision depends on land quality  4.8 5.7 1.6 
Others 4.5 2.2 12.9 
Note: n= number of observation 
 
3.4.4 Results from choice model  
Table 3.5 presents the coefficient estimates of the RPL model for the pooled sample of 
households as well as the subsamples according to the type of tree households want to 
grow. Acacia and bamboo are selected as they are the main species that farmers prefer to 
grow. All the three models are statistically significant with a p-value of zero. The pseudo-
R2 in all models is higher than 0.5, indicating that the explanatory power of the model is 
quite high.15
                                                            
15 Hensher et al. (2005; p. 337-339) shows the direct empirical relationship between the pseudo-R2 
and R2 of a linear regression model. Pseudo-R2 of 0.5 can be translated as an R2 of about 0.9.  
 The diagnostics of multicollinearity among explanatory variables show that 
there is no collinearity problem, as the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) of all 
variables is less than ten (Kutner et al., 2005) and the condition number is 15.95 which is 
less than the cut-off value of 30 (Belsley et al., 2005). The coefficients of contract 
attributes are highly significant and have the expected signs for all the models except for 
the frequency of subsidy payment which is not significant. The positive coefficients of 
harvesting policy, maintenance and punishment suggest that farmers prefer a more 
production oriented, less labor demanding and weaker punishment contract. Insignificant 
coefficient of payment frequency indicates that households are indifferent in how often 
they receive the subsidy. The ASC is negative and significant for only the pooled model,  
reflecting that in general without presenting the attributes of the contract, farmers are 
reluctant to sign up for the program. As expected, the amount of subsidy is positive and 
significant which means that farmers favor the higher subsidy amount per year. 
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Table 3.5 Coefficient estimates of RPL model by type of tree farmers want to 
grow 
Choice 
parameters 
Pooled data Acacia Bamboo 
Coeff. s.d. Coeff. s.d. Coeff. s.d. 
ASC (constant) -7.2127*** 
(1.9184) 
8.4693*** 
(0.9505) 
-0.6918 
(1.8131) 
5.6563*** 
(1.1861) 
-1.744 
(6.7569) 
8.3035*** 
(1.8979) 
Harvesting policy 
4.5287*** 
(0.4216) 
2.0510*** 
(0.2206) 
3.8677*** 
(0.5967) 
1.5778*** 
(0.2710) 
5.6567*** 
(1.0967) 
3.0330*** 
(0.6506) 
Maintenance 
frequency 
0.2135** 
(0.0830) 
0.4142*** 
(0.1361) 
0.2884** 
(0.1345) 
0.4317* 
(0.2473) 
0.3762** 
(0.1885) 
0.6498** 
(0.2955) 
Punishment 0.9413*** 
(0.1123) 
0.6608*** 
(0.1254) 
1.1083*** 
(0.2516) 
0.8641*** 
(0.2224) 
1.0547*** 
(0.2588) 
0.6197*** 
(0.2275) 
Subsidy amount 0.0021*** 
(0.0002) - 
0.0022*** 
(0.0004) - 
0.0019*** 
(0.0005) - 
Subsidy payment 
frequency 
0.0738 
(0.0935) 
0.0273 
(0.1700) 
0.0790 
(0.1493) 
0.1038 
(0.2399) 
0.1937 
(0.2186) 
0.0032 
(0.3183) 
Interactions with ASC 
Age 
1.4419 
(1.1349) - 
1.2346 
(1.6123) - 
-0.3225 
(5.4921) - 
Education 
-0.2498 
(0.8439) - 
-0.8712 
(1.2295) - 
-1.5925 
(1.8952) - 
Income 0.000002 
(0.00007) - 
0.00006 
(0.00008) - 
0.00002 
(0.0002) - 
Share of non-
farm and forest 
income 
2.5656* 
(1.4210) - 
-1.5307 
(2.1928) - 
3.4525 
(2.5581) - 
Active members 
-0.2523 
(0.3232) - 
-0.2636 
(0.4719) - 
-1.4913 
(1.0671) - 
Past support 4.1162*** (1.0011) - 
3.1279* 
(1.7766) - 
7.0749** 
(2.8864) - 
Access to road -3.5416*** (0.8506) - 
-4.0071*** 
(1.2138) - 
-4.9010** 
(2.3618) 
 
- 
Bamboo 
2.0107** 
(0.9897) - - - - - 
Acacia 4.9173*** (1.0554) - - - - - 
Pseudo R2 0.5598 0.5539 0.5819 
Log likelihood -863.7568 -300.4167 -195.7684 
AIC 1676.5140 636.8333 427.5368 
BIC 1904.5410 739.4305 523.8807 
No. of 
observations 
6,984 2,208 1,560 
Notes: Coeff. = coefficient estimates; s.d.= standard deviation; all parentheses denote standard 
errors. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5% and 10% level of error probability respectively. 
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The results also exhibit preference heterogeneity around the mean as demonstrated by 
the significant standard deviations of all the contract attributes. There is large variation 
within two parameters, ASC and maintenance frequency, as indicated by their high 
standard deviations. Such variation in maintenance frequency exists because approximately 
30% of the households prefer a higher maintenance frequency in contrast to the preference 
of the majority. Nearly 20% of the households have a positive ASC parameter estimate, 
indicating that they are willing to participate in the program even without knowing the 
contract attributes. 
The next set of results is the measures of marginal WTA or implicit price of each of 
the contract attributes as reported in Table 3.6. The table shows both the mean and standard 
deviation of WTA for attributes that are statistically significant from the RPL model 
estimation. The mean WTA of ASC shows that the minimum average compensation 
required for farmers to participate in the program without any other attributes is 3,434,619 
VND (USD 164.34) per hectare per year. However, farmers are also willing to forgo some 
amount of money if there are changes to the attribute levels of the contract. Harvesting 
policy is the most important attribute that households consider when they decide which 
contract to choose, as shown by the highest amount of implicit price. Households are 
willing to forgo 2,156,524 VND per hectare per year on average if the contracts allow them 
to harvest half of the timber, compared to a total ban on timber harvest. There is variation 
of mean WTA on harvesting policy between acacia and bamboo where farmers who want 
to grow bamboo are willing to forgo almost twice of the subsidy in order to harvest half of 
the timber, compared to those who want to grow acacia. This reflects that farmers place a 
higher value on bamboo harvest than acacia. The severity of punishment in case of contract 
violation comes as the second biggest concern, with households willing to give up 448,238 
VND to have a less strict rule of punishment. Households on average are also willing to 
forgo 101,667 VND per year if they are allowed to maintain their forest less often and 
those who prefer to grow bamboo are willing to give up more than the acacia households.  
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Table 3.6 Marginal willingness to accept by attributes (VND/year/household) 
Variable 
Pooled data Acacia Bamboo 
Mean 
WTA s.d. 
Mean 
WTA s.d. 
Mean 
WTA s.d. 
ASC -3,434,619 (-164.34) 
4,033,000 
(192.98) - - - - 
Harvesting 
policy 
2,156,524 
(103.19) 
976,667 
(46.73) 
1,758,045 
(84.12) 
717,182 
(34.32) 
2,977,211 
(142.46) 
1,596,316 
(76.38) 
Punishment 448,238 (21.45) 
314,667 
(15.06) 
503,773 
(24.11) 
392,773 
(18.79) 
555,105 
(26.56) 
326,158 
(15.61) 
Maintenance 
frequency 
101,667 
(4.86) 
197,238 
(9.44) 
131,091 
(6.27) 
196,227 
(9.39) 
198,000 
(9.47) 
342,000 
(16.36) 
Note: Numbers in brackets report value in USD; USD 1= 20,899 VND (average exchange 
rate in 2012, source: Vietcom Bank); s.d. = standard deviation. 
 
The results of ASC interacted variables reveal the determining factors for 
participation. Age, education, income and labor force are not statistically significant. The 
share of non-farm (including forest) income is positively significant only for the pooled 
model. It could be interpreted that farmers who are more successful with non-farm 
activities expect more benefits from forest plantation, hence are more willing to join the 
program. Previous experience of receiving support for forest plantation is positively 
significant for all the models, indicating that households who have participated in the 
government programs before wish to join the program again. Households who have easy 
access to market are less likely to participate in the program as shown by the negative and 
highly significant road access variable. Finally, type of tree is positive and significant 
which suggests households think that suitable tree choice is a factor contributing to the 
success of the program. 
Our main goal is to estimate the minimum WTA to plant forest which is shown in 
Table 3.7. Based on the results from RPL model where different attributes have been 
analyzed, total WTA is estimated by forming certain type of contract. We estimate two 
contract scenarios, taking into consideration the types of contract that could contribute to 
PES policy development. The first is the conservation oriented contract which forbids any 
timber harvest, requires monthly forest maintenance and any violation would lead to 
contract termination and return of previous payment to the government. The result reveals 
that on average the households are willing to accept 3,943,930 VND per hectare per year 
for participation in this type of contract. On the other hand, under the production oriented 
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scenario, households are even willing to pay on average 1,573,519 VND per hectare per 
year if the contract allows them to harvest 50% of timber, maintain forest once every three 
months, and only requires them to pay a fine, not contract termination, in case of contract 
violation. Our estimated WTA is higher than previous study of Bui and Hong (2008) which 
has average WTA of 190,000 VND per ha per year16
Table 3.7 Estimates of total WTA (VND/hectare/year) 
 as well as the compensation in piloted 
PFES policy which has a range from 130,000 to 280,000 VND per hectare per year 
(McElwee, 2012). However, the range of WTA estimates within the 95% confidence 
interval is quite large, reflecting a large variance of WTA across households.  
Contract scenario Mean WTA 95 % confidence interval Lower Upper 
Conservation oriented: 
Timber harvest is forbidden, participants 
have to maintain forest at least once a 
month, contract would be terminated if 
violated 
3,943,930 
(USD 188.7) 
473,418 
(USD 22.7) 
9,541,812 
(USD 456.6) 
Production oriented: 
50% of timber can be harvested, 
participants have to maintain forest at 
least once in every three months, fine 
payment when contract is violated 
-1,573,519 
(USD -75.3) 
-4,946,730 
(USD -236.7) 
3,867,062 
(USD 185.0) 
Note: average exchange rate for 2012 USD 1 = 20,899 VND (Vietcom Bank) 
 
3.4.5 Comparative analysis 
It is interesting to compare the monetary benefits farmers would obtain between 
participating and not participating in the forest plantation contracts. We examine the net 
present values (NPVs) of ten years benefit streams for conservation oriented contracts with 
two species of tree and for maize cultivation which is considered the most profitable 
agricultural activity in the study area. The result is reported in Table 3.8 with varying 
discount rates of 5%, 10% and 15%.17
                                                            
16 To be able to compare with our estimate, the value is adjusted to 2012 constant price. The 
average WTA by the time of study is 155,000 per ha per year. 
 It is obvious that on average the net profit from 
growing maize is far more substantial than signing up for the government forest programs, 
even more than double the upper level of WTA. The question arises as to why many 
farmers still choose to plant forest under the proposed program instead of using the land for 
cash crop cultivation. One plausible explanation is that some farmers may perceive other 
17 To establish the mid-point of discount rate, we use Vietnamese average inflation rate from 1999-
2012 which is approximately 7% (World Bank, 2012) plus opportunity cost of capital at 3% . Then 
we plus and minus 5% from the mid-point to set the range of discount rates. 
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benefits that do not show up in market transactions (Shaikh et al., 2007). Under the 
research setting where farmers are given extra piece of land, they may prefer to enter 
contract with government to have assured annual payment that can reduce risk from 
income variability or they may perceive environmental services from forest such as 
improvement in soil quality. Another reason is that market access for some households is 
too restricted for cash crops production, leaving them with no better option than receiving 
subsidy to plant forest. This factor is confirmed by the negative coefficient of road access 
in the RPL model as well as the result from ANOVA test showing that households who 
want to participate in the program have significantly poorer road access than those who do 
not. 
Table 3.8 NPVs of 10-year benefit from maize cultivation and conservation 
contract  
Discount 
rate (%) 
Maize 
cultivation 
Conservation contract 
Acacia 
plantation 
Bamboo 
plantation 
Acacia plantation 
with upper level 
WTA 
5% 154,428 23,933 7,238 75,603 
10% 123,891 17,656 5,136 57,619 
15% 101,938 13,324 3,708 44,994 
Note: The unit is thousand VND per ha; NPV for maize is calculated from the annual gross 
margins of 19.4 million VND per ha per year which is comparable to the data in Yen Chau 
district which is 20.4 million VND per ha per year (Saint-Macary et al., 2013). However, 
we assumed that cost of fertilizer increases by 5% every year. 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
This study utilizes choice experiment to elicit the willingness to accept to plant forest and 
examine the contract attributes that affect farmers’ preference and participation in the 
program. It contributes to a handful of research on choice experiment application in 
developing countries in the field of forest conservation scheme. The findings can inform 
policy makers on what types of forest conservation contracts are more attractive to local 
farmers, which is very useful for PFES policy implementation where voluntary 
participation is the key to the success of the policy. Hypothetical baseline and choice 
scenarios of five different attributes were applied through face-to-face interviews. Our 
results reveal that nearly two-third of the households want to plant forest if they were 
provided the extra piece of land and almost four-fifth of the households want to participate 
in at least one of the contracts. In our case where there are households who want to 
participate and who reject the program, indicating that the choice tasks are realistic and 
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respondents understood and took the choice decision seriously. The results from RPL 
model estimation reject the hypothesis that farmers are only concerned about the amount of 
subsidy from the government. These households also pay attention to how much they can 
harvest the timber, how often they need to maintain the forest and how strict the 
punishment is in case of contract violation. However, as harvesting policy has the highest 
marginal willingness to accept compared to the other attributes, farmers still tend to focus 
more on the potential pecuniary benefits from the program. 
There exists variation in the willingness to participate among different types of 
households. Those with a higher share of non-farm income and past experience of 
receiving support for forest plantation tend to be more interested in the program. 
Households who have market access to sell the products prefer not to join the program 
since they want to harvest all the planted forest without any restrictions from the 
government. Therefore, targeting the households in the remote villages where the road 
access is relatively poor may lead to a higher participation rate. Alternatively, the 
government would have to invest more resources to encourage farmers in the less remote 
villages to participate in the forest conservation program.  
Our results reveal that, surprisingly, farmers are even willing to pay to participate in a 
contract that allows up to 50% of timber harvest, does not demand a high maintenance 
frequency and has relatively weak regulations. However, if policy makers aim to 
implement the scheme that is more stringent for environmental protection, then a higher 
payment could be offered to encourage farmers to participate. It is evident that the 
willingness to accept for a conservation oriented contract is higher than the previous 
subsidy and the payment in the pilot PFES project, however, the result from our 
comparative analysis reveal that the subsidy is still far lower than the forgone income of 
cash crops cultivation. The reason could be that some farmers may perceive other benefits 
that do not show up in market transactions (Shaikh et al., 2007), such as the risk reduction 
from assured annual payment or environmental services from forest that could improve soil 
quality and so on. Imperfect credit and insurance market for crop production as well as 
limited market access for timber product could also lower farmers' WTA to plant forest. 
The finding underscores the fact that encouraging farmers to plant and conserve forest is 
not as costly as the opportunity cost of the land. Even though the local farmers tend to 
associate forestry more with monetary benefits, our findings have confirmed that there is 
A CHOICE EXPERIMENT TO ANALYZE WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT AND CONTRACT PREFERENCES  
 
57 
room for a more stringent forest conservation program as long as the farmers are 
adequately compensated. 
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Abstract 
Recent research on payments for environmental services (PES) has observed that high 
transaction costs (TCs) are incurred through the implementation of PES schemes and 
farmer participation. TCs incurred by households are considered to be an obstacle to the 
participation and efficiency of the policy. This study aims to understand transactions 
related to previous forest plantation programs and to estimate the actual TCs incurred by 
farmers who participated in these programs in a mountainous area of northwestern 
Vietnam. It also examines determinants of household TCs to test a hypothesis whether the 
amount of TCs vary according to household characteristics. Results show that average TCs 
are not likely to be a constraint for participation since they are about 200,000 VND (USD 
10) per household per contract, equivalent to about two days of wages. However, TCs 
amount to more than one-third of program benefits, which is relatively high compared to 
programs in developed countries. This implies that rather than aiming to reduce TCs, an 
appropriate agenda for policy improvement is to balance the level of TCs with program 
benefits to enhance the overall attractiveness of afforestation programs for smallholder 
farmers. Regression analysis indicates that household characteristics do not play a major 
role in determining the level of TCs. Only education, gender, and perception towards 
programs have significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Recent research on payments for environmental services (PES) has observed that high 
transaction costs (TCs) are incurred through the implementation of PES schemes and 
farmer participation (e.g., Dunn, 2011; FAO, 2007; To et al., 2012). TCs incurred in setting 
up and managing PES schemes are central to their sustainability. Many studies have 
reported that TCs are a significant factor in farmers’ decision to participate. Some studies 
find that higher TCs are likely to be greater obstacles to the participation of poor 
households in PES schemes than the households’ own capacity and resources (Behera and 
Engel, 2004; Engel, 2008; Locatelli et al., 2008; Wunder, 2008). Several studies find that 
participation decisions are highly influenced by fixed TCs (Goetz, 1992; Key et al., 2000; 
Kranton, 1996; Ouma et al., 2010). Omano (1998) shows that tension between TCs and 
participation in specialized farming may contribute to smallholders’ disregard for more 
income through greater specialization. Studies on agri-environmental schemes (AES)18
This article contributes to the literature on PES by investigating TCs incurred by 
smallholder farmers who participated in forest management schemes in a mountainous area 
of northwestern Vietnam. In September 2010, the government of Vietnam decreed the 
policy of payment for forest environmental services, which gave payments to service 
 
also claim that TCs do matter for farmers' decision to participate in such schemes 
(Falconer, 2000; Mettepenningen et al., 2009; Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2005). The concern 
over households' TCs is also related to the efficiency of implementation of agricultural 
policies (e.g., Buchl and Flury, 2005; Rørstad et al., 2007) and nature conservation 
practices (e.g., Falconer and Saunders, 2002; Mburu et al., 2003). The issue of high TCs, 
which can be an obstacle to farmers' participation and efficiency of the program, is 
acknowledged by the European Commission who introduced the compensation of TCs in 
calculating agri-environmental payments since 2005. To minimize a potential constraint 
from high TCs through participation in PES schemes, it is of importance to calculate the 
actual TCs incurred by farmers. However, few studies have empirically estimated farmers' 
TCs (Buchl and Flury, 2005; Falconer, 2000; Mburu et al., 2003; Falconer and Saunders, 
2002; Vatn et al., 2002; Rørstad et al., 2007; Mettepenningen et al., 2009). Instead, most 
studies tend to observe patterns of participation without determining which factors cause 
participation or non-participation (Engel et al., 2008).  
                                                            
18 AES is based on long-term, voluntary contracts between farmers and the government, whereby 
the exchange of certain environmental management and compensation fee are exchanged. 
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providers for forest protection activity. Studying TCs on past forest management schemes 
have policy implications for PES implementation and design of regulations and guidelines 
in the future. Our study aims to understand the processes and transactions related to past 
forest plantation programs and to estimate TCs incurred by farmers who participated in 
these programs. Another objective of this study is to examine determinants of household 
TCs to test whether the amount of TCs vary according to household characteristics. There 
are only a handful of studies that have empirically investigated factors determining the 
level of TCs of farmers’ participation in forest management programs (e.g., Adhikari and 
Lovett, 2006; Arifin, 2006; Meshack et al., 2006). Lastly, we review some studies on TCs 
of farmers participating in community-based schemes to compare the levels of 
commitment required in individual versus community-based participation. 
In current studies, focus is given to TCs involved in the implementation and 
monitoring of PES schemes. Recommendations to reduce TCs have been biased towards 
the adoption of community-based management as cost-saving alternatives (e.g., Jundal and 
Kerr, 2007; Meshack et al., 2006). By reducing the number of providers into group entities, 
TCs incurred by buyers or intermediaries of ecosystem services are substantially reduced. 
However, some studies have shown that time spent by participants in group meetings, 
planning, and decision making is the source of most TCs, which is a disadvantage of 
community-based programs. Community-based forest management may lower TCs 
incurred by the buyer or government, but a large portion of these costs is transferred to and 
taken up by members of the community or groups. Such a transfer is cost-efficient (i.e., it 
reduces the sum of transaction costs incurred by principal and agents) if the local group has 
information advantages over the principal, i.e., the buyer of the environmental service. This 
has been argued by Zeller (1998) and Sharma and Zeller (1998) for the case of 
microfinance institutions that transfer the functions of screening and monitoring borrowers 
to local solidarity credit groups who take out loans under joint liability for repayment of 
the loan lent to the group. We aim to understand differences in the level of TCs between 
individual and community-based forest management through a literature review and key 
stakeholder interviews. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 4.2 
describes the study area and forest plantation support programs; Section 4.3 contains the 
methodology, including data collection and econometric estimation strategy; Section 4.4 
reports the results with discussions; and Section 4.5 provides conclusions. 
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4.2 Study area 
The study area is the mountainous district of Da Bac, the largest district in Hoa Binh 
province. The district is located in northwestern Vietnam, with the highest altitude reaching 
560 meters above sea level. Its population density is 66 persons per sq. km. in 2010, which 
was the lowest in the province (Hoa Binh Statistical Office, 2011) and was approximately 
one-fifth of the average population density of the entire country. The study area has 
diversified economic activities due to its proximity to Ha Noi – about 100 km away – and 
various types of geographical conditions – the south is adjacent to the Hoa Binh reservoir, 
whereas the north is steep and mountainous. Forest occupies about two-thirds of district, 
with natural forest accounting for 39% and production forest for 28% of the total area. 
Agriculture, including paddy field, accounts for merely 7% of the total area, whereas 
nearly one-fifth of the total area is identified as unused land. Rice is grown as a subsistence 
crop in irrigated paddy fields in the lowlands. The main crops cultivated in the uplands are 
maize, cassava, and arrow root. In general, households also have small scale livestock 
farming for home consumption and income generation. Fishery and aquaculture are 
practiced in the communes located near the reservoir. In Da Bac district, forest land has 
been allocated to individual households since 1994 according to the 1993 Land Law (Tran 
et al., 2013). Households receive the land use certificate, also known as the 'Redbook' 
given the appearance of the certificate, as proof that its holder has the legal rights to 
exchange, transfer, lease, inherit, and mortgage the land use right over the designated land 
for the purpose of forestry for 50 years.19
Forest plantation support programs  
  
In the past, several government programs have been implemented to provide support for 
forest plantation even though the main purposes of these programs differ. The most well-
known and most participated in program is the resettlement program, known as Program 
747, for households that were relocated from the Hoa Binh dam construction site and its 
reservoir area. Although a main goal of this program was to stabilize socio-economic 
development for resettled households, the support of forest plantation is another element of 
the program. In particular, investment in short term growing trees, such as bamboo, was 
supported by the provision of bamboo seedlings and cash for compensating labor costs for 
                                                            
19 The period of land use right of agricultural land for planting annual and perennial crops is 20 
years. 
TRANSACTION COSTS OF FARMERS' PARTICIPATION IN FOREST MANAGEMENT 
64 
a period of three years. The amount of support varies among different communes. The 
program also provided training on techniques of tree plantation and maintenance.  
Another important program was the Five-Million-Hectare-Reforestation Program (also 
known as Program 661), which has the main goal of supporting forest plantation at the 
national level. The program began in 1998, after the start of Program 747, and initially 
offered loans to companies for reforestation with the purpose of forest protection. The 
program evolved to include the provision of direct support to plantations established by 
households since 2006 (Sikor, 2011). The program was planned and implemented through 
several hundred local projects designed and carried out by localities after being approved 
by higher level authorities. The government provided a broad framework and indicated a 
set of policies. Thus, local authorities were given a high degree of freedom to design 
activities (MARD, 2000).  
Households in the study area have received support from Program 661 through 
projects executed by the district-level office of Agriculture and Rural Development and 
State Forest Enterprise (SFE). For individual farmers, there are two types of support 
according to the purpose of forest plantation, namely, protection and production. Our 
analysis focuses only on the production forest component of the program, which provided 
tree seedlings and cash as a compensation for labor. The forestry department at the 
provincial level specified the type of trees and technical design of the plantation, such as 
how many trees per hectare and the distance between each tree. The program provided 
support mainly for acacia and other slow growing trees and had a maximum total value of 
support of 2 to 3 million VND (approximately USD 95 to 144) per hectare, depending on 
the type of seedling. The allocation of the support can be categorized as seedling and labor 
costs, which were granted to farmers directly, and administrative costs which accounted for 
5-7% of the total value of support deducted by local officers. The payment for labor 
compensation was not fixed, but instead was contingent on the quality and survival rate of 
the trees. As a worst case scenario, farmers would not receive the labor compensation if the 
percentage of tree cover is lower than 50% of the designated number of trees per hectare. If 
farmers maintained trees well, so that tree coverage is more than 85%, farmers would 
receive the full amount of labor compensation one year from the beginning of the contract. 
Table 4.1 summarizes the details of both programs. In addition to these two main 
programs, there were other forest plantation programs implemented in the study area; 
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however, because only a few households participated in these programs, they are not 
considered in this study. 
Table 4.1 Details of the two forest plantation programs 
Name of the 
program 
Goal Description of the 
program 
Target group 
Resettlement 
program  
(Program 747) 
-To stabilize the 
socioeconomic 
development in the 
resettled area from 
the construction of 
the Hoa Binh dam 
-The provision of 
material, cash, and 
training for forest 
plantation (especially 
bamboo) and other 
infrastructure or 
material support for 
livelihood 
improvements 
according to local 
needs 
 
-Households who 
have resettled as a 
consequence of the 
construction of the 
Hoa Binh dam  
Five-Million-
Hectare-
Reforestation 
Program 
(Program 661) 
-To increase forest 
cover to more than 
40% of the total area 
-To create 
employment and 
increase income to 
eliminate hunger and 
poverty 
- To supply enough 
raw material for 
forest product 
processing industries 
-The provision of 
material, cash, and 
training for forest 
plantation (e.g., acacia 
and chinaberry) 
-Any households 
who owns forest 
land  
Note: For Program 661, we consider only the component of the program related to 
production forest. 
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Conceptual framework 
Transaction costs are originally defined by Coase (1960) as the costs of carrying out a 
transaction by means of an exchange on the open market. However, to conduct an 
empirical analysis of private TCs from forest plantation programs, we adapt this definition 
of TCs and define them as costs that arise from organizing the transfer of goods and 
services between two agents. We focus on the transfer of support (material, cash, etc.) from 
the government in the exchange of forest cover provided by farmers. Literature on private 
TCs distinguishes the following three categories (e.g., Mburu et al., 2003; Mettepenningen 
et al., 2009; Van Huylenbroeck et al., 2005). The first category of TCs consist of search 
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and information costs, which arise ex-ante to the transaction and include the costs of 
looking for information for forest plantation programs and costs related to making the 
decision to join the programs. The second category is ex-ante negotiation costs, or in our 
case application costs since real negotiation on contract terms between the government and 
farmers does not exist in the programs. Application costs cover the costs of fulfilling 
preliminary conditions to be able to participate in the program, such as contacting 
government officers or following a specific training. The third category of TCs occur ex-
post to the transaction and comprise of costs that farmers incur as a result of monitoring 
and enforcement required by the government, such as  accompanying control officers to the 
field when the forest needs to be inspected.  
According to Williamson (1996), apart from the behavior of farmers and the 
institutional arrangement in which the transaction takes place, the level of TCs also 
depends upon the attributes of the transaction. These attributes include asset specificity, 
uncertainty, and transaction frequency. Asset specificity is defined as the degree to which 
an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses and by alternative users without sacrificing 
productive value: higher levels of asset specificity imply higher TCs (Williamson, 1996). 
The level of asset specificity of the forest plantation programs can be evaluated based on 
the sources of asset specificity. These sources are site specificity, temporal specificity, 
specific physical assets, human capital, brand name specificity, and dedicated assets 
(Williamson, 1996). High uncertainty due to unanticipated changes in the environment and 
opportunistic behavior from one of the partners increases TCs (Van Huylenbroeck et al., 
2005). Lastly, TCs are reduced if transactions are repeated over time because of reduced 
efforts to search for information, apply, and monitor (Mettepenningen and Van 
Huylenbroeck, 2009).  
Figure 4.1 shows the conceptual framework. We also apply this framework to a 
qualitative review of the levels of TCs incurred in individual versus community-based 
participation in forest management. 
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework 
4.3.2 Sampling and data collection 
Two household survey rounds were conducted in November and December 2011 and from 
August to September 2012 in Da Bac district, Hoa Binh province. A two-stage cluster 
sampling procedure was employed. In the first stage, 20 villages were randomly selected 
using the Probability Proportionate to Size method (Carletto, 1999). Therefore, larger 
villages have a higher probability of being selected. In the second stage, 15 households 
were randomly selected in each of the previously selected villages using village level 
household lists. There were two villages that did not have a list, so the random walk 
method (Henry et al., 2003) was used to select households. In total, the dataset consists of 
300 households and is representative at the district and village levels. For the second 
survey round, nine households could not be interviewed due to unavoidable reasons, such 
as sickness, death, and relocation. Apart from questions about time and cost spent on each 
transaction as well as benefits and perceptions towards forest plantation programs, the 
questionnaire covered a wide range of topics, such as demographic and socio-economic 
information, food security status, social capital indicators, land use, land tenure, 
agricultural production, and forest plantation activities.  
A starting point to analyze TCs is to examine transactions for each household who 
participated in a forest plantation program. We asked household heads about the most 
recent programs that they participated in since details on transactions are easier to recall 
and therefore the data is more reliable and complete. Respondents were asked about the 
activities that they have done related to participation in the program and how much time 
- Search and information costs 
- Negotiation and application 
costs 
- Actual transaction or 
contract signing 
- Costs of enforcement 
- Monitoring costs 
 
High uncertainty 
 - Asset specificity 
- Frequency 
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and money were spent for each activity. Such activities are clearly distinguished from 
production activities, such as forest planting and maintaining processes. A list of activities 
is first obtained from focus group discussions in the villages that are not included in our 
sample villages. The participants were selected by village head on a basis that the group 
members comprise of different genders and ages. Activities are then categorized into three 
types as mentioned above. The first type is the search and information gathering activity, 
which consists of participation in village meetings by household heads or representatives to 
obtain information about the program, decision making process, and any other activities 
before signing the contract.20
One challenge of estimating private TCs is the monetization of time inputs reported by 
farmers. Studies that estimate private TCs have used the opportunity cost of labor, such as 
the market wage rate (e.g., Mburu et al., 2003; Mettepenningen et al., 2009; OECD, 2005) 
or household farm income (Falconer and Saunders, 2002); however, wage rates for labor in 
rural areas in many developing countries may not accurately reflect the opportunity cost of 
labor because the labor market is not perfectly competitive (Gittinger, 1984). To estimate 
TCs incurred from time spent in participating in the program, we use an average wage rate 
multiplied by the reported time. However, the possibilities of working outside of the farm 
are not the same for each farmer since they depend on the location of the village in terms of 
its distance to the closest town where it is easier to find a job, such as factory work. 
Another factor is the quality of road access to the village, which is considered to be a 
barrier for finding a job due to lack of market access, especially for local small-scale 
businesses (e.g., toothpick production). Therefore, we adjust the value of TCs based on the 
assumed varying opportunity costs of labor according to location and road access. This 
adjustment is indicated by conversion factors which are shown in Table 4.2. Here, the 
opportunity costs of labor for farmers in remote villages with poor quality roads are only a 
fraction of the local average market wage rate (83,000 VND per day), as compared to 
 The second type of application activities includes contract 
signing, learning about the technical aspect of tree growing, or attending trainings, or 
receiving tree seedlings. The last type of monitoring and enforcement activities consists of 
accompanying officers for evaluating the plot during the forest establishment period 
(cleaning the weed, preparing the land, and growing trees), maintenance period, and the 
period until the payments have been received, as well as transactions that occur when 
farmers receive the payment.  
                                                            
20 The term 'signing the contract' in this case indicates the action where participants give their 
signatures to the officers when they receive the tree seedlings. 
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villages closer to the center of the district where it is assumed that the opportunity costs of 
labor are equal to the market wage rate. 
Table 4.2 Value of time input by location and road quality factors 
Village type Conversion factor Value of time input 
Villages near the town  
(district center) 1 
Labor days of transaction x 83,000 VND 
Remote villages with good 
road access 0.5 
Labor days of transaction x 83,000 VND 
x 0.5 
Remote villages with poor 
road access 0.2 
Labor days of transaction x 83,000 VND 
x 0.2 
 
4.3.3 Estimation strategy 
We use regression analysis to investigate whether the level of TCs differs across 
households due to household and program characteristics, focusing on differences in 
incentives created for participants to bear TCs. Our regression analysis is limited to 
Program 747 and Program 661 since they are the main programs that provide support for 
forest plantation in the study area. In addition, because these two programs are more 
recent, households are able to remember the details of these programs’ activities better than 
other programs. However, there are 49 cases of missing data on household TCs due to the 
fact that some household members could not recall the details of activities undertaken 
when they participated in the program. Using analysis of variance (ANOVA), we 
investigate whether respondents with missing data on TCs differ systematically from those 
who could recall data on TCs for a number of pertinent socio-economic characteristics, 
such as education, duration of residence, per capita income, etc. We find that there are no 
significant differences between the two comparison groups for all variables, indicating that 
there is no systematic bias in missing responses. Therefore, we conclude that respondents 
with missing information can be dropped from the analysis without generating biased 
results (Osborne, 2013). 
To examine factors determining total TCs incurred by households, ordinary least 
square (OLS) regression is used. Total TCs are computed as the sum of fixed cost TCs (i.e., 
TCs that do not vary with the size of the forest plantation) and variable TCs (i.e., TCs that 
do increase with the size of forest plantation, e.g., the costs of visiting and inspecting 
several large plots are higher compared to that for one small plot). Explanatory variables 
are selected based on previous studies on factors influencing private transactions, taking 
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into account the attributes of the transaction (conditions of asset specificity, level of 
uncertainty, and frequency), nature of the programs, and local context. Table 4.3 presents 
descriptions of the dependent variable and explanatory variables, their descriptive statistics, 
and expected signs. The dependent variable is the reported total TCs of participating in a 
forest plantation program. We only consider TCs for the most recent program, even though 
some households participated in several programs.  
We want to test whether household demographic characteristics influence the level of 
TCs (Mburu et al., 2003; Mettepenningen and Van Huylenbroeck, 2009). The duration of 
residence (RESIDENCE) in the villages is hypothesized to have a positive relationship 
with the level of TCs, since households who are more settled in the village tend to be more 
active in participating in community affairs. Having a male household head 
(MALEHEAD) is expected to entail higher TCs since they have more time to participate in 
programs than female household heads who have to take on more responsibilities in the 
household. Higher educated household heads (EDUC) tend to contribute more to village 
meetings and are thus expected to bear higher TCs. The availability of household labor 
force (ACTIVES) is hypothesized to have a positive impact on TCs since household heads 
are better able to set aside time for participating in the program if there is enough labor in 
the household. The effect of wealth (INCOMEPC) is expected to be the same as the effect 
of labor availability. Social capital indicators (MEMORG and TRUST) are expected to 
have a positive influence on the magnitude of participation (Mburu et al., 2003).  Higher  
levels of trust among villagers may reduce TCs from perceiving less need to be active in 
meetings to protect their individual rights or from spending less time on the decision to 
participate in the program because of a lower prospect of failure (such as from a lower 
incidence of timber stealing among villagers). Falconer (2000), Mettepenningen and Van 
Huylenbroeck (2009), and OECD (2005) indicate that farm size is an important factor 
influencing TCs because of the fixed cost nature of TCs. We hypothesize that farmers with 
larger areas of forest plantation (FORESTAREA) tend to bear higher variable TCs due to 
the need to spend more time for monitoring and enforcement activities. To examine the 
variable cost aspect of TCs, the square of forest land area (FORESTAREASQ) is included 
in the model to test whether total TCs increase or decline at the margin. Along the same 
line, the distance between the forest plot and household (DISTANCE) can increase 
monitoring costs, especially if the frequency of monitoring is high. Farmers with more land 
tenure security (REDBOOK), measured by having a forest land use right certificate, are 
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hypothesized to be more motivated to participate in the program and thus are hypothesized 
to incur higher TCs (Mburu et al., 2003). Farmers' perceptions of the program being 
beneficial may also encourage households to participate more in meetings and thus may 
have a positive relationship with TCs. We also examine if Program 747 (PROG 747) 
entails higher TCs than Program 661 to test the hypothesis that a higher frequency of cash 
distributions leads to higher TCs incurred by farmers. 
Table 4.3 Variables in the regression analysis and their descriptive statistics  
Note: s.d. = standard deviation; N/A = not applicable 
 
Variable Description Mean s.d. Expected sign 
Dependent variable 
TC Total TCs of participating in a 
forest plantation program 
(thousand VND/household) 
196.8 189.9 N/A 
Explanatory variable 
RESIDENCE Duration of  household residence 
in the village  (in years) 38.7 13.6 + 
MALEHEAD Gender of the household head  
(male = 1, female = 0) 0.9 0.2 + 
EDUC If the household head has a high 
school certificate (yes = 1, no = 0) 0.5 0.5 + 
ACTIVES Number of non-disabled adults 
living in the household aged 18-60 3.2 1.2 + 
INCOMEPC Annual household income per 
capita, excluding income from 
forest (in thousand VND) 
6,760.4 7547.8 + 
MEMORG Number of local organizations in 
which any household member is a 
member of 
2.3 1.4 + 
TRUST If the household head trusts others 
in the village in general  
(yes = 1, no = 0) 
0.4 0.5 +/- 
FORESTAREA Area of forest land (square meter) 13,254 13,937 + 
FORESTAREASQ The square of area of forest land 
(million square meter2) 369 924 - 
DISTANCE Walking time from house to forest 
plot (in minutes) 36.9 36.7 + 
REDBOOK If the household has Redbook for 
forest land at the time of plantation 
 (yes = 1, no = 0) 
0.5 0.5 + 
BENEFICIAL If the household head considers 
that the program is beneficial for 
the household  (yes = 1, no = 0) 
0.9 0.3 + 
PROG747 If the household participated in 
Program 747 (yes=1, no=0) 0.7 0.5 +/- 
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4.3.4 Qualitative synthesis  
We rely on qualitative synthesis in our literature review to assist in understanding 
differences in the level of TCs between individual- and community-based participation in 
forest management programs. The method can provide analytical depth and 
contextualization to this particular objective. We used inductive analysis to summarize the 
collective conclusions of the studies reviewed. To complement the findings, key 
stakeholders were interviewed to provide additional perspectives. 
 
4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Farmers' transaction costs of participating in forest plantation programs 
Regarding the extent of asset specificity of forest plantation programs, it is considered that 
forest plantation programs have low asset specificity. The programs have small site and 
temporal specificity since planting forest in our study area can be easily replaced by other 
agricultural activities, such as growing maize or cassava. The programs do not require very 
specific human capital since farmers do not need to invest much time in learning how to 
grow or maintain the forest or attending a training session on the specification and 
technique of forest plantation. In addition, participants are not obliged to invest in any 
specific physical assets to join the program. This low level of asset specificity indicates 
that TCs incurred by farmers will not be high enough to hinder participation by smallholder 
farmers. The level of uncertainty is considered to be moderate since some farmers claimed 
that trees died from extreme weather and some did not receive the full amount of cash 
compensation. Even though the programs have a low frequency of transactions, the level of 
TCs is not deemed to be higher due to this factor since the transactions are not very 
complicated. Moreover, farmers have already learned about how such programs are 
implemented given the history of similar programs in the study area.  
We find that household TCs mainly come from the opportunity cost of time spent on 
activities related to the programs. This can be partially explained by the decentralized 
nature of the programs: the programs were implemented at the village level and therefore 
farmers did not need to spend money and time on transportation. The TCs of participating 
in forest plantation programs are reported in Table 4.4. On average, the total TCs for 
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participating in a forest plantation program is 196,800 VND (USD 9.42)21
                                                            
21 The average exchange rate in 2012 is USD 1= VND 20,899 (Vietcom Bank). 
 per household 
per contract. This is relatively low since it is equivalent to about two days of wage labor 
(the average wage rate is 83,000 VND per day). TCs per hectare are 588,300 VND (USD 
28.15), which is approximately one-tenth of the input costs for maize cultivation (6 million 
VND per hectare). The high standard deviation of TCs, especially for unit TCs, indicates a 
large variation in TCs across households. Overall, there is no significant difference in total 
or per hectare TCs between both programs. TCs from monitoring and enforcement are the 
greatest for both programs, accounting for almost half of all TCs. Thus, the extent of 
farmer involvement is less important in the process of information receiving and decision 
making compared to monitoring activities. Nearly 70% of total TCs arise from fixed costs. 
Variable costs of monitoring and enforcement are about three-fourths of monitoring costs. 
Comparing the two programs,  each of the costs is not significantly different from one 
another, indicating that the transactions are more or less the same for both programs. The 
average benefit from the programs, which is the sum of the value of tree seedlings and cash 
compensation, is about 2.27 million VND (USD 108.7) per household per contract. Total 
TCs account for about one-third of the benefits farmers received from the programs. This is 
rather high compared to other related agricultural policies. For example, the share of 
private TCs per compensation is just 4.5 to 5% in a direct payment scheme to farmers for 
ecological compensation in Switzerland (OECD, 2005). For other agri-environmental 
programs in Europe, this share is 12% (Kumm and Drake, 1998 cited in Falconer, 2000), 
13% (Rørstad et al., 2007), 21.4% (Falconer and Saunders, 2002), and 25.4% 
(Mettepenningen et al., 2009)). This can be explained by the fact that the monetary benefits 
from the two programs examined in our study are relatively low compared to the agri-
environmental programs in developed countries. 
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Table 4.4 Farmers' transaction costs and benefits from forest plantation 
programs  
Category  Program 747 
(n=114) 
Program 661 
(n=48) 
All  
(n=162) 
Mean % of 
fixed 
cost 
Mean % of 
fixed 
cost 
Mean % of 
fixed 
cost 
Search and 
information costs 
 
54.4 
(66.1) 
100 
(0) 
55.7 
(59.1) 
100 
(0) 
54.8 
(63.9) 
100 
(0) 
Application costs 
 
55.7 
(77.8) 
100 
(0) 
54.8 
(53.4) 
100 
(0) 
55.4 
(71.3) 
100 
(0) 
Monitor and 
enforcement costs 
 
83.3 
(99.6) 
26.4 
(24.1) 
83.7 
(98.5) 
24.5 
(26.7) 
83.4 
(99.0) 
25.8 
(24.8) 
Total transaction 
costs 
 
195.9 
(197.4) 
67.9 
(15.7) 
198.9 
(172.8) 
69.0 
(17.7) 
196.8 
(189.9) 
68.3 
(16.3) 
Transaction costs 
per hectare 
 
593.8 
(1,226.4) - 
575.4 
(1,056.6) - 
588.3 
(1,175.4) - 
Benefits of the 
program  
2,403.7 
(5,750.0) - 
1,961.5 
(2,234.7) - 
2,272.7 
(4,970.3) - 
Transaction costs as 
% of benefit 
34.7 
(59.9) - 
40.5 
(63.3) - 
36.4 
(60.8) - 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in parenthesis; n = the number of observations; The 
unit is thousand VND/household/contract. 
 
4.4.2 Determinants of household transaction costs 
Table 4.5 presents the coefficient estimates of the regression analysis. Diagnostics of 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables indicate that there is no collinearity problem 
since the largest variance inflation factor (VIF) of all variables is less than ten (Kutner et 
al., 2005) and the condition number is 23.7 which is less than the cut-off value of 30 
(Belsley et al., 2005). The duration of residence is negative and significant, indicating that 
households with longer establishment in the village are less active in participation in the 
administrative process. This does not support our hypothesis and is also contrary to Mburu 
et al. (2003). We had expected that older household heads would be more involved in 
meetings used to disseminate information about the programs. In the study area, longer 
established households are less active in meetings and spend less time in the application 
procedure compared to younger households. This result may be driven by improved access 
to information that households with longer residence have. They have to spend less time in 
meetings to gather the same amount of information as compared to newer, in-coming 
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households who are less embedded in the political gossip of the village and have less 
information from key informants. Education is positive and significant, which supports our 
hypothesis that more educated households are more active in taking up the role of 
disseminating information and helping clarify regulations or technical explanation to 
others. Gender is negative and significant, rejecting the hypothesis that female household 
head have less time for participation and indicating that female household heads tend to be 
more active and spend more time in transactions. Labor availability has the expected sign 
but is not significant, implying that farmers' time spent in all the processes for program 
participating may not be large enough to sacrifice work on the farm. Income per capita has 
a negative sign, suggesting that wealthier households bear smaller TCs, although the 
variable is not significant. Both social capital indicators are not statistically significant, 
which may be explained by the nature of the programs which require a low level of co-
management from farmers.  
Table 4.5 Estimated coefficients from ordinary least square regression analysis 
Variable Coefficient estimate 
Coefficient P-value 
Dependent variable: Total transaction costs 
RESIDENCE -3.4388*** 0.001 
EDUC 133.4091*** 0.000 
MALEHEAD -147.925*** 0.000 
ACTIVES 0.9651 0.936 
INCOMEPC -0.0009 0.596 
MEMORG -6.9643 0.507 
TRUST 17.4334 0.545 
FORESTAREA 0.0039* 0.098 
FORESTAREASQ -0. 00000004 0.210 
DISTANCE -0.5632 0.111 
REDBOOK -33.9268 0.257 
BENEFICIAL 104.6698*** 0.000 
PROG747 21.946 0.484 
Constant 299.1412*** 0.000 
Observations 162 
F-statistic (14,147) 6.34*** 
R-squared 0.2228 
Note: ***,**, and * indicates significance at 1%, 5% and 10% of error probability, 
respectively. 
 
In addition, since there is a low incidence of conflict among participants in the 
programs, the role of social capital in resolving conflicts is presumably of lower 
importance. The area of planted forest is positive and significant, implying that time spent 
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on monitoring outcomes or enforcing regulations does depend on the size of the planted 
area. The square of forest area has a negative sign, which implies that costs decline at the 
margin; however, the coefficient is not significant so that no effect of this variable could be 
measured. The distance variable is also not significant. Land tenure security has a negative 
sign, but is not significant. The insignificant result might be caused to some extent by the 
fact that some households who do not have a Redbook for their land may join the program 
with the hope and expectation that they may receive the Redbook by participating in the 
program. Farmers' perception that the program is beneficial is positive and significant, 
suggesting that greater expectations of benefiting from the program encourage farmers to 
participate more and hence incur more TCs. Participating in Program 747 is not found to 
incur higher TCs compared to participating in Program 661 since the coefficient is not 
significant. This means that even though Program 747 has a longer period for the whole 
process, farmers did not bear higher TCs. 
4.4.3 Individual versus community participation 
To understand differences in TCs between individual and community-based forest 
management, it is necessary to examine the dynamics of TCs incurred by individual and 
community participation. Adhikari and Lovett (2006) attempt to quantify the extent of TCs 
incurred by households in the context of community forestry management in Nepal. 
According to this study, in general, search and information TCs incurred in community 
meetings at the early stage of the process are largely fixed, including costs associated with 
identification, negotiation with potential members, formation of groups, gathering 
information about the physical attributes of resources, demarcation of resources, and 
capacity building. The TCs of seeking information regarding potential members may be 
high (McDowell and Voelker, 2008). Group establishment in a PES-like scheme in 
Indonesia ranks high in TCs components as observed by Arifin (2006). Similar findings are 
reported by some leaders of community-based forest management in Hoa Binh. Locating 
willing and trustworthy members is time consuming in the beginning. However, Adhikari 
and Lovett (2006) observe that these costs are incurred annually, not just at the beginning 
of the program, due to the dynamic system of a group. The changes are due to the arrival 
and migration of group members, splits of households, and other factors.  
On the other hand, individual participants have the advantage of not having to go 
through such processes. Meshack et al. (2006) report that spending long periods in 
meetings is a typical process of community-based forest management. While individual 
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participants in Hoa Binh spend some time in meetings with implementing officers, 
community-based participants require more time in meetings with group members. 
Transaction incurred during the decision making of agreement and implementation is time-
consuming because all members should understand the process and content of the 
agreement and develop a consensus. It takes time to participate in community meetings in 
order to make decisions related to members’ responsibilities, time schedule, site visits, and 
what to do with the benefits. Members with different sets of preferences require 
considerable negotiation to reach a consensus. It is argued that heterogeneity of group 
members can create obstacles to community resource management because it can make 
communication and cooperation difficult (Agrawal, 2001; Baland and Platteau, 1999; 
Behera and Engel, 2004). On a study of well cooperation in small groups in India, 
Aggarwal (2000) observes that the costs of negotiating are higher in groups where 
heterogeneity among members in endowments and needs is high. Similar finding regarding 
negative effects of group heterogeneity is hypothesized by Zeller (1998) and Sharma and 
Zeller (1997) for repayment rates for loans given to solidarity groups. 
The TCs of monitoring often include costs incurred during the enforcement of an 
agreement, monitoring the forest area, and conflict management. Monitoring is essential 
for institutional maintenance. Community-based forest management has the option of 
delegating and rotating labor of planned activities. The larger the group, the more 
participants are able to divide labor and time. Individual participants do not have this 
option, which increases their TCs. However, inherent in a group- or community-based 
system are conflicts and rule violations among members. In Hoa Binh province, these 
activities consume a considerable amount of time and resources to households participating 
in community-based programs.   
The example in Hoa Binh province highlights the different levels of costs incurred by 
community/group and individual participation. Each has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. It is important to have a comparative measurement of TCs of the two 
participation options. Another important issue to examine is the equality of costs and 
benefits among group members. Some studies have shown that there is inequality, in that 
all members contribute equal amount of time and efforts into community activities, but that 
benefits are unevenly accrued to better-off members (Adhikari and Lovett, 2006; Mburu et 
al., 2003; Meshack et al., 2006).  
 
TRANSACTION COSTS OF FARMERS' PARTICIPATION IN FOREST MANAGEMENT 
78 
4.5 Conclusions 
This study has aimed to measure the level and importance of TCs incurred by households 
who participated in two major forest plantation programs in northwestern Vietnam. 
Measuring actual TCs is helpful to understand whether TCs could potentially act as a 
constraint to program participation. Our study has contributed to the knowledge on TCs 
borne by households in developing countries, since there are a handful of studies that have 
empirically analyzed actual TCs. The results found that monitoring and enforcement costs 
are higher than information searching and application activity costs. Average TCs are 
about 200,000 VND (USD 10) per household per contract, which is equivalent to two days 
of wage labor. Thus, TCs are not likely to be a constraint for participation in forest 
management programs like PES, given the same level of farmer involvement and 
monitoring mechanisms as in past programs. The relatively low TCs are also reflected by 
the program’s low level of asset specificity. It is expected that farmers will bear higher TCs 
from PES schemes due to greater program complexity and longer periods of 
implementation. We found a large variation in TCs among households, but there is no 
evidence that poorer farmers bear the burden of TCs more than wealthier farmers. Even 
though the absolute value of TCs is low, the share of TCs to program benefits is 35.7%, 
which is relatively high compared to other programs in developed countries with more 
complex programs. This implies that the payout ratio of the programs is quite low, and 
could be increased for the programs to be more widely adopted and to have better 
efficiency. Hence, rather than aiming to reduce TCs, balancing the level of TCs with 
benefits to enhance the overall attractiveness of afforestation programs for smallholder 
farmers is considered to be a more appropriate agenda for policy improvement. 
Our findings on the determinants of TCs reveal several insignificant and unexpected 
effects given that Mburu et al. (2003) claims that factors influencing the level of private 
TCs depend on local conditions. The case study of forest plantation programs underscores 
the importance of analyzing how programs are actually implemented when identifying 
determinants of private TCs. Overall, we find that household characteristics do not have a 
major role in determining differences in TCs among participants. The household head's 
education, gender, and perception towards the programs have large effects on the 
magnitude of TCs. Strengthening social capital may not be effective in influencing the 
level of TCs if the program is based on a top-down approach with less collaboration from 
participants regarding program implementation and where there is no significant conflict 
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among participants and authorities. The policy design should pay particular attention to 
trade-offs between strict monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and the level of TCs 
incurred by farmers. 
Although it was not possible to empirically measure TCs of farmers engaged in 
community-based forest management, our study identifies interesting results on the matter. 
Implications from this study could be further developed by expanding the survey and 
gathering data from participants in community-based forest management. Further research 
on the comparison of TCs associated with community- and individual-based management 
systems will have significant implications for the management of PES project and balance 
the growing bias towards community-based systems.  
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CHAPTER 5  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
During the last two decades, Vietnam has transitioned from state-managed forestry to 
village- and household- managed forestry to develop livelihoods and improve the 
environment. Several measures have been implemented to alleviate forest degradation, 
including forest land allocation and forest plantation programs. The current and growing 
international interest of civil society and governments in the acknowledgement of forest 
environmental services has become mainstream: Vietnam is among several countries who 
appreciate the need for payment or compensation to local communities for forest values 
through the PES mechanism. Encouraging local households to participate as environmental 
services providers is very crucial to achieve successful PES policies. This dissertation aims 
to understand farmers' behavior on forest management and their experiences with forest 
policies that are necessary for determining effective incentives that can bring about 
changes in behavior related to forest conservation practice in a mountainous area. In spite 
of a number of studies examining the impacts of forest policies in the northern Vietnam, 
there is limited research on incentive and forest management at the household level. A 
household level analysis could provide insightful information and policy implications for 
PES, especially for improved participation and cost efficiency.  
The research is mainly based on comprehensive data on forest production, 
socioeconomic indicators, and government participation in afforestation programs which 
were collected from 300 representative households in the mountainous area of Da Bac 
district, Hoa Binh Province in northwestern Vietnam. The first study, contained in Chapter 
2, on household adoption of forest plantation examines why farmers planted forest under 
the current incentive scheme taking several aspects of forest plantation into account. 
Results from a gross margin analysis indicate that planting forest yields far less profit 
compared to growing a cash crop like maize, even when accounting for monetary support 
received from the government. Government policies, namely, forest land allocation and 
forest plantation programs, are the main reasons why the majority of households still plant 
forest, even though it is less profitable. From a benefit viewpoint, planting forest is another 
way to generate income whereby farmers can reap benefits regularly from non-timber 
forest products. Results from a Heckman sample selection estimation indicate that more 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
85 
educated and wealthier households invest less in forest. These results contradict those in 
other adoption studies, which tend to find that more knowledge and money lead to more 
environmentally-friendly activities. This finding supports the above argument that farmers 
may view forests as an income generating business without considering its environmental 
or non-monetary benefits and that better educated farmers may be more able to realize that 
participating in afforestation programs implies losing money compared to growing maize.  
Even though support from the government can encourage farmers to plant forest, the 
regression results revealed that providing tree seedlings and a rather low level of cash 
compensation under the previous afforestation programs did not effectively encourage 
farmers to plant more trees or to replant the trees that were destroyed or did not survive 
from extreme weather. The implication of these results for PES schemes is that a higher 
monetary incentive is needed to make planting forest attractive in a sustainable manner. 
The findings also highlight another issue of forest plantation programs: Despite the fact 
that some transaction costs of participation are fixed, given that the benefit is paid on an 
area basis only, wealthier households receive more support because they own more land. 
This underlines the strong linkage between land allocation and forest conservation policies, 
especially in mountainous areas which suffer from land scarcity. Lack of formal land 
security is not found to hinder investments in forests, which contradicts expectations and 
the literature. However, this unexpected finding may be explained by the behavior of 
households who do not hold formal land security. Such households may expect that their 
participation will later facilitate the recognition of plot ownership by the local government. 
Due to the conditions in mountainous areas where forest plots are located outside of the 
village, the results indicate that the degree of trust among villagers that the planted forests 
are secured is an important factor promoting forest plantation. 
The finding from the first study on adoption of forest plantation indicates that previous 
incentive schemes are not able to effectively foster forest plantation, even when the 
purpose of plantation is commercial. The second objective of the study estimates how 
much money farmers are willing to accept (WTA) to conserve more forest in comparison 
to their current practices. It sheds light on the cost efficiency and preferences of local 
farmers on forest conservation programs. The hypothetical baseline assumes that every 
household is allocated a plot of land of the same size and conditions. This assumption is 
made to avoid bias from land holding inequality and to explore the potential demand of 
forest conservation. The use of the stated preference method allows the examination of 
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farmers’ preferences beyond their current practice. Choice experiments estimate the WTA 
planting and conserving forest and tests the hypothesis of whether the subsidy amount is 
the only factor that farmers consider when deciding to enter a forest conservation contract 
with the government. Results show that even though the pecuniary aspects of forests – 
namely, the subsidy amount and volume of allowable timber harvest – are the most 
important factors of the program, farmers consider other aspects as well. It is also 
noteworthy that the freedom to choose the tree species appears to be attractive for farmers 
who want to participate in forest plantation programs. This implies that the flexibility of 
the program according to local conditions can attract more potential participants. Another 
finding is that the degree of the willingness to participate varies among households. 
Households with a higher share of non-farm income and that have experienced receiving 
support for forest plantation tend to have more interest in the program. On the other hand, 
households who have better market access to sell forest products indicate less interest in 
the program since they prefer to harvest all of the timber without any restrictions from the 
government.  
Results from the WTA estimation shows that on average, farmers are willing to pay to 
participate in a contract in which they can exploit half of the timber with minimum care 
and weak regulations. On the other hand, stricter forest conservation contracts demand a 
subsidy that is greater than that offered in previous afforestation programs and in the pilot 
PFES policy. However, the result from the comparative analysis reveals that the WTA is 
far lower than forgone income from cash crops cultivation. This indicates that encouraging 
farmers to plant and conserve forest is not as costly as the opportunity cost of land. Even 
though local farmers tend to associate forests with monetary benefits, the results indicate 
that given the well-functioning land allocation policy, there is room for stricter forest 
conservation programs as long as farmers are adequately compensated. 
The final part of the dissertation analyzes the level and importance of TCs incurred by 
households who participated in past forest plantation programs. Measuring the actual TCs 
is helpful to understand whether TCs could potentially act as a constraint to participation in 
future programs. Results indicate that TCs incurred by households are not likely to be a 
constraint for participating in future PES programs if farmer involvement and monitoring 
mechanisms remain the same. There is no evidence that poorer farmers bear a higher 
burden of TCs than wealthier ones. However, it is expected that farmers will face higher 
TCs from a PES scheme due to its greater complexity and longer implementation period. 
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Monitoring and enforcement costs are highest, indicating that farmers are more involved in 
monitoring activities rather than searching for information and applying. Despite the low 
absolute level of TCs, they are equivalent to more than one-third of program benefits, 
which is quite high compared to other agricultural or conservation programs in developed 
countries where the nature of the programs are more complex.  
The regression analysis on determinants of TCs reveals that the household head's 
education, gender, and perception towards afforestation programs have large and 
significant effects on the magnitude of TCs. Social capital is insignificant for explaining 
participation in the two programs which were implemented in a top-down fashion with 
little community involvement. Therefore, strengthening social capital may not be effective 
in influencing the level of TCs if the program is based on a top-down approach which 
involves less collaboration from participants regarding program implementation and no 
significant conflict among participants and authorities. Future policy design should pay 
attention to the trade-offs between a strict monitoring and enforcement mechanism and the 
level of TCs incurred by farmers.  
As previous afforestation programs are based on a top-down approach, this 
dissertation contributes to the limited research on the potential demand of and farmers' 
preferences in forest management. The analysis provides policy implications for a PES 
scheme where voluntary participation and cost efficiency are crucial for its success. This 
dissertation also contributes to a small but growing body of literature on choice experiment 
application to the field of forest conservation schemes in developing countries. In addition, 
the analysis of TCs borne by households under the forest management scheme can 
contribute to the limited number of studies that have empirically analyzed private TCs, 
particularly in developing countries. 
A successful transition from a top-down approach to a market-based conservation 
policy such as a PES scheme calls for the need to understand household behavior and 
preferences under the local context to ensure effective participation and sustainable 
management. The results of our research underline the inadequacy of the previous forest 
plantation subsidy and recommend that given the situation of limited land, higher 
incentives are needed to make forest conservation attractive in the PES scheme. The 
findings from the choice experiment study reveal that depending on the type of contract, 
there exists a potential demand for forest conservation with a small subsidy or even without 
a subsidy if additional land is allocated. This suggests that policymakers should integrate 
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land allocation policy with PES policy to achieve cost efficiency. In addition, the CE study 
indicates that different types of households have different degrees of willingness to 
participate in the forest conservation programs. A policy recommendation to increase the 
participation rate is to target the PES campaign to households who have less interest in 
forest conservation, including households whose livelihoods depend mainly on agricultural 
production, who have not previously joined forest programs either due to their ineligibility 
or distrust in local government authorities, and who have limited market access due to poor 
road conditions. This study finds that the degree of security of the planted forest is a 
critical factor for the decision to plant forest since the location of forest plots are usually far 
away from the village and therefore difficult to protect against illegal logging. 
Strengthening the monitoring mechanism or introducing insurance to reduce the risk of 
plantation failure is recommended as another option to promote participation. 
This dissertation reveals that the amount of incentives that farmers are willing to 
accept to plant and conserve forest instead of engaging in farming activities is higher than 
previous subsidies. In mountainous areas where ethnic minorities still live in poverty, a 
higher subsidy is expected to achieve both environmental conservation and poverty 
alleviation outcomes. Nevertheless, a critical question arises as to whether a higher subsidy 
can lead to sustainable household forest management. This question should be addressed 
by future research by examining longitudinal data on household livelihood and forest 
management under a PES scheme. It has not been possible to empirically measure TCs of 
farmers engaged in community-based forest management, where such information would 
provide interesting results on this matter. The implications on this study could be 
developed further by expanding the survey and gathering data from participants of 
community-based forest management. Further research on the comparison of TCs 
associated with community and individual management is recommended to provide 
information to policymakers and researchers. Such research may contribute to the 
realization that community-based systems can create high transaction costs with little 
benefit for smallholder farmers if they are not implemented well.  
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Appendix A: Baseline household questionnaire, Da Bac District,           
Hoa Binh Province, Vietnam  
 
1. Identification 
 
1.1. Date of Interview :  
   
1.2. Commune name     
 
1.3. Village name  
 
1.4. Household identification number 
(please write this number on all pages) 
 
1.5. Name of the Household head 
 
1.6. Name of respondents   
  (Name and ID)  
 
1.7 Cell phone number of respondent (or household head)     
 
1.8 Ethnic group of the household head  
Kinh……………………………… 1 
Muong…………………………… 2 
Dao………………………………. 3 
Tay………………………………. 4 
Thai……………………………… 5 
Other (specify)…………………... 6 
 
1.9 Did your household resettle in this area?                            Local people=1, Resettled =2 
 
1.10 In which year was your household established ?                   year  
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
1.11 Interviewer name and code 
 
1.12 Supervisor name and code 
 
1.13 Date checked by supervisor                  _____/_____/______ 
 
Signature of the supervisor 
Note to the interviewer
Day 
 : A household consist of all people who live under the same roof, 
eat from the same pot and share expenditures. A person is not considered as a member if 
she spent more than 3 months away in the past 12 months.
Month Year 
 Code 2011 
APPENDIX A 
101 
2. Demographic profile 
 
 
ID 
2.1 
Name 
2.2 
Sex 
 
 
1= Male 
2= Female 
2.3 
Age 
 
 
2.4 
Relation to 
household head 
 
(code 1) 
2.5 
Marital Status 
 
 
 
(code 2) 
2.6 
Can read/ 
write 
 
 
(code 3) 
2.7 
Highest class 
passed 
 
 
(code 4) 
2.8 
If  > 6 years old  
 
Occupation in the last 12 months 
(code 5) 
Primary Secondary 
1          
2          
3          
4          
5          
6          
7          
8          
9          
10          
11          
Code 1 Relation to hh head   Code 2 Marital status   Code 3 Read/write   Code 4 Education   Code 5 Occupation  
Household head................... 
Spouse ................................ 
Son or daughter or son in 
law or daughter in law......... 
Father or mother.................. 
Grandparent.........................  
Grandchild .......................... 
Brother or sister .................. 
Other relative ...................... 
Other non relative................ 
1 
2 
 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
 Single ……………………………... 
Married with spouse permanently 
present in the household…………...  
Married with the spouse migrant...... 
Widow / widower ............................ 
Divorced / separated......................... 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
5 
 Cannot read or write.  
Can read only............  
Can read and write....  
Cannot speak ........... 
national language...... 
1 
2 
3 
 
4 
 Never attended school or 
 not yet attend school............  
Attended school but did not 
finish primary school............  
Primary degree .................... 
Secondary degree................. 
Vocational diploma ............. 
High school certificate.......... 
3 year-college degree...........  
Bachelor (university) degree  
Master and more.................. 
 
0 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
 Self employed in 
agriculture .......................... 
Self employed in non-farm 
enterprise ............................ 
Student/pupile .................... 
Government employee ...... 
Salaried worker in non 
agriculture .......................... 
Daily agricultural labor ...... 
Daily non agricultural labor 
Domestic worker ................ 
Military service................... 
 
1 
 
2 
3 
4 
 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
            Unemployed  
                 Looking for a job........... 10 
                 Doing household chore.. 11 
                 Retired........................... 12 
                 Disable to work............. 13 
                 Leisure........................... 14 
                                                                 APPEN
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3. Housing and utility 
 Questions Response 
3.1 What type of toilet does your household have? 
   Flush toilet with septic tank/sewage pipe................................. 
   Double-vault compost latrine, or toilet directly over water..... 
   No toilet or other type............................................................... 
 
1 
2 
3 
3.2 What type of exterior walls does the house have? (Q3.2 - 3.4 Just observe, do not have to ask) 
 
Leaves, branches…................................... 
Bamboo…................................................. 
Wood…..................................................... 
Galvanized iron…..................................... 
Earth…...................................................... 
Brick, stone…........................................... 
Concrete…................................................ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.3 What type of roofing material is used in your house? 
Concrete, cement...................................... 
Tile............................................................ 
Galvanized iron......................................... 
Wood, bamboo.......................................... 
Straw, leaves............................................. 
Canvas, tar paper....................................... 
Fibre cement.............................................. 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.4  What type of flooring does the main room have? 
 
Earth…...................................................... 
Bamboo…................................................. 
Wood…..................................................... 
Concrete…................................................ 
Brick…...................................................... 
Concrete with additional covering…........ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
 3.5 What type of cooking fuel source is primarily used? 
 Leaves/ grass/ rice husks/ stubble/ straw / thatch stems........ 
Wood...................................................................................... 
Coal/ charcoal......................................................................... 
Kerosene................................................................................. 
Biogas..................................................................................... 
Bottled gas.............................................................................. 
Electricity................................................................................ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3.6 What is your primary source of drinking water?  
 River, lake, spring, pond............................................ 
Rain water.................................................................. 
Public well – open..................................................... 
Public well – sealed with pump................................. 
Public tap................................................................... 
Well in residence yard – open.................................. 
Well in residence yard – sealed with pump.............. 
Outside tap................................................................. 
Inside tap.................................................................... 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
3.7 Do you have any of the following utilities for your household ?  
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a. Piped water 
 
b. Electricity 
 
c. Telephone 
 
d. Mobile (cell phone) 
 
Yes…………………..1 
No……………………2 
 
Note: For electricity, piped 
water 
If YES,  
+ Own 
production...................3 
+ Connected to national 
authorities...................4 
3.8 How much did your household pay per month for each utility? 
 
 
 
a. Piped water 
 
b. Electricity 
 
c. Telephone 
 
d. Mobile (cell phone) 
 
                                ‘000 VND 
 
                                ‘000 VND 
 
                                ‘000 VND 
 
                                ‘000 VND 
 
4.  Assets and credit 
 
4.1 Assets owned (count all members of your household) 
Assets type and code 4.1.1. 
Number owned 
4.1.2. 
Total resale value at the current market price (‘000 VND) 
1. Buffalo   
2. Pig   
3. Goat   
4. Cattle   
5. Dog   
6. Motor tiller   
7. Plough   
8. Ploughing machine   
9. Motorbike   
10.Car/Pick-up truck   
11.TV&Video player   
 
4.2 Credit constraint 
 
 
Formal organization 
(VBARD, VBSP, mass 
organization) 
 
 
Yes=1, No=2 
Informal sources 
(private moneylender, 
shopkeeper, fertilizer dealer, 
relative, friend/neighbor, 
etc.) 
 
Yes=1, No=2 
4.2.1 Did any member in your household apply 
for a loan from [source] in the last 12 months? 
         
 
 
4.2.2 If your household applied, was the loan 
granted? 
         
 
 
APPENDIX A 
104 
4.2.3 If the loan was granted, was the household 
granted the same loan amount as requested? 
  
4.2.4 If ‘No’, how many % you granted from the 
amount you requested? 
% % 
Note: if household granted loan more than one source of loan, put the lowest percentage of 
loan granted. 
 
4.2.5 If household members did not attempt to borrow ( ‘No’ in Q.4.2.1), what are the main 
reasons? (Please rank 3 most important reasons, write ‘0’ if household does not have 3 
reasons) 
 
We did not need credit.............................................................................................. 1 
Do not have enough information on how to get loan…………………………………….. 2 
Do not know anyone to borrow from/the relatives don’t have money to lend…………… 3 
The banks/the lenders are too far........................................................................................ 4 
The procedure is too complicated………………………………………………………… 5 
No guarantor/no mortgage………………………………………………………………... 6 
We dislike any borrowing………………………………………………………………… 7 
We would like to have applied but did not apply because  
We felt that we would be rejected because of our characteristics............................. 
 
8 
Don't want to borrow because the credit is not big enough……………………….. 9 
Interest is too high..................................................................................................... 10 
We believe that the government/informal source will not give any loan................. 11 
We are afraid that we cannot afford to pay back...................................................... 12 
We didn’t attempt to borrow because we have already borrowed........................... 13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Potential credit access 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 
Currently, 
how much 
does your 
household 
owe to…. 
4.3.2 
If you are not 
currently 
borrowing from 
this source, is it 
possible for you to 
borrow from..... 
 
Yes=1 
No=2 (next row) 
4.3.3 
In case of an 
emergency (food 
shortage, 
sickness), what is 
maximum 
amount could 
your household 
borrow from… 
4.3.4 
For income 
generating 
investment 
purposes, what 
is maximum 
amount could 
your 
household 
borrow now 
from… 
‘000 dong  ‘000 dong ‘000 dong 
1. VBARD     
2. VBSP     
3. Mass organization      
4. Informal credit group (Ho Hui)      
5. Money lender (in sum)     
6. Shopkeeper/trader (in sum)     
7. Relatives (in sum)     
8. Friends/Neighbour (in sum)     
1st 
2nd 
3rd 
rank formal informal
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5. Food security and staple food self-sufficiency 
5.1 Did your household experience food shortage in the last 12 months? 
 Often true (happen more than 180 days).................... 
Sometimes true (happen less than 180 days).............. 
Never true (never happen).......................................... 
1 
2 
3 go to Q5.4 
5.2 In the last 12 months, did you or other members of the household ever cut the size of your meal or skip 
meals because there was not enough money for food/or before the harvest. 
 Yes.............................................................................. 
No............................................................................... 
1 
2 (go to  Q5.4) 
5.3 Ask only if 5.2= Yes. How often did this happen? 
               More than 180 days ................................................... 
              Less than 180 days but more than 60 days................ 
              Less than 60 days....................................................... 
1 
2 
3 
5.4 “We could not afford to eat balanced meals” i.e. the main meals consists of rice and vegetables only 
(without any animal protein). Was that often, sometimes or never true in the last 12 months. 
 Often true (happen more than 180 days).................... 
Sometimes true (happen less than 180 days).............. 
Never true (never happen).......................................... 
1 
2 
3 
Staple food self-sufficiency  
 
 
Rice  
(all kinds) 
Maize Cassava Sweet 
potato 
5.5 How many months in the last 12 months did 
your household consume rice, maize, cassava, and 
sweet potato that you grew or produced at home? 
If the farmer doesn't grow or consume any types of 
these crops, skip to 5.8               
 
 
 
 
      #month 
         
 
 
 
#month 
         
 
 
 
#month 
    
 
 
 
 #month 
 5.6 How much did you consume in a typical month?  kg kg       kg          Kg 
5.7 What was the value of [food] you consumed in a 
typical month on your own production? 
 
                                           ‘000 VND 
 5.8 How many kilograms of rice do you usually buy 
in one time for home consumption  
                                             Kg 
 
 5.9 And how long can you consume this rice          #month 
5.10 How much do you usually spend on rice per 
one time of purchase? 
                                                     
                                                    ‘000 VND 
 
 
6.  Social capital and access to services and safety nets 
 
6.1 What are the problems/concerns (on economic, social, environment, etc.) that your 
household is facing at the moment? Please rank up to 3 most important problems. 
Do not have enough money to buy food or basic needs (including housing)........ 1 
Decreasing yield of crop production...................................................................... 2 
Increasing price of fertilizer and other inputs........................................................ 3 
Lowering price of agricultural products................................................................ 4 
Do not have enough land for farming.................................................................... 5 
Do not have enough credits/money to invest on farming, livestock, forest etc..... 6 
Problems in farm production (bad weather, disease,etc.)...................................... 7 
Others (please specify)........................................................................................... 8 
 
 
 
 
 
1st 
 2
nd  
3rd  
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Interviewer: Do not read the choices. Write ‘0’ if in the remaining box if the respondent does 
not mention 3 problems. In case of no problem/concern at all, write ‘0’ for every box. 
 
6.2 In case of shock (flood, loss of income, divorce, etc.) or problem such as the ones  you 
mentioned above, is it easy or not to ask for help (any kind of help) from different persons of 
your network ? 
 
 Relatives Friends/ Neighbour Village head Mass organisation 
very easy=1, 
easy= 2,  
difficult= 3,  
very difficult=4 
    
     (Do not know=0) 
 
6.3 Membership in association, group or organization 
We would like to ask questions about the associations in which you or household members 
participate and has membership, including communist party, mass organisation or any other 
kinds of organisation. 
 
(interviewer, ask the question for each member over 15
 
,  to be sure to enter in the table below 
all the organisation the household participates in. If a member has membership in several 
organizations, then enter his ID several time in the first column and fill a line for each 
organization he participates in) 
6.3.1 
ID of hh member (use 
ID from family roster) 
6.3.2 
Type of 
organization 
 
 
(code 1) 
6.3.3 
Degree of 
participation 
 
 
(code 2) 
6.3.4 
During the past 12 months, did you make 
contributions to this organization... 
 
Yes  (in cash or in kind)..........1 
No............................................2 
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6.4 How many people do you or any member of your household know personally and who 
work (in decision making position) in the following organisations at all administrative levels 
(i.e. commune, district, province)? (please record only two way relationships) 
Type of organisation 
 
6.4.1 
How many do you 
know? 
6.4.2 
How many are relatives of 
the household head or the 
spouse? 
6.4.3  
Have you ever asked for 
help from these people 
that you know? 
Yes=1 
No=2 
Not applicable=0 
Communist party     
People’s committee    
Women Union    
Fatherlands front union    
State Forest Enterprise    
Others (specify)…………    
 
 
 
6.5 Please tell me if in general you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
Strongly agree................... 1 
Agree................................. 2 
Disagree............................ 3 
Strongly disagree............... 4 
 
 
 
Code 1 type of organization Code 2 degree of 
participation 
Mass organisation 
Farmer Union............................... 1 
Women Union.............................. 2 
Youth Union................................. 3 
Veteran Union.............................. 4 
Fatherland Front........................... 5 
Eldery Union................................ 6 
 
NGO providing services 
NGO providing extension 
service...................................... 7 
NGO providing microfinance 
services..................................... 8 
Other NGO (family planning, health 
care, school education, and 
services for any other social 
sector)............................ 9 
VBSP Credit group...................... 10 
Other formal Credit group........... 11 
Other informal credit/finance 
group......................................... 12 
Environmental group................... 13 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agriculture/trade organization 
Extension club.................................   
Cooperative.....................................   
Traders association..........................   
Professional association...................  
Trade union......................................  
Hobby club…..................................   
 
Political organization 
Communist Party.............................  
People’s committee.........................   
Ethnic committee.............................   
 
Other local groups/organization 
Religious group...............................   
Cultural association.........................   
Parent group....................................   
School committee............................   
Health committee............................   
Sport group......................................  
Police in the commune....................  
 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
 
 
20 
21 
22 
 
 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
 
Leader.................................1 
Follow the regulations of  
Organization.......................2 
Give help from time to 
time.................................3 
Not active...........................4 
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Interviewer, read slowly the following statement to the respondent:  
 
6.5.1 Most people in this village are basically honest and can be trusted. 
 
6.5.2 People are interested only in their own welfare. 
 
6.5.3  If my household has a problem, there is always someone to help me. 
 
6.5.4 If you loose an animal (pig, poultry, or goat) someone in the village  
would help look for it or would return it to you 
 
6.6 How would you qualify your access to government services listed below on a scale from 
1 to 5 ? 
(1= do not have access, 2= poor access, 3= fair access, 4= good access,5= very good access) 
For education service, if household doesn't have children  and don't know about school,  
write 0 
 
6.6.1 Education/schools  6.6.7 Water distribution for household use  
6.6.2 Health services/clinic  6.6.8 Water distribution for irrigation  
6.6.3 Housing assistance  6.6.9 Agricultural extension  
6.6.4 Job training/employment  6.6.10 Sanitation service  
6.6.5 Credit/finance  6.6.11 Justice/ conflict resolution  
6.6.6 Transportation (road)  6.6.12 Security/ police services  
 
6.7 Here are listed some services/programs offered by the government, 
Name of the service 6.7.1 
Do you know 
about it ? 
 
 
 
 
1= Yes 
2= No>> next row 
6.7.2 
If yes, have you 
received such 
support or 
participate in the 
program in the 
last 5 years 
(since 2007)? 
 
Yes = write the 
year you receive 
or participate 
(can be several 
years if received 
more than one) 
No = 0 
6.7.3 
Amount received 
in the past 12 
months ? 
 
 
 
 
 
‘000 VND  
 
6.7.4 
If 6.7.2 = 
‘No’.What are the 
reason why you 
did not receive 
support or 
participate in the 
program? 
(multiple reasons 
possible) 
 
 
code 1 
1. Access to loan with 
low interest rate 
    
2. Education tuition 
exemption and 
reduction/ free 
textbooks 
    
3. Support for 
agricultural production 
    
4. Cash transfer 
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5.Resettlement program 
    
6.Reforestation 
program 
    
7.Training program 
  Content of 
training 
 
8. Support for 
electricity 
    
 
Code 1: Reasons for not receiving support or not participating government programs 
Did not fullfil the criteria/requirement of the program.................................................................... 1 
Do not have interest to participate in the program/do not need the support.................................... 2 
Do not have time.............................................................................................................................. 3 
Has applied but rejected by the authority/has applied but still waiting........................................... 4 
Village head did not choose my household..................................................................................... 5 
Receive the support long time ago................................................................................................... 6 
Do not have this program/support in the village/commune............................................................. 7 
Do not know how to apply............................................................................................................... 8 
 
 
6.8 Did your household receive poor certificate from commune in........? 
 
Yes.........................................................1 
No..........................................................2 
Do not know..........................................3 
 
 
7. Land allocation and land tenure 
7.1 Does your household have forestry land? 
            Yes...................... 1  
 No....................... 2  (go to Q. 7.6) 
 
7.2 Has your household received land use certificate (Red Book, Green Book) for forestry 
land?  
 Yes...................... 1  
 No....................... 2  
 
7.3 If ‘Yes’, when did you receive it?.........................Year  
 
7.4 If ‘No’, have your household applied for land use certificate for forestry land? 
Yes.....................1                                        
No.......................2   
7.5 If No, what are the main reasons, why you haven’t applied for the certificate?  (multiple 
answer possible) 
Do not want forestry land......................................................................1 
It would be difficult to obtain certificate...............................................2 
The commune has no land to allocate, do not want to waste ti.............3 
We have applied but are not accepted by commune.............................4 
Do not know..........................................................................................5 
Fee is too expensive, we cannot afford.................................................6 
Commune hasn’t allocated land yet/no need to apply...........................7 
The plot is too small that it is not worth to apply for RB......................8 
…2007?  
…2008?  
…2009?  
…2010?  
…2011?  
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For household who has land use certificate either for agricultural land or forestry land. 
7.6  Do you think there will be a reallocation of land in your village before the end of the 
Use Right period. 
 
It is very likely to occur....................1 
It is likely to occur............................2 
It is unlikely to occur........................3 
It will definitely not occur................4 
 
7.7  What do you think would happen to your land after the end of use right period? 
 
            I still can use the same land (but perhaps need to extend certificate).......1 
 I will have to register for the new plot of land..........................................2 
 It is very hard to tell..................................................................................3 
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7.8 Information at plot level  
 
 
P 
L 
O 
T 
 
 I 
D 
General information Acquisition Land use 
Type of 
plot 
 
code1 
Area 
 
 
m2 
 or 
ha 
 
Use right 
 
with RB=1 
w/o RB=2 
 
Distance 
Plot-house in 
walking 
minutes 
Slope 
 
 
 
  
 
code 
slope 
 
How do you 
assess 
quality of 
soil? 
 
 
Code2 
When did you 
first acquire 
this land? 
 
 
 
    Year 
Is your 
household 
using this 
land now? 
 
 
Code3 
If you leased 
this plot out, 
how much 
would you 
receive? 
 
‘000 
VND/year 
How did you use it in 
2011? 
 
 
 
Code 4 
How did 
you use it 
in 10 years 
ago? 
 
 
 
Code4 
Why do 
you change 
the land 
use? 
 
 
 
 
Code5 
How can you rank 
your plots on profit 
that you earned 
from each plot? 
(only agricultural 
land) 
1= highest profit 
2= second highest 
3= third highest 
.......           Crop1  Crop2   
             
1               
2               
3               
4               
5               
6               
7               
8               
Code 1 Type of plot Code 2 Soil quality Code 4 Land Use  Code 5 
Protection forest............................ 1 
Planted forest................................         2 
Perennial tree land........................ 3 
Paddy field irrigated..................... 4 
Paddy field non irrigated.............. 5 
Other farming land irrigated.......... 6 
Other farming land non irrigated... 7 
Fish pond....................................... 8 
Land for livestock.......................... 9 
Residential land.............................       10 
Barren land....................................       11 
Home vegetable garden.................       12 
Plant growth: 
Vigorous........................................ 1 
Normal........................................... 2 
Stunted.......................................... 3 
 
Yes................................................ 1 
Code 3 Plot management 
No,  
Plot is leased out (fixed rent)......2 
Share tenancy............................. 3 
Mortgaged out............................ 4 
Given away, lent out (no 
payment).................................... 5 
Borrowing land..............................6 
Renting land...................................7 
Paddy rice............. 1 
Upland Rice.......... 2 
Maize.................... 3 
Cassava................. 4 
Arrow root.............       5 
Sweet Potato......... 6 
Sugar Cane........... 7 
Soybeans...............        8 
Peanut.................. 9 
Sesame..................      10 
Vegetables............       11 
Acacia....................      12 
Bamboo.................      13 
Eucalyptus..............     14 
Mango.............................. 15 
Longan.............................. 16 
Other fruit tree.................. 17 
Fish pond.......................... 18 
Plot not managed by hh.... 19 
Fallow.................................   20 
Melia (Chinaberry)........... 21 
Maize+cassava+bamboo....    22 
Other tree............................   23 
 
Receive government support...............  1 
New crop is more profitable................. 2 
Rotate crop to improve soil quality...... 3 
Lack of money to plant trees/crops...... 4 
No water............................................... 5 
There is buyer/market for this crop...... 6 
Trees died............................................. 7 
No labour.............................................. 8 
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8.  Agricultural production 
 
8.1 Net profit of crops at household level in one season in 2010 
 
Amount and expenses on 
input use 
Unit Paddy 
Rice 
(ask for 
season 1) 
Upland 
Rice 
Maize 
(ask for 
season 1) 
Cassava Arrow 
root 
8.1.1 What was the total 
cultivated
m2 
 area in one season?  
     
8.1.2 How many crop seasons 
did you grow? 
Number      
Costs 
8.1.3 Seedling 
What kind of seed did you 
use?  
Name of seed 1      
What is the quantity you 
used?  
Kg      
Amount you bought? Kg      
What is the price? (if buying) ‘000 VND/kg      
What kind of seed did you 
use? 
Name of seed 2      
What is the quantity you 
used?  
Kg      
Amount you bought? Kg      
What is the price? (if buying) ‘000 VND/kg      
8.1.4 Fertilizer 
1. NPK -Volume Kg      
-Price ‘000 VND/kg      
 -When did 
you pay? 
Immediately=1 
After buying=2 
     
2. Urea -Volume Kg      
-Price ‘000 VND/kg      
 -When did 
you pay? 
Immediately=1 
After buying=2 
     
3. Potassium 
(kali) 
-Volume Kg      
-Price ‘000 VND/kg      
 -When did 
you pay? 
Immediately=1 
After buying=2 
     
4. Phosphate -Volume Kg      
-Price ‘000 VND/kg      
 -When did 
you pay? 
Immediately=1 
After buying=2 
     
5.Organic 
fertilizer 
-Volume Kg      
-Price ‘000 VND/kg      
8.1.5 Pesticide (including 
hiring sprayer) 
‘000 VND      
8.1.6  Labor  (notice that man-day= number of days * number of people) 
- Land 
preparation 
Did you 
use 
machine? 
Yes=1,No=2      
Househol
d labor 
Man-day      
Hired Man-day      
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labor 
- Growing Househol
d labor 
Man-day      
Hired 
labor 
Man-day      
- Weeding  Househol
d labor 
Man-day      
Hired 
labor 
Man-day      
- Harvesting 
(including 
moving back to 
your house) 
Did you 
use 
machine? 
Yes=1,No=2      
Househol
d labor 
Man-day      
 Hired 
labor  
Man-day      
8.1.7How much did you pay 
for hired labor 
 (in all processes) 
‘000 VND      
8.1.8 How much did you pay 
for renting land? 
‘000 
VND/season 
     
8.1.9 What was the total cost 
for hired machinery/transport  
for all the crops that you 
grew? 
‘000 VND  
8.1.10 How much was the 
interest paid for the loan used 
for crop cultivation? (also 
estimate for in-kind payment) 
‘000 VND  
 Revenue (For rice, use unhusked quantity) 
8.1.11 What was the total 
quantity of crop did you 
harvest in one season? 
Kg      
8.1.12 Quantity used for 
home consumption 
%      
8.1.13 Quantity sold %      
8.1.14 Average selling price   ‘000 VND/kg      
In case of cassava and arrow 
root, if farmer cannot answer 
8.1.11-.8.1.14 
8.1.15 How much did you get 
from selling your product? 
‘000 VND      
 
9. Forest protection and forest production 
Ask only households who are currently managing forest land (including both of forest 
protection and forest production). If households are not managing any forest land go to 
Q 9.18 
 
9.1 Do you participate in forest protection? 
* For forest protection activity 
                   Yes = 1 
                   No  = 2  (go to question 9.11) 
9.2 Which year did you start the activity of forest protection?............................. (4 digits) 
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9.3 How many hectares of protection forest do you 
participate?.............................................. (ha) 
9.4 How many people are in your group?.............................................persons 
9.5 How much do you receive to protect the forest from 
government?........................................(‘000VND/ha/month) 
9.6 How much did you get from non-timber products in the last 12 months? 
Non-timber products Quantity (kg) Consumption (kg) Sold (‘000VND) 
9.6.1 Bamboo shoot    
9.6.2 Mushroom    
9.6.3 Jew’s ear    
9.6.4 Medicines    
9.6.5 Fuelwood    
9.6.6 Others (specify)...... 
......................................... 
   
 
9.7 Why did you participate in forest protection? 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
9.8 What are the three most difficulties/concerns you are facing in forest protection? 
           Payment for forest protection is too low.............................1 
           Unsafety because of illegal logging....................................2 
           I have to spend too much time to deal with officers...........3  
           (for signing contract,  officers come to monitor, etc.) 
           Other (specify)....................................................................4 
 
9.9 How many days per month does your household spend on forest 
protecti......................days 
 
9.11 What is the total forest area your household have?............................(ha) 
* For forest production 
 
9.12  Do you make a contract with a company? 
          Yes =1  
           No =2 
 
9.13 Costs and revenue from forest production (if the farmer sign a contract with the 
company, please skip information about the price of seedling and fertilizer) 
 
Information Unit/code Acacia Bamboo Eucalyptus 
Establishment period (within the first 
three years) 
    
9.13.1 Seedling     
How many trees (including extra growing)? number    
When did you grow? time    
Price of seedlings ‘000 VND    
9.13.2 Fertilizer     
Type 1 of fertilizer name    
+ Volume Kg    
1st 
 2
nd  
3rd  
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+ Price  ‘000 VND/kg    
Type 2 of fertilizer name    
+ Volume Kg    
+ Price  ‘000 VND/kg    
Type 3 of fertilizer name    
+ Volume Kg    
+ Price  ‘000 VND/kg    
9.13.3 Herbicides (including hiring 
sprayer) 
‘000 VND    
9.13.4  Labor (from land preparation to 
harvest) 
    
-Land preparation Household 
labor 
Man-day    
Hired labor Man-day    
-Growing Household 
labor 
Man-day    
Hired labor Man-day    
- Weedling  Household 
labor 
Man-day    
 Hired labor Man-day    
9.13.5 What was the other costs that you 
spent on the establishment? 
‘000 VND    
Operating cost (since 4th year)     
9.13.6 How often do you maintain the 
forest? (weeding,…) 
Time/year    
9.13.7 How many man-days do your 
household member work on each time? 
Man-day    
9.13.8 How many man-days of hired labor? Man-day    
9.13.9 What was the total cost for hired 
labour? 
‘000 VND    
9.13.10What was the other costs that you 
spent on maintaining forest? 
‘000 VND    
Harvesting (if household has not harvested timber yet, go to ask about non-timber products from question 
9.13.18) 
9.13.11 How many man-days did your 
household member spend for harvesting (if 
needed) 
Man-day    
9.13.12 How many man-days of hired 
labor? 
Man-day    
9.13.13 Cost of hiring labor ‘000VND    
9.13.14 How much did you get from selling 
timber? (1st sale) 
‘000 VND    
9.13.15 When is that? year    
9.13.16 How much did you get from selling 
timber? (2nd sale) 
‘000 VND    
9.13.17 When is that? year    
9.13.18 How much did you get from selling non-timber products in one year, on the average? 
1. Bamboo shoot a. Total harvested quantity Kg  
b. Quantity sold Kg  
c. Average selling price ‘000VND/kg  
2.Mushroom a. Total harvested quantity Kg  
b. Quantity sold Kg  
c. Average selling price ‘000VND/kg  
3. Jew’s ear a. Total harvested quantity Kg  
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b. Quantity sold Kg  
c. Average selling price ‘000VND/kg  
4. Medicinal plant a. Total harvested quantity Kg  
b. Quantity sold Kg  
c. Average selling price ‘000VND/kg  
5. Fuel wood a. Total harvested quantity Kg  
b. Quantity sold Kg  
c. Average selling price ‘000VND/kg  
6. Other (specify)........ 
................................... 
................................... 
a. Total harvested quantity Kg  
b. Quantity sold Kg  
c. Average selling price ‘000VND/kg  
9.13.19 Have you received any subsidies/supports from the 
government? 
Cash=1 
Loan=2 
Rice=3 
Seedling=4 
Fertilizer=5 
No=6 
 
 
9.14 List three most difficulties you are facing now in forest production? (for example: 
production side, marketing side, and others) 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
9.15 What are other benefits you obtain from forest plantation? 
 
 Improving soil quality...............................................................................................1 
 Trees provide shade and beauty................................................................................2 
              Forest is good for the environment...........................................................................3  
  (e.g. help improving air quality, reduce soil erosion, improve water quality 
downstream etc.) 
              Forest can be considered a saving in case of emergencies or saving for children...4 
 Other (specify)..........................................................................................................5 
 
 
9.16 What are the reasons why you chose to plant forest? Please rank the three most 
important reasons. 
Hope to earn more income from forestry/use forest products  
for home consumption............................................................ 
 
1 
Government provides support................................................ 2 
Forestry does not need much labor......................................... 3 
Want to have more land/want to keep the land...................... 4 
Forest is good for soil protection/soil 
improvement/increasing water quantity................................. 
 
5 
Other (specify)........................................................................ 6 
 
 
 
9.17 What do you want from following actors in order to support your forest production? 
1st 
 2
nd  
3rd  
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- From central government (higher than provincial level) 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
- From local government (province, district and commune level) 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
- From mass organizations and associations 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
Ask households who are not currently conducting forest plantation. 
 
9.18 Have you ever thought about planting forest? If no, why is that? If yes, what is 
preventing you from adopting forest plantation? 
 
No Forestry is not profitable 1 
 Do not have land to plant forest 2 
 Do not have enough labor/time to grow/maintain the forest 3 
 Do not know how to do it 4 
 It is too long to get benefits 5 
 Do not have money/credit for initial investment 6 
 It is too risky  7 
 Other (specify) 8 
Yes, but... Do not have land to plant forest 9 
 Do not have enough labor/time to grow/maintain the forest 10 
 Do not know how to do it 11 
 It is too long to get benefits 12 
 Do not have money/credit for initial investment 13 
 It is too risky e.g. the tree may die before harvesting 14 
 Other (specify) 15 
 
10. Household income in the last 12 months 
 
 How much did all the member of household earn 
from the following sources in the last 12 months? 
(i.e. for crop production: gross revenue – production 
costs) 
‘000 VND 
1.Vegetables  
2. Other crops (cotton, sugar cane, etc.): 
specify________________________________  
3. Fruit  
4. Livestock Ask only revenue 
5. Fisheries (Capture fish in the nature) Ask only revenue 
6. Aquaculture Ask only revenue 
1st 
 2
nd  
3rd  
APPENDIX A 
118 
 
11. Household expenditure in the last 12 months 
 
11.1 Food expenditure 
 
Item Response 
Food at home 
11.1.1 How much do you spend on average to purchase food to consume at home in one month? 
Rice 
..............................‘000 VND 
Food eaten with rice 
.............................................................................‘000 VND 
11.1.2 How many months in the last 12 months did your household consume 
food (rice, maize, cassava, sweet potato, vegetable, live stock, fruit, etc) that 
you grew or produced at home? 
#month 
11.1.3 What was the value of the food you consumed in a typical month 
from your own production? (approximately) 
‘000 VND 
Food outside 
11.1.4 How many times in a month #time  that your household usually have a meal 
outside home e.g. at the restaurant? (don't count special occasions, e.g. 
wedding) 
11.1.5 How much do you spend for a typical meal? ‘000 VND 
 
11.2 Non-Food expenditure 
How much did your household spend on the following items during the last 12 months? 
Item Value (‘000 VND) 
11.2.1 Clothing, including shoes, bags, jewellery  
11.2.2 Personal care items and services (soap, shampoo, toothpaste, 
cosmetics, detergent, haircut 
 
11.2.3 Leisure, entertainment and sport (travel, cinema, cultural event, sport 
equipment, toys,  etc.) 
 
11.2.4 Tax (income tax, tax on a living plot, housing and property tax, etc.)  
11.2.5 Insurance (auto, property, health, etc.)  
11.2. 6 Payment to wedding and funeral   
11.2.7 Others  
 
11.3 Durable goods 
How much did you household spend on the following item in total during the last 12 
months? 
 
 ‘000 VND 
 
7. Agricultural trade  
8. Agricultural wage  
9. Non agricultural wage  
10. Non agricultural business (incl. revenue from 
lending land)  
11. Remittances  
12. Government aid  
13. Others (specify)................................  
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Read the list of durable goods one by one and take note if household bought the item. 
 
Category Example 
Furniture  Bed, cupboard, wall clock, sofa, table etc. 
Electrical appliances Electric fan, iron, radio, telephone, mobile phone, computer, video/dvd 
player, camera, television, satellite dish, rice cooker, refrigerators, washing 
machine, air conditioner, water heater, etc. 
Vehicle Bicycle, motorcycle, car, etc. 
Others Cooking pots, stove, sewing machine, water filter, etc. 
 
11.4 Remittances 
11.4.1 During the last 12 months, how much have all member of your household provided 
money or goods to person who are not members of your household?  For example, for 
relatives living elsewhere, child support or alimony, or to friends and neighbors, for 
holidays, Tet….? 
 
 ‘000 VND 
11.4.2 In case you also send any food or other goods, what it the total approximate value of 
the food or goods that you sent ? 
 
 ‘000 VND 
 
11.5 Education expenditure 
During the last 12 months, how much has your household spent on education (fees, 
uniforms, textbooks, or other materials) for any of its members? 
 
 ‘000 VND 
 
11.6 Health expenditure 
During the last 12 months, how much has your household spent on health, such as fees for 
visits to doctors, health clinics, or traditional practitioners, or to pay for medicines or other 
materials? 
 
 ‘000 VND 
 
12. Perceptions on sustainable livelihood 
 
12.1 Are you satisfied with the current living condition? and the reason why? If ‘Do not 
know’, write ‘99’. 
                                                        Yes =1             
     No=2 
because………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
12.2 How do you think your living condition would be in the next 20 years? 
 It would be the same like this….1 
 It would be better………………2 
 It would be worse ……………...3 
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Reasons why do you think so 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..........
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
12.3 How do you think your community would be in the next 20 years? 
 It would be the same like this….1 
 It would be better………………2 
 It would be worse ……………...3 
 
Reasons why do you think so 
…………………………………………………………………………………………..........
.................................................................................................................................................. 
 
12.4 What kind of supports do you need from the government in order to improve the 
livelihood in your community? 
………………………………………………………………………………………….......... 
 
I would like to ask some questions concerning forest plantation in your community.  
 
12.5 Do you think forest is important for your livelihood? For example, it would benefit 
agriculture production and environment?  
 Yes……………1 
 No…………….2 
 
12.6 Do you know that planting forest will also provide benefits to other people especially 
the hydropower dam at the downstream will get benefits from improving water flow and 
decreasing in sedimentation? 
                  Yes, I know…………….1 
                  No, I don’t know……….2 
 
12.7  Do you agree that the forest area in the community should be increased ? 
                  Agree……………………….1 
                  Disagree…………………….2 
 
If ‘Disagree’, could you give the 
reason………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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Appendix B: The second household survey, Da Bac district,                        
Hoa Binh Province, Vietnam 2012 
Note for enumerator: Enumerator shall ask ONLY the household head or spouse who are 
in the decision making position. If the household head or spouse are not available, the 
enumerator shall proceed to the next household or wait until the respondent is available. 
1. Identification 
 
1.1. Date of Interview :  
 
 
       
1.2. Commune name     
 
1.3. Village name  
 
1.4. Household identication number                        
 
1.5. Name of the Household head                                                                                               
(enumerator confirm whether it is the same household from the first survey ) 
 
1.6. Name of respondent  
 
1.7 Gender of respondent:    Male = 1, Female = 2 
 
1.8 Cellphone number of  respondent   
 
1.9 Interviewer name and code 
 
 
2. Choice experiment on voluntary forest plantation program 
 
2.1. Does your household currently own planted forest/forestry land? 
         Yes = 1      No = 2 
 
2.2 Have you planted forest so far? 
      Yes, in my own forestry land………………………………………………..1 
      Yes, in my own land but not in forestry land………………………………..2 
      Yes, but not in my own land/in the rental land……………………….……..3 
      No…………………………………………………………………………....4  
Day Month Year 
 
Code   1 2 
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Note to enumerator: Ask EVERY household, no matter what they have planted forest land or 
not 
2.3 Question about the importance of forest plantation program characteristics (Enumerator 
uses buttons or peanuts to help farmer to answer this question) 
We want you to think about what is important for the successful forest plantation program. In 
this case, successful forest plantation program means that the program will provide benefit to 
farmer and at the same time help farmer to maintain good quality forest which would also 
have environmental benefits such as reducing soil erosion and land slide problems. We are not 
talking about your past experience. You may think about the new program that you never had 
before. 
Instruction 
We propose five aspects of the forest plantation program for you to consider as follow. 
Aspect Rank Point 
(1) Opportunity to use and sell forest products for income (example of 
forest products: commercial wood, bamboo shoot, mushroom, etc) 
  
(2)  Frequency of subsidy payment  
(you may prefer receiving the money more often, for example, every 3 
months or every 6 months) 
  
(3)  Amount of cash that government provides to support forest 
production/conservation 
  
(4)  Monitoring and punishment if the rules are violated   
(5)  Forest must be maintained more often by farmer  to make sure that 
the forest is healthy and no one cut the trees illegally 
  
Total - 100 
 
First, please consider which attribute is the most important. Then, which one is the second 
most important and continue until the least important (put number 5). 
After the farmer has ranked all the attributes, the enumerator shall confirm again for the 
ranking. 
Next, tell the farmer that if they had 100 points to assign to these five aspects to demonstrate 
their relative importance of successful/desirable forest plantation program, how would he/she 
do that? 
It does not mean that every aspect needs to have points assigned to it. If the farmer thinks the 
attribute is not important to them at all, the point would be 0. 
Enumerator shall confirm whether the points correspond with the ranking or not. If not, ask the 
farmer again for clarification or check if there are misunderstanding. 
 
Questions on choices 
 
For the next questions, we want you to imagine the following hypothetical situations. The 
situation is not for real and since we are researchers from the university, not the government 
officers, we cannot promise that anything will happen after this research. However, we would 
like you to think about the questions seriously because the result from this research might 
benefit the process of policy making in the future.  
Instruction  
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Suppose the government will allocate 1 hectare of land in the sloppy land located about 1 km 
from your house where you can decide what to do with this land, that is, you can choose to 
plant forest OR plant crops like cassava or maize OR any other activities.  
Hypothetical scenario 
Note for enumerator: remind the farmer that government provides ONLY land NOT inputs 
(like seedlings, fertilizer or anything else) 
Please imagine this situation and answer the following questions. 
 
2.4 What would you like to do with this land? (choose only one option that you would like to 
do the most) 
Plant cash crops (like maize, cassava, etc.)………….……..……. 1 
Plant wood trees…………………………………………….…… 2 
Plant perennial crops (like tea, fruit trees, etc)…………………... 3 
Lease to somebody else to earn money…………………………. 4 
Other activities (specify)………………………………………… 5 
 
2.5 Could you also give the reason for the answer in 2.4?        
Want to earn more income………………………………….........   1 
Can use the products for home consumption or feeding livestock 2 
To prevent soil erosion................................................................... 3 
Do not have labor/time to grow anything……………….............. 4 
Do not have capital/credit to grow anything…………….............. 5 
Others (specify)………………………………………...........…... 6 
Next, suppose the government also wants to initiate the program to support forest plantation. 
The program is not compulsory. You can decide whether your household wants to participate 
or not. 
The details of the program are as follows. 
1. The government will be responsible for all the establishment cost of the forest plantation 
(including seedlings, fertilizer and labor cost) if you choose to participate in the program. 
2. If you decide to participate, the program would have the duration of 10 years. 
3. You can choose the choice of tree  that is suitable to local conditions. 
What we want you to do is relatively simple. We will show you 8 cards that describe possible 
contracts, which are contract A and contact B and the choice not to participate in any 
contracts. We want you to evaluate each scenario and tell us which contract would you be 
most likely to participate?  
 Keep in mind that you have a full right to use the land for something else if you decide not to 
participate in any of the contracts. 
There are no right and wrong answers. We are not from the government, please feel free 
to state your opinion. 
2.6 Before we show you the cards, if you were to participate in the program, what kind of tree 
would you like to grow? 
Bamboo................................. 1 
Acacia................................... 2 
Ironwood (Lim).................... 3 
Bo de..................................... 4 
Mo........................................ 5 
Others (specify).................... 6 
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2.7 Choice answers  
Code for choice card.................................................. 
No. of 
card 
Contract A Contract 
B 
Not participate Degree of certainty of 
answers 
1=least certain, 5 = most 
certain 
Why did you choose this 
choice? 
Card 1      
Card 2      
Card 3      
Card 4      
Card 5      
Card 6      
Card 7      
Card 8      
 
Note for interviewers: If the respondent chose 'contract' for any of the 8 cards, go to Q 2.10 
 
2.8 In case you choose ‘I do not want any contracts for all scenarios’, please tell us why do 
you NOT want any contract? 
      The subsidy amount is too low………………………..1        (ask Q 2.9) 
      (Answer)………………………………………..……..2      
 
2. 9 In case you answer ‘the subsidy amount is too low’, what is the minimum amount that you 
are willing to accept to plant forest?...............................................’000 vnd per year 
 
2.10 Evaluate the questionnaire with the help of the following statements. 
Question Answer 
 
2.10.1 Amount of time to think about the answer (not 
include the time of explaining) 
 
Less than 20 minutes = 1 
20- 30 minutes = 2 
More than 30 minutes = 3 
2.10.2 Did you understand the scenario and choice 
tasks 
 
 
 
1= did not understand,  5 = fully understand 
2.10.3 Do you think the scenario and choice tasks are 
feasible (or likely to happen in the future)?  
 
 
1= impossible,  5 =  most likely to happen 
2.10.4 If you think the scenario is impossible, could 
you give the reason? 
 
............................................................................... 
................................................................................. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
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For household who own  forest land, ask Q2.11. For household who does not have the 
forest land, ask Q2.13 
2.11 If you chose to participate in any of the contract, are you willing to make such contracts 
with government on your own forest land (in case you can decide how much land you would 
like to allocate under the contract)? 
            Yes = 1,           No = 2  
 
2.12 Could you explain why? (Ask for both 'Yes' and 'No' answer) 
To earn more income/can harvest products for home consumption………. 1 
We have grown something (e.g. bamboo) already, we do not want to clear 
the land to grow something else.................................................................... 
2 
Others (specify)………………................................................................…. 3 
 
2.13 Since your household does not have the forest land, are you willing to use your cropland 
for planting forest under the contract (in case you can decide how much land you would like to 
allocate under the contract)? 
            Yes=1,           No=2  
 
2.14 Could you explain why? (Ask for both 'Yes' and 'No' answer) 
We have to grow food crop for home consumption……………………….. 1 
Land is fully cultivated, cannot grow forest............……………………….. 2 
Others (specify)………………................................................................…. 3 
 
3. Forest production activities (Ask only household who has planted forest, if the 
household has not planted forest, go to section 4) 
Costs and revenue from forest production  
Information Unit/code Acacia Bamboo Other tree 
(specify) 
Establishment period (within the first three years)  
Seedling     
3.1 How many trees (including extra 
growing)? 
number    
3.2 Area planted Sq.m    
3.3 When did you grow? year    
3.4 How many minutes walk from your house 
to your forest plot? or how many kilometer? 
minute    
3.5 Price of seedlings that the farmer actually 
paid 
‘000 
VND/seedlings 
   
3.6 Did you plant for est before or after 
receiving Redbook? 
Before = 1 
After = 2 
   
3.7 Have you planted any cash crop (e.g. 
cassava) in the same plot with trees? 
Yes, but only at 
the beginning=1 
Yes, we are 
planting it 
continuously=2 
No=3 
   
Fertilizer     
3.8 Name of fertilizer name    
3.9 Volume of fertilizer used Kg    
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3.10 Price of fertilizer ‘000 VND/kg    
3.11 Herbicides (including hiring sprayer) ‘000 VND    
Labor     
3.12 Land preparation at the 
beginning 
Household 
labor 
Man-day    
Hired labor Man-day    
3.13 Growing at the 
beginning 
Household 
labor 
Man-day    
Hired labor Man-day    
3.14 Cleaning the weed 
(count for the first three 
years) 
Household 
labor 
Man-day    
Hired labor Man-day    
3.15 What was the other costs that you spent 
on the first 3 years? 
‘000 VND    
Operating cost (since 4th year)     
3.16 How often do you maintain the forest? 
(weedling, monitoring the forest for stolen 
timber,..) 
Time/year    
3.17 How many man-days do your household 
members work on each time for maintaining 
the forest? 
Man-day    
Harvesting  
3.18 Have you harvested the timber so far? Yes = 1,  
No = 2 
   
3.19 How many man-days did your household 
member spend for harvesting (if needed) 
Man-day    
3.20 How many man-days of hired labor for 
harvesting? 
Man-day    
3.21 Cost of hiring labor for harvesting ‘000VND    
3.22 How much did you get from selling the 
timber for the last time?  
‘000 VND    
3.23 In which year? year    
3.24 [For bamboo], how much did you get on 
average from selling the timber per one time 
of harvesting?  
‘000 VND    
3.25 [For bamboo], how often do you harvest 
the timber? 
Per year    
3. 26[For bamboo], how many trees did you 
cut per typical month? 
tree    
3.27 Have you received any supports from the 
government to plant these trees? (e.g. cash, 
free seedlings, cheap seedlings, loan, etc.) 
- No = 0 
- Prog 661 = 1 
- Government 
program but not 
661 = 2 
-Friend/Neighbor 
= 3 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
127 
4. Participation in the government programs  
4.1 Do you know about any government program that has supported forest plantation or/and 
forest protection? (Explain: government has provided free seedlings, fertilizer ,cash and so on 
to support tree plantation or provided cash to protect forest) 
                    
                       Yes=1,           No=2 (go to section 5) 
 
4.2 If ‘Yes’, could you tell the name of program that you know? Note: if the respondent does 
not know the name of the program,  write down the explanation that he/she knows. 
Name of the program Since when have you know about it? 
(Year or important events) 
1  
2  
3  
4  
 
4.3 Have you ever participated in any programs that has supported forest plantation or/and 
forest protection before? 
      Yes = 1,           No = 2 (go to section 5) 
 
Details of the program 
participated 
Program 
661 
(forest 
production) 
Program 
747 
Program 
135 
Program 
327 
Forest  
protection 
as a group 
If you don't 
know the 
name of the 
program, 
please 
explain what 
did you 
receive 
4.4 Do you think the program was 
successful or beneficial for you? 
 Yes=1,           No=2 
      
4.5 What did you NOT LIKE 
the most 
1. Not enough financial support 
about the program? 
2. Government provided 
inappropriate seedling which was 
not suitable to local conditions 
3. Did not have police/ranger to 
monitor the forest to prevent 
stealing timber/illegal logging 
4.Did not have enough 
information on how to grow or 
maintain forest 
5. Others (specify)......... 
      
4.6 What did you LIKE the most 
about the program? 
1. Receiving money/materials 
from government 
2. Obtaining Redbook for the land 
3. Able to harvest timber for home 
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consumption or selling 
4. Others (specify).............. 
 
4.7 What kind of supports did you get from program 661 (forest production) or the program you 
mentioned that you do not know the name? Ask for the whole period of receiving the support (At least 
the household received seedlings and cash!!) 
Year Type of support 
Cash=1 
Seedlings=2 
Fertilizer=3 
Rice=4 
Others (specify) 
How much did you receive? 
1.   
2.   
3.   
 
5. Transaction costs of participation in forest plantation programs 
5.1 When did you sign the contract under the program 661 (put the vietnamese name of the 
contract)? ..............................................Year 
5.2 I would like to ask you about activities you have done related to program 661  
Activity Time spent 
(estimate by hour.  
1day = 8 hours) 
Cost incurred 
(e.g. travel 
cost) 
BEFORE signing the contract 
How did you know about the program ? 
5.2.1 Village meeting to inform about program 661   
5.2.2 Making decision (discussion with family, 
neighbor, etc.) 
  
5.2.3 Other activities before signing the contract 
(e.g. preparing documents) 
(specify activities).................................................. 
  
5.2.4 Contract signing  
(have to go to commune office? If it is far from 
house, did farmer have cost for travelling? How 
long did it take to sign contract?) 
  
AFTER signing the contract 
5.2.5 Learning about the technical design of 
plantation with the government officers 
  
5.2.6 Receiving the seedlings 
(where did you receive the seedlings? did you have 
to go far away?) 
  
5.2.7 Attend to officers for coming to check the 
plot for the growing period 
  
(1) when finished removing weed or shrub   
(2) when finished land preparation   
(3) when finished growing the trees   
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5.2.8 Attend to officers for coming to check the 
plot for the maintenance period (after the first 
month) 
  
(1) How many times did the officer come to check 
your plot after growing until receiving 
payment?............................................................time 
  
(2) How long did it take to attend to officer per 
time of visit? including your travel time to the plot. 
  
5.2.9 Receiving the payment 
(including the time of officer checking the plot 
before paying. where did you receive the money?) 
  
5.2.10 Other activities after receiving payment 
(Has the officer come to check your plot after 
receiving money?) 
  
 
5.2.11 Overall, were you satisfied with the activities you have interacted with the 
government officers under 661 program (as mentioned in above table)? 
                                     
                           1= least satisfied,  5 = most satisfied 
5.2.12 If you were not satisfied with any activities, please specify what they are and why you 
were not satisfied. 
Activities you were not satisfied  
....................................................................................................................................................... 
Why?............................................................................................................................................. 
 
6. Food security and road access  
Note to enumerator: Ask for the normal situation not the situation when they had bad weather 
or natural disaster. 
Question Code Doi Moi  
(1986) 
10 years ago 
(2002) 
Past 12 
months 
6.1 Does your household have 
enough rice to eat all year long? 
 
Yes = 1, 
No =2 
   
6.2 Does your household have 
enough chicken or pork (luxury 
food) for your celebration on 
wedding or Tet holidays? 
Yes = 1, 
No =2 
   
6.3 Were you and your 
household members hungry for 
at least 1 month out of 12 
months 
Yes = 1, 
No =2 
   
6.4 Did your household have 
access to the main road that the 
truck can come?  
No access=0 
Poor access=1 
Very good 
access=5 
   
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C: Gross margin analysis of forest plantation 
 
In our sample, 266 households have planted forest which account for 88.7% of all households. 
Among households who have planted forest, 170 households (63.3%) have harvested timber 
products at least one time. Regarding costs and benefits of bamboo plantation, the price per 
tree is 20,000 VND. One stem of bamboo multiplies to 25 stems after 3 years of growing. 
Generally, farmer harvests bamboo shoot on the fourth year of growing and one group of 
bamboo can produce 2 kg of bamboo shoot per year. The price of bamboo shoot is 3,800 VND 
per kg. For acacia, timber can be harvested after 7 years and the price depends on the 
perimeter of the timber. Timber with a perimeter of more than 50 cm is estimated to account 
for half of the plantation and another half is smaller timber. The price of the big and small 
timber is approximately 600,000 VND per m3 and 400,000 VND per m3 respectively. It is 
calculated that for the timber length of 5 meter, 10 trees would account for 1 m3 for big size 
timber and 25 trees would account for 1 m3 for small size timber. The market price of 1,000 
VND is used for the value of firewood. Value of support for forest is estimated from the 
average value of seeds and cash provided to farmers.  
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